By Daniel L. Robertson and Arie Feltman-Frank, Associate Attorneys

On December 15, 2022, the California Occupational Safety & Health Standards Board (Board) adopted COVID-19 prevention non-emergency  workplace standards in a 6-1 vote. The standards will be in Title 8, Division 1, Chapter 4, Subchapter 7, of California’s regulations and, if approved by the Office of Administrative Law, will take effect in January 2023. The standards will sunset two years following their effective date, except for certain recordkeeping requirements that will remain in effect for three years.

Subchapter 7, titled “General Industry Safety Orders,” establishes minimum occupational safety and health standards that generally apply to all places of employment in California. In response to the COVID-19 outbreak, the Board previously approved emergency temporary standards (ETS) on COVID-19 prevention starting in November 2020, which were revised in June 2017, January 2022, and May 2022. However, the May 2022 ETS is set to expire on December 31, 2022.

Notable portions of the adopted non-emergency standards are summarized below.

• Prevention Program: Employers are no longer required to maintain a standalone COVID-19 Prevention Plan but must still address COVID-19 in their written Injury and Illness Prevention Programs or other standalone documents that include measures to address COVID-19 transmission in the workplace. Further, employers are required to review applicable state and local health department guidance when determining measures to prevent and address COVID-19 transmission.
  
  
• Screening and Exclusion: Employers will no longer have to perform daily screenings of employees, whether through questionnaires or otherwise. Employees instead are encouraged to report their own symptoms and stay home if ill. Time periods for exclusion have been shortened, and employees who are deemed close contacts do not necessarily have to be excluded if they test negative and meet certain other requirements.
  
  
• Employee Accommodations: In perhaps the most contested development, employers will no longer have to provide paid time off to infected employees or close contacts ordered to stay home. Instead, those employees must rely on other existing benefits if they are unable to work due to COVID-19 infection or isolation. Employers must continue to provide respirators to employees upon requests, and employees must still wear masks at work for at least 5 days if exposed. Companies experiencing outbreaks, defined as three or more cases in a 14-day period, must make testing available to exposed employees immediately and provide tests twice a week.
  
  
• Notice and Timing: Notice rules now only require notice to close contacts “as soon as possible” while simplifying the notice contents. However, employers should remain mindful of similar applicable rules that currently still require that the notice be given within one business day. Outbreaks no longer require “no new cases” to conclude and instead only require “one or fewer” new cases over a two-week period. A major outbreak, defined as 20 cases in a 30-day period, must be reported to the California Division of Occupational Safety and Health. While there will no longer be a requirement to report outbreaks to local public health agencies, employers should still be mindful of other local standards for reporting.
  
  
• Close Contacts and Testing: The “close contact” definition continues to follow that used by the California Department of Public Health (CDPH), which defines a close contact depending on the size of the workspace and regardless of the use of face coverings.
  
  
  • A close contact occurs in an indoor workspace with floor space of 400,000 cubic feet or less when someone shares the same indoor airspace as an infected person for a cumulative total of 15 minutes or more over a 24-hour period during the infectious period.
  • A close contact occurs for larger indoor workspaces when someone is within 6 feet of the infected person for a cumulative total of 15 minutes or more during a 24-hour period during the infectious period.

Notably, this standard affirmatively states that any future amendments to the CDPH definition will take precedent over the Board’s adopted definition. Employers must also follow applicable CDPH guidance to improve ventilation and filtration. Further, employers will now only have to make testing available at no cost to employees who are considered close contacts of an infected coworker, versus previous requirements that testing be made available to all symptomatic employees.

• Infectious Period: This definition also tracks that of CDPH and states that a person is considered infectious for two days prior to symptoms and 10 days after unless they test negative from the fifth day onward. For an asymptomatic person, these same timeframes apply based on the date of the first positive test.

The Board’s news release can be read here and the text of the adopted standards is available here. We will continue to monitor COVID-19 and other workplace health and safety developments in the Corporate Environmental Lawyer.

As Gay Sigel walked through the doors at One IBM Plaza in Chicago, fresh out of law school and ready to launch her career as an attorney at Jenner & Block, she could not have envisioned the tremendous impact she would have on her clients, her colleagues, and her community over the next 39 years. Gay started her legal career as a general litigator, but Gay and Bob Graham were quick to realize how the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) was creating a new and exciting area of the law that was increasingly important for the firm’s clients: Environmental Law. Gay and Bob saw an opportunity to specialize in that area and founded Jenner & Block’s Environmental Health and Safety Practice. Gay has been an ever-present force in the EHS community ever since.

Over her 39-year career at Jenner & Block, Gay has worked on some of the most significant environmental cases in the country for clients ranging from global Fortune 50 corporations to environmental organizations to individuals. For more than a decade, she taught environmental law at Northwestern University, helping shape the next generation of environmental lawyers. She has worked on issues of global impact, like those affecting climate change, issues of local impact like those related to combined sewer overflows to the Chicago River, and issues of individual impact like those involving employee safety and health. No matter the subject, Gay has always been a tireless advocate for her clients. We often describe her as the Energizer Bunny of environmental lawyers: she is the hardest working attorney we have ever met. 

Gay’s true passion is to make this world a better, more just place for others. So, throughout her career as an environmental, health, and safety lawyer, Gay has devoted her time, energy, and emotional resources to innumerable pro bono cases and charitable and advocacy organizations. Her pro bono work includes successfully protecting asylum applicants, defending criminal cases, asserting parental rights, and defending arts organizations in OSHA matters. Among her many civic endeavors, Gay was a founding member of the AIDS Legal Council of Chicago (n/k/a as the Legal Council for Health Justice); she was the Secretary and active member of the Board of Directors for the Chicago Foundation for Women; and she was on the Board of the New Israel Fund. Gay continues to promote justice wherever she sees injustice, including as an advocate for women’s rights, particularly for women’s reproductive rights.

In both her environmental, health, and safety practice as well as her pro bono and charitable work, Gay is a tremendous mentor to younger (and even older) attorneys. She is curious, committed, exacting, fearless, and demanding (though more of herself than of others). We all give Gay much credit for making us the lawyers we are today.

Gay is leaving Jenner & Block to embark on her next adventure. She is returning to public service as Assistant Corporation Counsel Supervisor with the City of Chicago's Department of Law where she will be focusing on environmental issues. The City and its residents will be well served as Gay will bring her vast experience and unparalleled energy to work tirelessly to protect the City and its environment. We will miss working with and learning from Gay on a daily basis, but we look forward to seeing the great things she will accomplish for the City of Chicago. We know we speak for the entire firm as we wish Gay bon voyage—we will miss you! 

Steven M. Siros, Allison A. Torrence, Andi S. Kenney

By Allison A. Torrence and Tatjana Vujic

On the final day of its 2022 term, the Supreme Court issued its highly-anticipated opinion in the case of West Virginia v. EPA, 579 U.S. __ (2022), addressing EPA’s authority to regulate greenhouse gases (“GHGs”) under the Clean Air Act (“CAA”), but having much broader implications for the authority of all administrative agencies. The opinion signals a significant shift in the standards used to review administrative actions. Chief Justice Roberts wrote the opinion for the Court, joined by Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett. Justice Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Alito joined, and Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Breyer and Sotomayor joined.

Major Questions Doctrine Has its Day in the Sun

In a significant yet long-predicted move, the six-to-three opinion rejected EPA’s approach to regulating GHG emissions under the Obama Administration’s Clean Power Plan (“CPP”), under which EPA intended to regulate existing coal-and natural-gas-fired power plants pursuant to Section 111(d) of the CAA.[1] Of greater significance, however, the Court took the opportunity to fully embrace the “major questions doctrine,” a standard several Justices had endorsed but which had not yet been fully unveiled by the Court. The doctrine now requires agencies, in instances in which a regulation will have major economic and political consequences, to point to clear statutory language showing congressional authorization for the power claimed by the agency. In particular, in “extraordinary cases” in which “the history and the breadth of the authority that the agency has asserted and the economic and political significance of that assertion” is significant or major, courts have “a reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress meant to confer such authority.” Slip op. at 17. In such extraordinary cases, the Court will not read into ambiguous statutory text authority that is not clearly spelled out. Instead, “something more than a merely plausible textual basis for the agency action is necessary”; specifically, “[t]he agency instead must point to clear congressional authorization for the power it claims.” Slip op. at 19.

As support for the adoption and application of the major questions doctrine, the Court cited numerous cases in which agency authority was curtailed because of extraordinary circumstances that it determined required a clear congressional directive. The cases included the FDA’s attempt to regulate tobacco (FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000), the CDC’s effort to issue an eviction moratorium during the COVID-19 pandemic (Alabama Assn. of Realtors v. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 594 U.S. __ (2021)), EPA’s assertion of permitting authority over millions of small sources like hotels and office buildings (Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302 (2014)), and OSHA’s endeavor to require 84 million Americans either obtain a COVID-19 vaccine or undergo weekly testing (National Federation of Independent Business v. OSHA, 595 U.S. __ (2021)), all of which, according to the Court, involved an agency overstepping its authority to act in situations not dissimilar from the extraordinary circumstances presented in West Virginia v. EPA. The dissent, on the other hand, regarded the majority’s use of the major questions doctrine to be without precedent, observing that “[t]he Court has never even used the term ‘major questions doctrine’ before.” Dissent at 15.

As discussed below, when the Court determines that the major questions doctrine applies, even if the administrative action arguably fits within what may seem like a broad grant of statutory authority, it is not necessarily enough to authorize the agency to act. Rather, if the court finds that the administrative rule is an “extraordinary case”, i.e., will have a significant economic or political impact, the agency must base its action on very clear congressional authorization to justify the power it is attempting to assert.

Clean Power Plan is Out But Regulating GHGs Still OK

Turning back to the regulation at issue in West Virginia, the Court reviewed the Clean Power Plan, which dates back to the Obama Administration’s EPA. At that time, EPA promulgated the CPP pursuant to its authority under the New Source Performance Standards (“NSPS”) in Section 111(d) of the CAA. The Court’s review thus centered on Section 111(d), which gives EPA authority to select the “best system of emission reduction” for existing sources of pollution, like power plants. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d). Under the CPP, the Obama Administration’s EPA used the NSPS to set GHG emission standards for existing power plants which would require many operators to shut down older coal-fired units and/or shift generation to lower-emitting natural gas units or renewable sources of electricity. The Court viewed EPA’s CPP, which would have required power producers to significantly change the generation mix, as an “extraordinary case” because it would have a major impact on the economy and was a “transformative expansion in [EPA’s] regulatory authority” based on “vague language” in the CAA. Slip op. at 20. In addition, the Court noted that EPA was using an “ancillary provision” in the CAA to regulate GHGs and stated that “the Agency’s discovery [of Section 111(d)]”—which the Court described as a “gap filler”—"allowed it to adopt a regulatory program that Congress had conspicuously and repeatedly declined to enact itself.” Slip op. at 20.

Best System of Emission Reduction

Notably, the Court acknowledged that “as a matter of definitional possibilities, generation shifting can be described as a system” (and thus a “best system of emission reduction”), but nevertheless determined that the CAA’s grant of authority was too vague. Slip op. at 28. According to the Court, almost anything could be described as a “system”, and therefore the CPP was based on a vague grant of authority and did not pass the major questions doctrine test. Slip op. at 28. The majority found such a broad grant of authority questionable, particularly because climate change legislation has been debated in Congress for years with no action, signaling that EPA could not exercise such broad authority when Congress had clearly declined to take such action itself.

By contrast and contrary to the majority’s narrow reading of “best system of emission reduction,” the dissent argued that the generation shifting prescribed by the CPP was precisely the type of “system” of emission reduction permitted under the CAA. In particular, the dissent contended that the term “system” is not vague (which Justice Kagan defined as unclear, ambiguous or hazy) but intentionally expansive to allow for such system-wide programs. Thus, the crux of the disagreement between the majority and dissent is that the dissent saw the CAA as having bestowed broad authority on EPA to regulate complex and important issues of air pollution—including and especially climate change, particularly considering the severity of the problem—in the manner that EPA determines is most appropriate, while the majority required further scrutiny for large-scale administrative endeavors like the CPP, which it held require very clear and specific authorization.

What’s Next?

In terms of the implications of West Virginia, what is clear is that the major questions doctrine is here to stay and EPA’s ability to regulate GHG’s under Section 111(d) of the CAA may be curtailed but has not been rejected. In fact, the Court specifically endorsed EPA’s authority to regulate GHGs. So, what does this mean, not only for GHG regulation but also for agency rulemaking in general?

First, while the ruling marks a significant setback for EPA, it does not shut the door on the agency’s ability to regulate GHGs. The CPP rules at issue raised the specter of the major questions doctrine because the regulation would have required generation shifting across the entire energy industry—an action viewed by the Court as having a significant impact on the national economy. The Court, however, declined to opine on “how far our opinion constrains EPA,” indicating that EPA’s authority had not been disallowed. Slip op. at 31, fn5. In fact, the opinion unequivocally states that it is within EPA’s purview to set a specific limit on GHG emissions. Slip op. at 6 (“Although the States set the actual rules governing existing power plants, EPA itself still retains the primary regulatory role in Section 111(d). The Agency, not the States, decides the amount of pollution reduction that must ultimately be achieved.”) Nothing in the opinion suggests that EPA cannot choose to regulate GHGs at power plants with more traditional technology-based requirements. Indeed, an inside-the-fence-line regulation that requires technology like carbon-capture would likely be within EPA’s traditional expertise and less likely to implicate large swaths of the economy like generation switching, and hence not be struck down.

Looking beyond EPA and GHG regulation, additional fallout from the Court’s embrace of the major questions doctrine is sure to occur. In addition to the Court’s explicit adoption of the major questions doctrine, Justice Gorsuch—a longstanding proponent of the doctrine—used his concurring opinion to lay out what he saw as the appropriate elements to consider when evaluating administrative rules under the doctrine. While Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence is not binding, future courts and administrative agencies likely will look to both the Court’s majority opinion and the Gorsuch concurrence for guidance. Administrative regulations will face increased challenges and heightened judicial scrutiny thanks to the major questions doctrine, and we can expect to see not only the number of challenges increase but also the number of successful challenges rise. Additionally, administrative agencies may proactively rein in regulatory actions they were planning to promulgate—keeping the rules more modest or tailored in an attempt to avoid challenges based on the major questions doctrine.

Undoubtedly, this will not be the last word on EPA regulation of GHGs or the use of the major questions doctrine. EPA will issue new GHG regulations, which certainly will invite future litigation. The decision will also certainly trigger many more challenges of agency authority under the newly minted major questions doctrine.

[1] Notably, the CPP was revoked by the Trump EPA, and the Biden EPA has stated that it intends to promulgate new GHG regulations different from the previous rules under past administrations. Nevertheless, the Court held that the parties had standing to proceed and the case was not moot. Slip op. at 14, 16.

By Allison A. Torrence

As we near Earth Day 2022, the United States may be headed toward a profound change in the way EPA and similar administrative agencies regulate the complex areas of environmental law. EPA began operating more than 50 years ago in 1970, and has been tasked with promulgating and enforcing some of the most complex regulations on the books. From the Clean Air Act to the Clean Water Act; to CERCLA and RCRA and TSCA; and everything in between.

EPA has penned voluminous regulations over the past 50 years to implement vital environmental policies handed down from Congress—to remarkable effect. While there is certainly progress left to be done, improvements in air and water quality in the United States, along with hazardous waste management, has been impressive. For example, according to EPA data, from 1970 to 2020, a period in which gross domestic product rose 272% and US population rose 61%, aggregate emissions of the six criteria pollutants decreased by 78%.

(source: epa.gov)

For the past 50 years the environmental administrative law process has worked mostly the same way: First, Congress passes a law covering a certain environmental subject matter (e.g., water quality), which provides policy objectives and a framework of restrictions, prohibitions and affirmative obligations. Second, EPA, the administrative agency tasked with implementing the environmental law, promulgates detailed regulations defining terms used in the law and explaining in a more comprehensive fashion how to comply with the obligations outlined in the statute. Depending on the subject matter being addressed, Congress may leave more details up to EPA, as the subject matter expert, to fill in via regulation. In some instances, there is a third step, where additional authority is delegated to the states and tribes to implement environmental regulations at the state-level based on the framework established by Congress and EPA. Occasionally someone thinks EPA overstepped its authority under a given statute, or failed to act when it was supposed to, and litigation follows to correct the over or under action.

Currently, this system of administrative law is facing challenges from parties that believe administrative agencies like EPA have moved from implementing Congress’s policy to setting their own. The most significant such challenge has come in the consolidated Clean Air Act (“CAA”) cases pending before the U.S. Supreme Court, West Virginia v. EPA, Nos. 20-1530, 20-1531, 20-1778, 20-1780.^[1] In West Virginia v. EPA, challengers object to the Obama-EPA’s Clean Power Plan (“CPP”), which used a provision in the New Source Performance Standards (“NSPS”) section of the CAA to set greenhouse gas emission standards for existing power plants. The biggest issue with the CPP, according to challengers, is that the new standards would require many operators to shut down older coal-fired units and shift generation to lower-emitting natural gas or renewable units. Challengers, which include several states, power companies and coal companies, argue the CPP implicates the “major questions doctrine” or “non-delegation doctrine”. These doctrines provide that large-scale initiatives that have broad impacts can't be based on vague, minor, or obscure provisions of law. Challengers argue that the NSPS provision used as the basis for the CPP is a minor provision of law that is being used by EPA to create a large-scale shift in energy policy. EPA argues that, although it is currently revising its greenhouse gas regulations, the actions taken in the CPP were authorized by Congress in the CAA, are consistent with with the text of the CAA as written, and do not raise the specter of the major questions or non-delegations doctrines.

While this case will certainly dictate how EPA is permitted to regulate greenhouse gases under the CAA, it will likely have broader impacts on administrative law. On the one hand, the Court may issue a narrow opinion that evaluates the CPP based on the regulations being inconsistent with the text or intent of the CAA. On the other hand, the Supreme Court may issue a broader opinion that invokes the major questions or non-delegation doctrines to hold that based on the significant-impacts of the regulation, it is an area that should be governed by Congress, not an administrative agency. If the Supreme Court takes the latter route, it could set more limits on Congress’s ability to delegate regulatory authority to administrative agencies like EPA.

Indeed, in the Supreme Court’s recent decision on the OSHA emergency temporary standard on employer vaccine or test mandate (“the OSHA ETS”), Ohio v. Dept. of Labor, et al., 595 U.S. ____ (2022), the Court struck down an administrative regulation in a preview of what might be coming in the EPA CAA case. As everyone knows by now, the Supreme Court struck down the OSHA ETS, holding it was an overstep of the agency’s authority to regulate safety issues in the workplace. The Court’s opinion focused on the impact of the OSHA ETS—that it will impact 84 million employees and it went beyond the workplace—instead of the statutory language. The Court stated, “[i]t is telling that OSHA, in its half century of existence, has never before adopted a broad public health regulation of this kind—addressing a threat that is untethered, in any causal sense, from the workplace.” Slip op. at 8.  

Justices Thomas, Alito and Gorsuch invoked the major questions doctrine in their concurring opinion, stating that Congress must speak clearly if it wishes to delegate to an administrative agency decisions of vast economic and political import. In the case of OSHA and COVID-19, the Justices maintained that Congress did not clearly assign to OSHA the power to deal with COVID-19 because it had not done so over the past two years of the pandemic. Notably, the fact that when Congress passed the Occupational Safety and Health Act, it authorized OSHA to issue emergency regulations upon determining that “employees are exposed to grave danger from exposure to substances or agents determined to be toxic or physically harmful” and “that such emergency standard[s] [are] necessary to protect employees from such danger[s]”, was not a sufficient basis for the Court or the three consenting Justices. In their view, in order to authorize OSHA to issue this vaccine or test mandate, Congress had to do more than delegate to OSHA general emergency powers 50 years ago, but instead would have had to delegate authority specific to the current pandemic.

Applying this logic to EPA and the currently-pending CAA case, Justices Thomas, Alito and Gorsuch may conclude that provisions of the CAA written 50 or 30 years ago, before climate change was fully on Congress’s radar, should not be used to as the basis for regulations that impact important climate and energy policy. Of course, many questions remain: Will a majority of the court adopt this view, and how far they will take it? If Congress can’t delegate climate change and energy policy, what else is off the table—water rights? Hazardous waste? Chemical management? If Congress can’t delegate to EPA and other administrative agencies at the same frequency as in the past, how will Congress manage passing laws dealing with complex and technical areas of law?

All of these questions and more may arise, depending on how the Supreme Court rules in West Virginia v. EPA. For now, we are waiting to see what will happen, in anticipation of some potentially significant changes on the horizon.

[1] Jenner & Block filed an Amicus Curiae brief in this case on behalf of Former Power Industry Executives in support of EPA.

By Gabrielle Sigel, Co-Chair, Environmental and Workplace Health and Safety Law Practice

On June 21, 2021, the federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) had its Occupational Exposure to COVID-19, Emergency Temporary Standard (ETS) published in the Federal Register, making it immediately effective on that date. 86 FR 32377 (June 21, 2021). OSHA has the authority to issue an ETS, for immediate application upon publication in the Federal Register, without first proceeding through typical notice-and-comment rulemaking, if OSHA “determines” that “employees are exposed to grave danger from exposure to substances or agents determined to be toxic or physically harmful or from new hazards,” and an ETS is “necessary to protect employees from such danger.” 29 USC §655(c)(1). 

Any person “adversely affected” by the ETS may raise a legal challenge in the U.S. Court of Appeals of their principal place of business or residence, within 60 days after the ETS’s publication, and the court could then issue a stay of the rule’s implementation. 29 USC §655(f)(1). By statute, the “determinations of [OSHA] shall be conclusive if supported by substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole.” Id.  OSHA has not successfully issued an ETS in more than four decades; the open legal issue is whether OSHA’s ETS will survive legal challenge, if any is raised. 

Despite its broad title in the Federal Register, the ETS, to be codified at 29 CFR §1910.502, is targeted to specific employment “settings,” i.e., “all settings where any employee provides healthcare services or healthcare support services.” 29 CFR §1910.502(a)(1). OSHA further narrows the scope of the ETS to apply to those employees who are licensed healthcare providers and likely to be involved in the care of people suspected or confirmed to have COVID-19 and certain fully vaccinated employees. See generally, id. at §1910.502(a)(2) and the OSHA decision tree “Is Your Workplace Covered by the ETS?” The ETS requires that affected employers (1) have a COVID-19 plan, typically in writing, with a designated person in charge of implementing the plan, and based on a risk assessment, providing policies and procedures for control of COVID-19 transmission; (2) institute patient screening and management; (3) implement policies and procedures for precautions, including regarding PPE, response to aerosol-generating procedures, cleaning/disinfecting, physical distancing, and barriers; (4) ventilation standards; (5) have health screening and paid medical removal of employees after illness and exposure; (6) have paid vaccination leave; (7) provide training and communication, including regarding anti-retaliation protections; (8) institute recordkeeping of all COVID-19 cases, regardless of work-relatedness; and (9) institute a “mini respiratory protection program” when use of respirators are not otherwise required, but the employee or employer chooses to upgrade a facemask to an N95 or similar respirator. Employers must comply with all provisions within 14 days, i.e., by July 5, 2021, except for the provisions regarding physical barriers, training, and ventilation, which have a July 21, 2021 compliance date. 

By Gabrielle Sigel, Co-Chair, Environmental and Workplace Health and Safety Law Practice

On June 10, 2021, the US Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) published its long-awaited response to President Biden’s January 21, 2021 Executive Order to OSHA, which had directed the agency to consider and, if necessary, by March 15, 2021, issue an Emergency Temporary Standard (ETS) in response to workplace hazards from COVID-19. With the deadline long-passed, interest in OSHA’s approach was heightened when the CDC, on May 13, 2021, issued its Interim Public Health Recommendations for Fully Vaccinated People (the “May 13 CDC Guidance”), and OSHA posted on its website that it was updating its guidance in response.

As the author predicted, OSHA did not issue a broad COVID-19 ETS applicable to all industries. Instead, on June 10, 2021, OSHA issued two documents: (1) an ETS applicable only to the healthcare industry; and (2) updated guidance applicable to all other industries, implementing the recommendations from the May 13 CDC Guidance. This article addresses only the updated guidance.

The June 10, 2021 OSHA guidance, “Protecting Workers: Guidance on Mitigating and Preventing the Spread of COVID-19 in the Workplace” (“Updated OSHA Guidance”) replaces guidance of the same name that the agency issued on January 29, 2021. The difference between the two versions of OSHA’s guidance reflects the significant changes that have occurred in disease transmission and workplace risks, due to vaccines and other factors. Because the May 13 CDC Guidance found that most “fully vaccinated people can resume activities without wearing a mask or physically distancing” in most locations, the Updated OSHA Guidance announced: “Unless otherwise required by federal, state, local, tribal, or territorial laws, rules, and regulations, most employers no longer need to take steps to protect their fully vaccinated workers who are not otherwise at-risk from COVID-19 exposure” (emphasis removed). Therefore, the Updated OSHA Guidance “focuses only on protecting unvaccinated or otherwise at-risk workers in their workplaces (or well-defined portions of workplaces).” “At-risk workers” are defined as those (a) whose medical condition are such that they may not “have a full immune response to vaccination,” or (b) who, under the Americans with Disabilities Act, “may be legally entitled to reasonable accommodations that protect them from the risk of contracting COVID-19 if, for example, they cannot be protected through vaccination, cannot get vaccinated, or cannot use face coverings.”

With publication of the Updated OSHA Guidance, the agency clearly is pulling back from regulating COVID-19 in most workplaces, particularly compared to its stance earlier this year. As is typical, OSHA advises that its guidance “is not a standard or regulation, and it creates no new legal obligations.” Also, as typical, the guidance has a subtext that its guidance could be used to establish a recognized hazard and methods of prevention under the OSH Act’s General Duty Clause. Yet, by issuing guidance, rather than regulation, OSHA is signaling that its concerns about risks from COVID-19 in most workplaces have significantly decreased since vaccines have become widely available.

In the Updated OSHA Guidance, it advises that both at-risk workers and other unvaccinated workers (collectively, “protected workers”) should be protected from the risks of COVID-19 in the workplace. The Updated OSHA Guidance proceeds to describe control measures that an employer “should take” to protect these workers in all industries except healthcare (who are covered by the new ETS); public transportation (workers are subject to CDC’s transportation-related mask mandate); and schools (which are to follow “applicable,” but unspecified, CDC guidance).

With respect to recommended protections, OSHA provides a two-part approach. Part one describes controls for all workplaces, and part two is an “Appendix” with “Measures Appropriate for Higher Risk Workplaces with Mixed-Vaccination Status Workers.” In part one, OSHA recommends 11 “multi-layered interventions” that “employers should engage with workers and their representatives to determine how to implement” for protected workers:

1. Grant paid time off for vaccination.
2. Sick or symptomatic employees, and protected workers who were exposed as “close contacts” should stay home.
3. Physical distancing in all communal areas, particularly indoors, and use barriers when distancing is not possible.
4. Provide, at employer’s cost, CDC-compliant face coverings or surgical masks to protected workers, for indoor work. All but immunocompromised workers can opt for no mask-wearing outdoors. Employers can determine that PPE, e., respirators, are necessary for protected workers, including when PPE is a “reasonable accommodation” under the ADA. In addition, if workers “want to use PPE if they are still concerned about their personal safety (e.g., if a family member is at higher-risk for severe illness,” employers should “[e]ncourage and support voluntary use of PPE in these circumstances and ensure the equipment is adequate to protect the worker.” However, if face coverings present greater risk, e.g., from heat-related illness, the employer should develop other face covering/respirator options.
5. Educate and train workers on COVID-19, controls (including vaccination), and workplace policies, and track that training “as appropriate.” “Ensure” that supervisors are familiar with the employer’s “workplace flexibilities and other human resources policies and procedures,” and that all workers understand their rights.
6. “Suggest that unvaccinated customers, visitors, or guests wear face coverings,” in workplaces where there are public interactions with protected workers, “even if no longer required by your jurisdiction.”
7. Maintain ventilation systems, per CDC and ASHRAE guidance, including installing air filters at a minimum of MERV 13.
8. Routinely clean and disinfect if someone with COVID-19 symptoms or diagnosis was in the worksite within the past 24 hours, in accordance with OSHA standards for use of cleaning chemicals.
9. Record and report COVID-19 infections/deaths per 29 CFR part 1904, but through May 2022, OSHA is not requiring that adverse reactions to a mandated vaccine be recorded as a work-related illness.
10. Protect workers from retaliation and establish an anonymous process for voicing concerns.
11. Follow OSHA standards on PPE, sanitation, and other potentially applicable regulations, as well as an employer’s obligations under the General Duty Clause.

In the Appendix, OSHA recommends that employers assess whether their protected workers are at greater risk, by evaluating close contact situations, duration of contacts, type of contacts, and “distinctive factors” such as employer-provided transport, community exposure, and communal housing and living quarters, particularly in manufacturing, meat and poultry processing, high-volume retail and grocery, and seafood processing. In those workplaces, employers should evaluate imposing additional protections for protected workers, such as physical distancing, staggered work schedules, ventilation improvements, and barriers.

Although OSHA urges employers to impose a separate set of obligations solely for a subset of workers, OSHA is silent on several issues of importance to an employer managing its workplace during this “vaccine-available” phase of the pandemic. Instead, it is up to employers to determine how to navigate the public health, safety, and equal opportunity employment law, and other legal constraints to implement those issues at their workplaces.  For example, OSHA is silent on:

• An employer’s methods for identifying or verifying which of its workers are vaccinated and, therefore, no longer need to be protected from COVID-19 hazards.
• Whether there are any non-excepted industries where there should be protections for vaccinated workers, who are not known to be at-risk, but who may still get symptoms or test positive for COVID-19 because, as CDC has said: “How long vaccine protection lasts and how much vaccines protect against emerging SARS-CoV-2 variants are still under investigation.” However, vaccinated workers are indirectly addressed when OSHA states that “all workers should be supported in continuing face covering use if they choose, especially in order to safely work closely with other people.”
• Whether those who contracted COVID-19 over the past 90 days, but are not vaccinated, can be treated as vaccinated workers. (Note: CDC guidance states that people who recovered from COVID-19 do not need to quarantine after exposure to another COVID-19 case.)
• OSHA’s Appendix does not emphasize PPE, such as N95 respirators, even for voluntary use, and even at the higher-risk workplaces.
• The Updated OSHA Guidance does not refer to the agency’s March 12, 2021 COVID-19 National Emphasis Program or enforcement protocols.

The Updated OSHA Guidance no longer (or only briefly) discusses several topics that were discussed at length in the January 29, 2021 OSHA guidance.  For example, the old guidance instructed employers to “Not distinguish[] between workers who are vaccinated and those who are not.” The Updated OSHA Guidance instructs the opposite.  The Updated OSHA Guidance also:

• No longer addresses the need to assign a workplace coordinator for COVID-19 or to conduct a “thorough hazard assessment”.
• No longer recommends an extensive and enhanced cleaning and disinfection process.
• No longer addresses screening and testing.
• No longer provides extensive instructions regarding “good hygiene practices,” including hand washing and sanitizers.
• No longer states detailed recommendations on isolation, quarantine, contact tracing, and return to work protocols. Instead, OSHA now encourages employers to report COVID-19 cases as required locally and to support local contact tracing efforts, and to have all ill workers stay home, but does so in far less detail.

Throughout the pandemic, employers have been looking to the CDC and OSHA, as well as the EEOC, for guidance on the steps they should take to protect workers and to avoid liability to their workers, the government, and the public. Particularly now that state and local governments have eliminated all or most COVID-19 restrictions, employers seeking to limit their liabilities will have the difficult task of developing different ways to work now that their employees can, and according to OSHA, should be divided into two populations: the vaccinated worker and the protected worker. The Updated OSHA Guidance describes how the protected worker should be treated differently, but the employer has the more difficult challenge of adapting that guidance to the business’s unique culture, financial constraints, and goals for survival and success, during yet another unprecedented phase of working in a pandemic.

For more information or advice on the OSHA standards and enforcement during the pandemic, please contact the author. Additional information regarding working during the COVID-19 pandemic can be found in Jenner & Block’s Corporate Environmental Lawyer blog and in the Jenner & Block COVID-19 Resource Center.

By Leah Song

On May 20, 2021, the California Occupational Safety and Health Standards Board (“Board”) held a public meeting to consider revisions to the State’s COVID-19 emergency temporary standard (“ETS”), which had been the applicable law for California workplaces since November 30, 2020.  (See December 1, 2020 Corporate Environmental Lawyer blog).  On May 7, 2021, the California Division of Occupational Safety and Health (“Cal/OSHA”) issued a notice of emergency action regarding proposed revisions to the ETS for the Board to consider for adoption, given the developing science around COVID‑19, particularly the impact of vaccines and Cal/OSHA’s experience enforcing the ETS. However, on May 19, 2021, Cal/OSHA asked the Board to table its vote on Cal/OSHA’s May 7 proposed COVID-19 ETS revisions.

Given Cal/OSHA’s May 7 proposed revisions to the ETS included notable revisions changing definitions, masking and physical distancing requirements, and engineering controls, including distinctions based on whether employees were vaccinated. However, on May 13, 2021, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) posted its guidance for fully vaccinated people recommending, in part, that “fully vaccinated people no longer need to a mask or physically distance in any setting, except where required by federal, local, tribal, or territorial laws, rules, and regulations, including local business and workplace guidance.” CDC, Guidance for Fully Vaccinated People (May 13, 2021).  In light of that new guidance, and the science that the risk is low that vaccinated people transmit the virus, Governor Newsom announced that the state will implement the new CDC mask guidelines on June 15, 2021, along with fully reopening the economy.  In addition, California Health and Human Services Secretary Dr. Mark Ghaly announced on May 17, 2021 that, starting on June 15, 2021, “California plans to implement the CDC’s guidelines around masking to allow fully vaccinated Californians to go without a mask in most indoor settings.” However, California Department of Public Health issued a directive on May 21, 2021, that adopted the CDC guidance, but also stated that, with respect to COVID-19 protections, employers remain subject to the ETS, as applicable to their business.

On May 19, 2021, the day before the Board meeting, Cal/OSHA sent a memo recommending that the Board not vote on its May 7 proposed revisions, because it “believes it is important to revisit the proposed COVID-19 prevention emergency regulations in light of this new [CDC] guidance.”  In the memo, Cal/OSHA stated that it will “limit any potential changes to consideration of the recent [CDC] guidance” regarding fully vaccinated people. On May 20, 2021, after hearing hours of public comment, the Board voted to table Cal/OSHA’s May 7 changes and to allow it to post, by May 28, 2021, its new proposed changes to the ETS for public comment. The Board will vote on June 3, 2021 in a special meeting as to whether to adopt the new Cal/OSHA proposed changes or to take other action on the ETS. 

Jenner & Block’s Corporate Environmental Lawyer will continue to update on the California COVID-19 ETS and other COVID-19 matters as they unfold.  Additional information regarding working during the COVID‑19 pandemic can be found on this blog and in Jenner & Block’s COVID‑19 Resource Center.

By Gabrielle Sigel, Co-Chair, Environmental and Workplace Health and Safety Law Practice

On his first full day in office, President Biden issued an Executive Order on Protecting Worker Health and Safety, which required OSHA to “consider whether any emergency temporary standards on COVID‑19, including with respect to masks in the workplace, are necessary,” and if so, to issue such emergency temporary standards (ETS) by March 15, 2021. Executive Order 13999, § 2(b) (Jan. 21, 2021), 86 FR 7211 (Jan. 26, 2021). An ETS, which skips the initial notice and comment process before it is in effect, can be issued pursuant to Section 6(c) of the OSH Act if OSHA determines that employees are exposed to “grave danger” and that an emergency standard is “necessary” to protect them from the grave danger. 29 USC § 655(c).

March 15, 2021 came and went; no ETS was issued. As of this writing, OSHA has not made a public statement as to why it did not issue an ETS on March 15, or the agency’s considerations and future plans regarding an ETS. Why might OSHA have chosen not to act now? What has OSHA done instead? What ETS might be on the horizon?

Why Might OSHA Have Decided Not to Issue an ETS Now?

There is considerable legal risk that a COVID-19 ETS will not hold up in court. OSHA has not successfully issued an ETS since 1978. Its last attempt to issue an ETS would have regulated asbestos exposure and was invalidated by the US Court of Appeals in 1984. In Asbestos Info. Ass’n v. OSHA, 727 F.2d 415 (5th Cir. 1984), the court rejected the ETS because OSHA did not  sufficiently support its conclusion of a “grave danger,” i.e., that 80 people would die in the next six months without the ETS and that OSHA could not show that an asbestos ETS was “necessary” given its existing respiratory standard.

As an additional legal hurdle, OSHA, in the last administration, has already gone on record that an ETS is unnecessary, and won that position in federal court. On June 11, 2020, the US Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit denied the AFL-CIO’s petition for a writ of mandamus to compel OSHA to issue an ETS for Infectious Diseases. The three-judge panel found that “OSHA reasonably determined that an ETS is not necessary at this time” given the “unprecedented nature of the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as the regulatory tools that the OSHA has at its disposal to ensure that employers are maintaining hazard-free work environments, see 29 U.S.C. § 654(a).” The panel held that “OSHA’s decision not to issue an ETS is entitled to considerable deference.”

By Gabrielle Sigel, Co-Chair, Environmental and Workplace Health and Safety Law Practice

On March 12, 2021, OSHA took two significant new actions to enhance its enforcement actions regarding COVID-19 workplace safety: (1) establishing the National Emphasis Program – COVID-19 (the NEP) targeting higher hazard industries for OSHA enforcement action; and (2) updating and replacing its former Interim Enforcement Response Plan for COVID-19 (the Enforcement Plan) to prioritize in-person worksite inspections by OSHA Compliance Safety and Health Officers (CSHO). This action is in response to President Biden’s January 21, 2021 Executive Order on Protecting Worker Health and Safety, in which he directed OSHA to “launch a national program to focus OSHA enforcement efforts related to COVID-19 on violations that put the largest number of workers at serious risk or are contrary to anti-retaliation principles.” Executive Order (EO) No. 13999, § 2(d), 86 FR 7211 (Jan. 26, 2021). Although the Executive Order (§ 2(b)) also required OSHA to consider whether to issue a COVID-19 Emergency Temporary Standard (ETS), and to do so by March 15, 2021 if determined necessary, these two new OSHA policy documents are not an ETS. Instead, OSHA has buried in the text of both the NEP and the Enforcement Plan that “in the event that” OSHA issues an ETS, the ETS will be used instead of a General Duty Clause violation as the basis for citations with respect to COVID-19 safety violations, which will be enforced through the new NEP and Enforcement Plan.

A National Emphasis Program is an OSHA enforcement policy procedure, developed in accordance with OSHA’s Directives System, through which OSHA decides how it is selecting sites for enforcement initiatives. An OSHA enforcement response plan informs CSHO how to conduct their enforcement activities, whether in regard to an NEP, a particular hazard, or otherwise. In this case, the NEP and the Enforcement Plan together tell employers the categories of workplaces and the types of enforcement procedures that are OSHA’s highest COVID-19 safety priorities.

In the NEP, OSHA is targeting those specified industries whose workers “have increased potential exposure to [a COVID-19] hazard, and that puts the largest number of workers at serious risk.” NEP, p. 1. The NEP also focuses on making sure that “workers are protected from retaliation,” including by referring allegations of retaliation to OSHA’s Whistleblower Protection Program. Id. OSHA makes clear that its NEP is to “augment” its continuing enforcement actions at all workplaces where it receives a complaint, severe incident report, or referral involving COVID-19 safety issues.

By Matthew G. Lawson

On Monday, March 8, 2021, the Centers for Disease and Control and Prevention (CDC) released its first set of public health recommendations for individuals fully vaccinated against COVID-19, titled “Interim Public Health Recommendations for Fully Vaccinated People.”  The CDC’s newly published guidelines are intended to replace the CDC’s existing public health guidance specifically for those individuals fully vaccinated for COVID-19.  By “fully vaccinated”, CDC means ≥2 weeks after an individual has received the second dose in a 2-dose series (Pfizer-BioNTech or Moderna), or ≥2 weeks after an individual has received a single-dose vaccine (Johnson and Johnson [J&J]/Janssen).  The updated guidance includes specific recommendations for vaccinated individuals in the non-healthcare workplace, public spaces and private and/or family settings.  While the CDC guidance is only intended to provide recommended best practices, it is anticipated that the CDC’s newest guidance will be relied on by states, municipalities, school systems, and private employers as these entities continue to update and implement their own respective health guidance and COVID-19 policies and protocols. 

        According to the updated guidelines, vaccinated persons can now engage in a number of new activities, including:

• Visiting with other fully vaccinated people indoors without wearing masks or physical distancing;
• Visiting with unvaccinated people from a single household who are at low risk for severe COVID-19 disease indoors without wearing masks or physical distancing; and
• Refraining from quarantine and testing following a known exposure to COVID-19 if asymptomatic.

Notably, the new guidelines leave in place many of CDC’s existing recommendations for both vaccinated and non-vaccinated individuals.  For example, the CDC recommends that fully vaccinated individuals continue to wear a mask in public, physical distance, avoid crowds and avoid poorly ventilated spaces.  In addition, the CDC is continuing to recommend that vaccinated individuals delay domestic and international travel, and, if they do travel, continue to follow all CDC requirements and recommendations when doing so.

        CDC’s guidelines for vaccinated individuals include a number of implications for private employers.  In the context of non-healthcare workplaces, the CDC is now recommending that fully vaccinated employees do not need to quarantine following a known or suspected exposure to COVID-19 in the workplace unless that the vaccinated individual develops “COVID-like symptoms.”  However, the guidelines still recommend that vaccinated persons receive testing “through routine workplace screening programs” following an exposure to COVID-19.  Notably, CDC’s no quarantine recommendation does not extend to vaccinated employees working in congregate settings or other high-density workplaces (e.g., meat and poultry processing and manufacturing plants), and as a result vaccinated employees in congregate work environments should continue to adhere to the quarantine requirements following exposure.  Employers should therefore evaluate their respective work environment to determine the appropriate quarantine procedures for employees who have received a vaccine.  Under the guidelines, vaccinated individuals also need to comply with any existing COVID-19 health and safety rules issued by their employer.  Thus, an employee’s vaccination status should not allow the employee to avoid his or her workplaces’ COVID-19 policies and procedures.  Finally, CDC’s new guidelines do not update the CDC’s prior recommendation (issued December 30, 2020) regarding business travel.  The CDC is continuing to recommend that employers “minimize non-essential travel” for all employees and, if resuming non-essential travel, ensure their employees continue to follow all state and local COVID-19 regulations and guidance regardless of their vaccination status.

       In the accompanying scientific brief to its newly released guidance, the CDC cites to existing studies demonstrating the highly effective nature of the approved mRNA COVID-19 vaccines against SARS-CoV-2 infection (including both symptomatic and asymptomatic infections).  Despite early evidence of the effectiveness of the approved vaccines, the CDC noted that only “approximately two-thirds of U.S. adults state that they [are] at least somewhat likely to receive a COVID-19 vaccine (or had received one already).”  Because maintaining requirements to continue COVID-19 prevention measures after vaccination “may disincentive vaccine uptake,” the CDC explained that its new guidance intends to communicate additional advantages, to the individual and the community, from vaccination.  The CDC advised that its guidance for vaccinated individuals will continue to be updated and modified “based on the level of community spread of SARS-CoV-2, the proportion of the population that is fully vaccinated, and the rapidly evolving science on COVID-19 vaccines.” 

By Gabrielle Sigel, Co-Chair, Environmental and Workplace Health and Safety Law Practice

On his first full day in office, President Biden issued an Executive Order on Protecting Worker Health and Safety, which required OSHA to “consider whether any emergency temporary standards on COVID‑19, including with respect to masks in the workplace, are necessary,” and if so, to issue such emergency temporary standards (ETS) by March 15, 2021. Executive Order 13999, § 2(b) (Jan. 21, 2021), 86 FR 7211 (Jan. 26, 2021). An ETS, which skips the initial notice and comment process before it is in effect, can be issued pursuant to Section 6(c) of the OSH Act if OSHA determines that employees are exposed to “grave danger” and that an emergency standard is necessary to protect them from the grave danger. 29 U.S.C. § 655(c).

Putting aside that OSHA has not successfully issued an ETS since 1978, including that the last attempt to issue an ETS, regulating asbestos exposure, was invalidated by the US Court of Appeals in 1984,[1] OSHA now has several models for a COVID‑19 ETS from which it may draw. Specifically, California, Michigan, Oregon, and Virginia are among the 22 states and territories that administer and enforce their own state-plan OSHA, rather than rely solely on federal standards and enforcement.[2] These four states have developed their own COVID‑19 safety regulations that apply to most, if not all, workplaces in their respective states, and have both distinctive features and commonalities. Employers would be well-advised to be aware of each of the states’ specific standards, not only to comply with regulatory requirements in that state, but to consider whether their workplace is ready for potential, nationwide regulations which may incorporate elements of these states’ approaches.

With OSHA under a Presidential deadline to issue a nationwide COVID-19 safety regulation, we review the current status of OSHA guidance; describe the basic elements of the four states’ regulations; and look at recent federal orders by other agencies to anticipate what employers nationwide may soon be facing.

US OSHA: COVID‑19 Regulation and Guidance in the Prior Administration

By Gabrielle Sigel, Co-Chair, Environmental and Workplace Health and Safety Law Practice

On February 16, 2021, Acting Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services (“HHS”) Norris Cochran, published in the Federal Register the Sixth Amendment to the Declaration Under the Public Readiness and Emergency Act [“PREP Act”].  86 Fed. Reg. 9516-9520 (Feb. 16, 2021).  This is the second amendment to the Declaration issued since President Biden took office and continues the Trump Administration’s practice of providing broad liability protection for those responding to COVID‑19.

The Declaration originally was issued on January 31, 2020, by former HHS Secretary Azar.  Pursuant to the PREP Act, the Declaration allows the Secretary to extend liability immunity to “covered persons” for taking allowed actions with respect to “covered countermeasures,” in prescribed circumstances, all as declared by the Secretary.  A “covered person” is “immune from suit and liability under Federal and State law for all claims of loss caused by, arising out of, relating to, or resulting from the administration or use of a covered countermeasure,” which includes FDA-authorized COVID‑19 vaccines and tests.  See 42 U.S.C. § 247d‑6d(a)(1).  Under the PREP Act, “covered persons” include “manufacturers,” distributors,” “program planners,” “qualified persons,” and their “officials, agents and employees.”  42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(i)(2). 

In the Sixth Amendment to the Declaration, the Acting Secretary augmented the “covered persons” protected from liability with an additional category of “qualified persons.”  Although the Unites States is, by statute, a “covered person,” the structure of the statutory provision defining “covered person” does not make clear that direct contractors and employees of the United States are similarly covered.  See 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(i)(2).  To clear up that ambiguity, the Sixth Amendment provides that a “qualified person” includes “any Federal government employee, contractor or volunteer who prescribes, administers, delivers, distributes or dispenses a Covered Countermeasure,” if the federal department or agency “has authorized or could authorize” that person “even if those authorized duties or responsibilities ordinarily would not extend to members of the public or otherwise would be more limited in scope than the activities such employees, contractors or volunteers are authorized to carry out under this declaration.”  86 Fed. Reg. at 9519 (Feb. 16, 2021).

This expanded liability protection is fully consistent with and will support President Biden’s National Strategy for the COVID‑19 Response and Pandemic Preparedness, which envisions federal vaccination sites and “deploy[ing] thousands of federal staff, contractors and volunteers to support state and local vaccination efforts.”  See National Strategy, pp. 9, 52.

By Gabrielle Sigel, Co-Chair, Environmental and Workplace Health and Safety Law Practice

U.S. EPA recently has approved two new products for use on surfaces in the battle to kill SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID‑19.

On February 10, 2021, EPA announced that it had approved a copper alloy product, made of at least 95.6 % copper, as a product that kills the virus upon contact.  Thus, all products containing the copper alloy product can be sold as providing long-term disinfection against the virus.  Specifically, EPA’s approved use on surfaces of the copper alloy product registered to the Copper Development Association (“CDA”) [EPA Reg. No. 82012‑1].  CDA’s registration had previously been approved under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide & Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”), for more than a decade, albeit for other purposes.  Products using the approved antimicrobial copper alloys will be added to EPA’s List N appendix of supplemental antimicrobial products that can be used to kill SARS‑CoV‑2 virus particles that contact surfaces treated with the copper alloys.     

Perhaps anticipating EPA’s action, on February 1, 2021, New York State Senator Timothy Kennedy sponsored a bill, S3905, in the New York State Senate to require the use of EPA’s approved copper alloy product in all touch surfaces in new, publicly funded construction projects.  As of this writing, the bill is in committee for consideration.  On January 7, 2021, Assembly Member Marianne Buttenschon had introduced the same language in a bill, A998, in the New York Assembly, where it also is being considered in committee.

In addition to the copper alloy surface approval, on January 15, 2021, EPA issued a FIFRA Section 18 emergency exemption for an antiviral treatment of the air, Grignard Pure, which can be used in indoor spaces to kill SARS-CoV-2.  Section 18 of FIFRA allows EPA to approve, on an emergency basis, federal agencies’ and states’ petitions to allow the use of pesticides for previously unregistered uses.  The emergency exemption for public health reasons lasts only for a year.  To date, EPA has issued only two emergency exemptions to address SARS-CoV-2.

Most recently, on January 15, 2021, EPA granted emergency exemptions to Georgia and Tennessee for the use of Grignard Pure, which forms a mist that contains triethylene glycol (“TEG”) as the active ingredient that kills the virus upon contact in the air.  TEG is an ingredient commonly used in fog machines, but only for its theatrical effects, not as a pesticide.  EPA stated that, the product can be applied only by a “trained professional in certain indoor spaces in Georgia and Tennessee where high occupancy, prior ventilation or other factors make it challenging to follow public health guidance and maintain appropriate social distancing.”  Based on laboratory testing, Grignard Pure, when activated, “will continuously inactivate 98% of airborne SARS‑CoV‑2 particles,” EPA explained.  Using Grignard Pure does not eliminate the need for mask wearing and social distancing, EPA warned.

Prior to the Grignard Pure emergency exemption, the only other FIFRA Section 18 emergency exemption that EPA had granted in the fight against SAR-CoV‑2 was a product called SurfaceWise2, which was approved for the use in American Airlines airport facilities and airplanes in Texas, Oklahoma, and Arkansas, and in limited health facilities in Texas.  SurfaceWise2, manufactured by Allied BioScience, is a surface coating that can be used with electrostatic sprayers, that inactivates the virus within two hours of its application.  That one-year exemption currently expires in August 2021.

By Allison A. Torrence

On December 7, 2020, EPA completed its five-year review of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (“NAAQS”) for Particulate Matter (“PM”), a criteria air pollutant under the Clean Air Act. In a final action set to be published in the Federal Register in the coming days, EPA decided to retain the current NAAQS for PM, which have been in place since 2012.

PM is measured in two categories:

1. Fine particles, or PM_2.5, which are particles with a diameter of 2.5 micrometers and smaller; and
2. Coarse particles, or PM₁₀, which are particles with a diameters between 2.5 and 10 micrometers.

PM_2.5, emitted from numerous sources including power plants, vehicle exhaust, and fires, is generally the more significant health concern, as it has been linked to serious respiratory disease, increased mortality rates, and recent studies have even linked a history of PM_2.5 exposure to increased COVID-19 mortality rates.

The Clean Air Act requires EPA to set both primary and secondary NAAQS for PM_2.5 and PM₁₀. Primary NAAQS must be set at levels that will protect public health and secondary NAAQS must be set at levels that will protect public welfare. All NAAQS must be reviewed by EPA every five years. EPA has regulated PM emissions through the NAAQS since 1971, and revised the PM NAAQS four times since then—in 1987,1997, 2006 and 2012.

The current primary and secondary NAAQS for PM are as follows:

According to EPA data, there are currently 16 counties in the U.S. currently in nonattainment of the primary PM_2.5 NAAQS and 23 counties currently in nonattainment of the primary PM₁₀ NAAQS.

EPA’s decision to keep the existing PM NAAQS comes despite warnings from its own scientists. Notably, in the Policy Assessment for the Review of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter, one of the technical documents used by EPA in support of its final decision, EPA scientists concluded that:

“When taken together, we reach the conclusion that the available scientific evidence, air quality analyses, and the risk assessment…can reasonably be viewed as calling into question the adequacy of the public health protection afforded by the combination of the current annual and 24-hour primary PM2.5 standards.”

This Policy Assessment also states that under the current PM_2.5 standards, long-term PM_2.5 exposures are estimated to be associated with as many as 45,000 total deaths per year. However, the Policy Assessment also noted certain uncertainties and limitations in the evidence and risk assessments that could lead the agency to decide to keep the existing standards.

EPA received over 60,000 public comments on the PM NAAQS proposal, which was closely watched by environmentalists and industry alike. Because of this close public interest, this may be an issue that will be reviewed sooner than the normal five-year review once the Biden Administration begins in 2021. As always, we will keep you updated on any further developments at the Corporate Environmental Lawyer.

By Gabrielle Sigel, Co-Chair, Environmental and Workplace Health and Safety Law Practice

On the afternoon of November 30, 2020, the California Office of Administrative Law (OAL) issued the final approval, allowing the emergency COVID‑19 regulation proposed by the California Division of Occupational Safety and Health (Cal-OSHA) and approved by the California Occupational Safety and Health Standards Board (Board) on November 19. The emergency regulation, establishing new sections 3205, 3205.1 through 3205.4 to Title 8, Division 1, Chapter 4 (General Industry Safety Orders) of the California Code of Regulations (CCR) is titled “COVID‑19 Prevention.” The COVID‑19 Prevention Rule is attached here as approved by the OAL. The COVID‑19 Prevention Rule is immediately effective on November 30, 2020. As an emergency regulation, it expires by October 21, 2021, unless it is extended or made permanent.

California, which as a “state-plan State,” can adopt workplace safety and health regulations more stringent than US OSHA regulations and guidance, has through its emergency regulatory process adopted a COVID‑19 regulation that applies to “all employees and places of employment” in California, except if the employees are working from home, the place of employment has only one employee “who does not have contact with other persons,” or employees when covered by California’s Aerosol Transmissible Diseases regulation, 8 CCR § 5199, which applies only to health care services, facilities, and operations. 8 CCR § 3205(a)(1). 

The basic construction of the COVID‑19 Prevention Rule follows the elements of California’s Injury and Illness Prevention Program (IIPP) rule, 8 CCR § 3203, and requires that all employers prepare and adopt a written program with the same elements of employee communication, hazard identification, inspections, hazard correction, training, controls, reporting, recordkeeping and access, but adds substantive requirements relating to COVID‑19 within each of those elements, and adds elements unique to an employer’s response to and control of COVID‑19. The COVID‑19 Prevention Rule also has provisions affecting aspects of an employer’s operations beyond its traditional safety and health scope, including an obligation to “continue and maintain an employee’s earnings, seniority and all other employee rights and benefits, including the employee’s right to their former job status, as if the employee had not been removed from their job” for employees who are otherwise able to work, but are excluded from the worksite for work-related COVID‑19 exposures and quarantines. 8 CCR § 3205(10)(C).

Other notable aspects of the regulation include:

• Definitions of COVID‑19 “exposure”, “symptoms”, “high-risk exposure period”, “exposed workplace”, periods of exclusion from the workplace (quarantine and isolation) and return-to-work criteria, that do not match the CDC’s current approach for essential workforces and which do not allow for any future changes in CDC guidelines regarding the length of isolation, quarantine, or return-to-work criteria.
• Employers must provide viral testing for all employees excluded under Cal-OSHA’s broad definition of “exposed workplace,” up to twice weekly depending on the severity of an outbreak at the workplace.
• Employers, with employee participation, must “conduct a workplace-specific identification of all interactions, areas, processes, equipment and materials that could potentially expose employees to COVID‑19 hazards.” 8 CCR § 3502 (c)(2)(D).
• Specific requirements regarding controls, including physical distancing, face coverings, ventilation, disinfection, cleaning, hygiene, PPE and engineering controls.
• Employers must provide notice within one business day of all COVID‑19 cases in the exposed workplace to employees “who may have had COVID‑19 exposures and [their union representative] and to all other employers/contractors in the workplace. 8 CCR § 3502 (c)(3)(B)3. (See also recently enacted revision to Labor Code § 6409.6 (AB 685).)
• Employers must communicate hazards, policies and procedures to employees and all “other employers, persons, and entities within or in contact with the employer’s workplace.” 8 CCR § 3502 (c)(1)(D)
• Specific requirements regarding COVID‑19 case investigation that must be documented and provided to any employee, employee representative, Cal-OSHA, or local health agencies.
• Employers must have a documented procedure for investigation of COVID‑19 cases in the workplace, with many specific steps required in the COVID‑19 Prevention Rule.
• Requirements for employer-provided transportation to and from the workplace and employer-provided housing. 8 CCR §§ 3205.3 and 3205.4.

Merely preparing the written program document, in addition to the required procedures and protocols, will be a significant undertaking for almost all California employers. In the public hearing before the Board, Cal-OSHA representatives minimized the additional burden placed on employers given its view that employers already should have already undertaken much of the effort to update their basic IIPP document. Cal-OSHA representatives stated, however, that it recognized that employers would have to take some time to get all the requirements in place and would exercise enforcement discretion given the regulation’s immediate effective date. Cal-OSHA also informed the Board that it planned to issue interpretive guidance and other materials, but did not specify a date by which it would do so. Cal-OSHA stated that it would hold Advisory Committee meetings with employers and employees regarding refining the Rule, but noted that the agency did not expect to propose any changes in the regulatory language in the near-term.

For more information or advice on how to comply and implement the COVID‑19 Prevention Rule, please contact the author.  Additional information regarding working during the COVID‑19 pandemic can be found on this blog and in Jenner & Block’s COVID‑19 Resource Center.

By Gabrielle Sigel  and Leah M. Song

On November 2, 2020, Judge Cogan of the U.S. District for the Eastern District of New York dismissed the amended complaint of workers at Amazon’s Staten Island JFK8 fulfillment center (“JFK8”) against their employer over its alleged non-compliance with state and federal public health guidance and law during the COVID‑19 pandemic. Palmer. v. Amazon.com Inc., No. 20-cv-02468, U.S. Dist. Ct. E.D.N.Y., Doc. 73, Nov. 2, 2020 (“Op.”).

The workers alleged issues with the company’s productivity requirements preventing basic hygiene, limited air-conditioned break rooms impeding social distancing, inadequate contact tracing, and lack of communication and pay regarding COVID‑19 leave at the JFK8 facility. The amended complaint asserted claims for (i) public nuisance, (ii) breach of the duty to provide a safe workplace under New York Labor Law (“NYLL”) § 200, (iii) failure to timely pay COVID‑19 leave under NYLL § 191, and (iv) an injunction against future failure to timely pay COVID‑19 leave. Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief for their first, second, and fourth causes of action, and damages for their third cause of action.

On August 11, 2020, Amazon moved to dismiss the action based on the theory of primary jurisdiction, workers’ compensation law exclusivity, and other grounds. Judge Cogan granted Amazon’s motion to dismiss the public nuisance and workplace safety duty claims, without prejudice, based on the federal doctrine of primary jurisdiction, which “seeks to maintain a proper balance between the roles of courts and administrative agencies,” allowing a district court to choose not to rule in favor of having a matter addressed by an administrative agency. Op. at 8. Judge Cogan found that the “central issue in this case is whether Amazon’s workplace policies at JFK8 adequately protect the safety of its workers during the COVID‑19 pandemic,” which the court framed as a question of whether that issue is best handled by OSHA or the court. Id. at 10.  The court noted that, although OSHA has not issued a regulatory standard specific to COVID‑19, this “does not mean…that OSHA has abdicated its responsibilities during the pandemic. Rather, the agency has exercised its discretion in determining how to proceed in the face of an evolving pandemic fraught with uncertainty.” Id. The court reasoned that it was “not expert in public health or workplace safety matters, and lack[s] the training, expertise, and resources to oversee compliance with evolving industry guidance.” Id. at 11. Furthermore, the court found that “[p]laintiffs’ claims and proposed injunctive relief go to the heart of OSHA’s expertise and discretion.” Id. The court further held that the “risk of inconsistent rulings further weighs in favor of applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction” as “[c]ourts are particularly ill-suited to address this evolving situation” and OSHA would be able to impose more flexible and uniform policies across the industry. Id. Therefore, the court dismissed plaintiffs’ public nuisance and NYLL § 200 claims, “so that plaintiffs may determine whether to seek relief through the appropriate administrative and regulatory framework.” Id. at 12.  

Moreover, the court held that, even if the court did not defer to OSHA’s primary jurisdiction, it would dismiss the public nuisance claim because New York law requires that a private action for public nuisance allege that the plaintiff sustained special injury not common to the public at large. Finding that an increased risk of contracting COVID‑19 is “common to the New York City community at large” and the JFK8 facility is “not the source of COVID‑19,” the court held that plaintiffs could not maintain a public nuisance claim. Id. at 13-14. The court also found that, although the state safe workplace claim under NYLL § 200 is not preempted by the OSH Act, plaintiffs’ claims for past injuries, even for injunctive relief, are precluded by the language of New York’s workers’ compensation law, which makes workers’ compensation the exclusive remedy for workers’ claims against employers “for any liability whatsoever.” Id. at 14-20.

The court also dismissed plaintiffs’ NYLL § 191 claims regarding failure to pay timely COVID‑19 sick leave, finding that the statute addresses claims for prompt payment of “wages,” not sick leave. In reaching that decision, the court rejected the NY State Department of Labor’s recent COVID‑19 guidance in which it stated that prompt payment of COVID‑19 sick leave was subject to NYLL § 191’s requirements. Id. at 21-24.

Another example of a case in which a court relied on the primary jurisdiction clause to dismiss COVID‑19 workplace safety claims against an employer is Rural Community Workers Alliance (“RCWA”) v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., No. 5:20-cv-06063 (N.D. Mo.) from May 5, 2020. In that case, the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri granted Smithfield Foods’ (“Smithfield”) motion to dismiss pursuant to the primary jurisdiction doctrine. The RCWA plaintiffs alleged two common law claims: (1) Smithfield’s practices at the meat processing plant constituted a public nuisance; and (2) Smithfield had breached its duty to provide a safe workplace. The plaintiffs, an employee and a workers advocacy group, sought only injunctive relief to require Smithfield to comply with OSHA/CDC guidance issued for the entire meat processing industry, and importantly, did not allege that they or any of their members had contracted COVID‑19 at the plant.

The Missouri federal case dismissed the case with prejudice, based on the federal primary jurisdiction doctrine. The court found and deferred to OSHA’s primary jurisdiction to interpret and apply its guidance and to the rights, albeit limited, that plaintiffs can seek through OSHA’s administrative and judicial processes. Id. at 14-17. In addition, the court found that plaintiffs had not met their “extraordinary burden” of proving a right to preliminary injunctive relief. Id. at 17. The court found that, despite the prevalence of COVID‑19 in the community and in the plant, the plaintiffs had not suffered “irreparable harm” because they alleged only the possibility of death or serious illness in the future. Id. at 18-20. The court found that “unfortunately, no one can guarantee health for essential workers – or even the general public – in the middle of this global pandemic.” Id. at 19. Thus, because the employer was taking measures to control the spread and there no confirmed COVID‑19 cases currently, “the court cannot conclude that the spread of COVID‑19 at the Plant is inevitable or that Smithfield will be unable to contain it if it occurs.” Id. at 20. The court also noted, when balancing the harms of granting (or denying) the injunction that “no essential-business employer can completely eliminate the risks that COVID‑19 will spread to its employees through the workplace. Thus, it is important that employers make meaningful, good faith attempts to reduce the risk.” Id.

The court also found that plaintiffs were unlikely to prevail on the merits of their nuisance claim because the employer had taken “significant measures” and there were no occurrences of the disease. Id. at 21-22. Similarly, the court found that plaintiffs would not be able to prove that Smithfield had breached its duty to provide a safe place to work, because the company “has taken substantial steps to reduce the protection for COVID‑19 exposure” and appeared to be complying with the OSHA/CDC guidance. Id. at 22.

Please feel free to contact the authors with questions or for further information. For regular updates about the impact of COVID‑19 in the workplace and on business generally, please visit Jenner & Block’s Corporate Environmental Lawyer blog and Jenner & Block’s COVID‑19 Resource Center.

By Gabrielle Sigel, Co-Chair, Environmental and Workplace Health and Safety Law Practice

I.  The New CDC Definition of Close Contacts

On October 21, 2020, the CDC published a new definition of “Close Contact” for contact tracing purposes.  This new definition will affect how employers determine Close Contacts for purposes of internal contract tracing to limit and prevent exposures and spread of the coronavirus within the workplace.  The new CDC definition can be found here:  https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/php/contact-tracing/contact-tracing-plan/appendix.html#contact  Quoting from the CDC link:

“Someone who was within 6 feet of an infected person for a cumulative total of 15 minutes or more over a 24-hour period* starting from 2 days before illness onset (or, for asymptomatic patients, 2 days prior to test specimen collection) until the time the patient is isolated.

* Individual exposures added together over a 24-hour period (e.g., three 5-minute exposures for a total of 15 minutes). Data are limited, making it difficult to precisely define “close contact;” however, 15 cumulative minutes of exposure at a distance of 6 feet or less can be used as an operational definition for contact investigation. Factors to consider when defining close contact include proximity (closer distance likely increases exposure risk), the duration of exposure (longer exposure time likely increases exposure risk), whether the infected individual has symptoms (the period around onset of symptoms is associated with the highest levels of viral shedding), if the infected person was likely to generate respiratory aerosols (e.g., was coughing, singing, shouting), and other environmental factors (crowding, adequacy of ventilation, whether exposure was indoors or outdoors). Because the general public has not received training on proper selection and use of respiratory PPE, such as an N95, the determination of close contact should generally be made irrespective of whether the contact was wearing respiratory PPE.  At this time, differential determination of close contact for those using fabric face coverings is not recommended.”

Previously, CDC had defined “Close Contact” to mean someone who spent at least 15 consecutive minutes within six feet of a person confirmed to be have COVID-19, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2.

II. What Does the New Definition Mean for Employers (Outside the Healthcare Industry)

Under CDC guidance, an employer should quarantine any Close Contact employee, i.e., the Close Contact employee should not be allowed on the worksite and should be told to quarantine per CDC guidance.  If the Close Contact develops symptoms or tests positive, in which case the Close Contact becomes an infected person who is in isolation per CDC guidance. Notably, the CDC also states that, at this time, whether an infected person or the exposed person was wearing a mask during the exposure period does not affect the determination of a Close Contact for these purposes.  However, the CDC does recognize that the determination of a Close Contact is “difficult to precisely define” and suggests that other factors may be considered, such as whether the infected person had symptoms at the time of exposure, whether the infected person was engaged in activities “likely to generate respiratory aerosols,” and environmental conditions, such as whether the exposure occurred indoors and the adequacy of indoor ventilation.

Per CDC guidance, the quarantine period is for 14 days, which typically means that the employee is not at the worksite, but can work remotely if their circumstances, including any labor agreement, so allows.  The CDC recognizes, however, that a mandatory worksite quarantine period for Close Contacts could cause severe consequences for employers of “Critical Infrastructure Workers,” typically as defined by the Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (“CISA”).  Thus, the CDC provides an exception to the 14-day worksite quarantine for asymptomatic Critical Infrastructure Workers – they may continue to work at the standard workplace(s) if they adhere to protective measures  prior to and during their work shift, including: pre-screening and regular monitoring for fever and other symptoms; wearing a face mask “at all times while in the workplace;” maintaining at 6-foot distance and practice social distancing “as work duties permit;” and working in areas that are frequently cleaned, including common areas and commonly shared equipment.

Although the CDC suggests that determinations of close contact can be affected by factors other than proximity and duration of exposure, it provides no guidance on how to account for those other factors in the course of the determination.  Most employers are going to need to rely on clearly defined and easily understood rules, so that a workplace contact tracing program can be appropriately administered. Thus, most employers likely will continue to rely only on the more easily determined proximity and duration factors.

As a result of CDC’s change to the definition of Close Contact to include anyone in close proximity within a cumulative 15-minute period, rather than a consecutive 15-minute period, more employees may be designated as Close Contacts and, therefore, more employees may need to be precluded from working on-site, particularly those who cannot be classified as Critical Infrastructure Workers.  Although an employer typically cannot prevent an exposure from occurring outside the workplace, an employer’s best “defense” to potential coronavirus exposure in the workplace, and the resulting Close Contact designation, is adherence to and enforcement of 6-foot distancing for all workplace activities, both during more social activities (such as in breakrooms, cafeterias, restrooms) and during job tasks. 

Other Related CDC Sites:

https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/guidance-manufacturing-workers-employers.html

https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/php/open-america/non-healthcare-work-settings.html

https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/critical-workers/implementing-safety-practices.html

Questions?  Please contact Gabrielle Sigel, 847-710-3700, [email protected]

Jenner & Block’s Corporate Environmental Lawyer will continue to update on these matters, as well as other important COVID‑19 related guidance, as they unfold.

By Leah Song and Steven Siros

On August 18, 2020, the Center for Biological Diversity, Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc., and Riverkeeper, Inc. (“Conservation Groups”) filed a new lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and Administrator Wheeler (“EPA”) for failing to comply with their mandatory duties under the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) in connection with promulgation of EPA’s COVID-19 enforcement discretion policy. More specifically, the Conservation Groups argued that the EPA failed to “initiate and complete ESA Section 7 consultation to ensure that EPA’s actions in response to the COVID-19 pandemic,” as described in the March 26, 2020 “COVID-19 Implications for EPA’s Enforcement and Compliance Assurance Program” (“Temporary Enforcement Policy”), would not jeopardize any listed species or their habitats. An analysis of the Temporary Enforcement Policy can be found at Jenner & Block’s Corporate Environmental Lawyer blog here.

Other environmental groups had previously challenged EPA’s Temporary Enforcement Policy, claiming that EPA was unreasonably delaying its response to a petition filed by the groups requesting that EPA issue an emergency rule requiring written notice from regulated entities that elect to suspend required environmental reporting and/or monitoring due to the COVID-19 pandemic. On July 8, 2020, Judge McMahon of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York ruled that the Natural Resources Defense Counsel and other environmental organizations failed to show that they were injured by EPA’s purported “unreasonable delay” and therefore granted summary judgment in favor of EPA.  

In this latest lawsuit, the Conservation Groups claim that EPA failed to engage in a required ESA Section 7 consultation prior to promulgating its Temporary Enforcement Policy. Notwithstanding that EPA’s Temporary Enforcement Policy explicitly states that regulated entities should “make every effort to comply with their environmental compliance obligations” and merely provides guidance on how EPA’s plans to exercise its long-held enforcement discretion in light of the challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, the Conservation Groups’ complaint explains how the regulatory programs affected by the Temporary Enforcement Policy implicate the interests of listed species and their habitat as those programs are “intended to limit pollution and prevent adverse environmental harm.” For example, the complaint asserts that suspension of Clean Water Act’s National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”) effluent sampling program “potentially affects listed species and critical habitats by allowing unmonitored and unreported (and hence unrestricted) contamination of waterways such species depend on.”

The Section 7 consultation process is meant to “insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency . . . is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species which is determined . . . to be critical.” 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). The Section 7 consultation process must be initiated at “the earliest possible time” for any project that “may affect” listed species. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(a). The Conservation Groups allege that the Temporary Enforcement Policy “clearly meets the ESA’s ‘may affect’ threshold for triggering the agency’s Section 7 consultation obligations.” While the Conservation Groups recognized the unique challenges posed by COVID-19, they stated “this does not mean that EPA may simply ignore its vitally important, and legally required, ESA Section 7 duties and disregard potential impacts on imperiled species and their critical habitats.” They argue there is no evidence that the EPA undertook Section 7 consultation with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service or the National Marine Fisheries Service, or even followed the emergency consultation process provided for in the ESA.

EPA announced that it will terminate its reliance on the Temporary Enforcement Policy on August 31, 2020 (although EPA stated that the termination in no way limits its ability to exercise enforcement discretion on a case-by-case basis). EPA’s termination announcement was previously discussed on Jenner & Block’s Corporate Environmental Lawyer blog here. In light of EPA’s announcement, several State Attorneys Generals that had also filed a complaint challenged EPA’s Temporary Enforcement Policy indicated that they intend to dismiss their lawsuit so long as EPA terminates its reliance on the policy on or before August 31^st. In an attempt to preempt what is likely to be a motion to dismiss on mootness grounds, the Conservation Groups allege that “there is no assurance that the policy will be rescinded by that date, particularly given the recent surge in COVID-19 cases,” and that their case should therefore be allowed to proceed.

Please feel free to contact the authors with questions or for further information. For regular updates about the impact of COVID‑19 in the workplace and on business generally, please visit Jenner & Block’s Corporate Environmental Lawyer blog and Jenner & Block’s COVID‑19 Resource Center.

By Leah Song and Gabrielle Sigel

Although Illinois Governor Pritzker has scored successes in the federal lawsuits brought against his COVID‑19 Executive Order actions, he has not fared as well, thus far, in state court.

Back on April 23, 2020, Illinois State Representative (R) Darren Bailey filed a complaint in the Clay County Circuit Court with two counts for declaratory judgment and a request for injunction, alleging that Governor Pritzker’s extension of the stay-at-home order exceeded the authority afforded to the Governor under the Illinois Emergency Management Agency Act (“IEMAA”). Specifically, the lawsuit alleged that the IEMAA grants certain enumerated powers to the Illinois Governor following the proclamation of a “public health emergency,” but that Section 7 of the IEMAA limits these authorities to “a period not to exceed 30 days” following the declaration. Thus, Rep. Bailey alleged that any extension of the stay-at-home order 30 days after the original Executive Order was void. On the same date that he filed his complaint, Rep. Bailey filed a motion seeking a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) to enjoin Governor Pritzker from enforcing the stay-at-home order against him or entering any further executive orders that would limit Rep. Bailey’s ability to travel within the state.

On April 27, 2020, Illinois Circuit Court Judge Michael McHaney temporarily blocked enforcement of Governor Pritzker’s stay-at-home order by granting Rep. Bailey the TRO, solely as to him. In its order granting the TRO, the circuit court found that Rep. Bailey had “shown he will suffer irreparable harm if the [TRO] is not issued” and had “shown he has no adequate remedy at law or in equity in that absent a [TRO] being entered, plaintiff, will continue to be isolated and quarantined in his home.” On that same day, Governor Pritzker filed a notice of interlocutory appeal to the Appellate Court of Illinois, Fifth Judicial District, requesting that the court reverse and vacate Judge McHaney’s decision and dissolve the TRO. On April 30, 2020, Rep. Bailey filed in the Fifth District Appellate Court a consent to entry of order vacating the TRO and remanding the case back to the circuit court, which the court agreed to do on May 1, 2020.

On remand, Rep. Bailey filed an amended complaint on May 13, 2020, consisting of four counts seeking the follow relief:

1. “Declaratory judgment finding that the April 30 Proclamation is void for failing to meet the definition of a disaster as defined in the IEMAA;”
2. “Declaratory judgment finding that Pritzker had no authority to utilize emergency powers after April 08, 2020;”
3. “Declaratory judgment finding that the Illinois Department of Public Health Act governs the conduct of the state actors in this context;” and
4. “[I]njunctive relief.”

Shortly after, on May 18, 2020, Rep. Bailey filed a motion for summary judgment. Before the hearing on the summary judgment motion, the Governor removed the case to federal court, but it was ultimately remanded. The U.S. Department of Justice got involved in this legal battle, filing a brief in federal court arguing that this case belonged in state court.

Following the remand from federal court, Rep. Bailey filed a notice of hearing on his summary judgment motion. On July 2, 2020, Judge McHaney ruled in favor of Rep. Bailey and held that Governor Pritzker’s COVID-19 Executive Orders were void and granted summary judgment on two counts (“July 2 Order”). The court concluded that the “30-days of emergency powers provided in Section 7 of IEMAA … lapsed on April 08, 2020,” such that all COVID-19 Executive Orders after April 8, 2020 are “void ab initio.” Further, the Governor had no authority “to restrict a citizen’s movement or activities and/or forcibly close business premises.” The court also granted Rep. Bailey’s “oral request that his Amended Complaint be a representative action” such that this ruling shall “apply to all citizens of the State of Illinois.”

The court must rule on the remaining issue of whether COVID-19 “meets the definition of a disaster as defined in the IEMAA.” Until then, the July 2 Order is neither enforceable nor appealable. The Illinois Attorney General moved to dismiss the remaining count and a hearing was set for July 17, but it was vacated by agreement. On July 22, Rep. Bailey filed a motion for leave to amend and add an additional count, seeking a declaratory judgment that a “public health emergency” as defined by the IEMAA did not exist in Clay County on June 26, 2020, when Governor Pritzker issued a proclamation that a “public health emergency” existed within all Illinois counties as a result of COVID-19.

Most recently, on August 5, 2020, Rep. Bailey filed a Petition for Adjudication for Indirect Civil Contempt, seeking to hold Governor Pritzker in civil contempt of court for disregarding the July 2 Order and continuing to issue COVID-19 Executive Orders. Judge McHaney ordered Governor Pritzker to appear in the Clay County Courthouse on August 14, 2020 to “show cause why he should not be held in indirect civil contempt and sanctioned for his willful disregard with the previously entered order of the Court.” The order stated that failure to appear may result in a warrant for the Governor’s arrest. But on August 11, 2020, the Illinois Supreme Court issued an order to stay the contempt hearing set for this Friday.

On July 23 and 24, 2020, Rep. Bailey’s attorney filed similar cases in various counties across the state, including Bond, Clinton, Edgar, Richland, and Sangamon counties, all seeking a declaratory judgment that a “public health emergency” as defined by the IEMAA did not exist as of June 26, 2020 and to void the Governor’s Executive Orders. . See Craig v. Pritzker, No. 2020-MR-589 (Sangamon Cty. Cir. Ct., Ill.); Allen v. Pritzker, No. 2020-MR-45 (Edgar Cty. Cir. Ct., Ill.); DeVore v. Pritzker, No. 2020- MR-32 (Bond Cty. Cir. Ct., Ill.); Gorazd v. Pritzker, No. 2020-MR-79 (Clinton Cty. Cir. Ct., Ill.); English v. Pritzker, No. 2020-MR-48 (Richland Cty. Cir. Ct., Ill.).

On August 11, 2020, in response to a motion for a supervisory order filed by the Illinois Attorney General on behalf of the Governor, the Illinois Supreme Court consolidated, in the Sangamon County Circuit Court before Judge Grischow, all of the cases filed in various counties, including Rep. Bailey’s lawsuit. Sangamon County includes the city of Springfield, the Capitol of Illinois.

An analysis of the Governor’s successes upholding his Executive Orders in federal court can be found here. For regular updates about the impact of COVID‑19 in the workplace and on business generally, please visit Jenner & Block’s Corporate Environmental Lawyer blog and Jenner & Block’s COVID‑19 Resource Center.

By Leah Song and Gabrielle Sigel

Several state and federal court lawsuits have been brought challenging Illinois Governor Pritzker’s proclamations and executive orders related to COVID‑19 (“Executive Orders”). In federal court, in contrast with state court, the Governor has been successful defending his Executive Orders. Most recently, on July 29, 2020, in a written opinion issued on August 1, 2020, the Village of Orland Park, and certain of its residents lost their motion to obtain immediate invalidation of the Executive Orders, when Judge Andrea Wood, of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois (“the Northern District”), found that their claims had less than a “negligible likelihood” of succeeding. Village of Orland Park v. Pritzker, No. 20-cv-03528.

As background to the Village’s lawsuit, in response to the COVID‑19 pandemic, Governor Pritzker issued Executive Orders on March 9, March 20, April 1, April 30, May 29, and June 26, 2020 declaring a statewide public health disaster and restricting business operations, gatherings above a certain size, and other measures consistent with both stay-at-home and reopening orders. On June 16, 2020 the Village of Orland Park, the owner of a restaurant in the Village, and two Village residents (“Plaintiffs”) sued Governor Pritzker seeking to have the federal court issue a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction prohibiting enforcement of the Executive Orders.

Plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that the Executive Orders violate their due process rights, the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and their procedural and substantive rights under the Illinois constitution and the Illinois Department of Public Health Act. The Village claimed that the Executive Orders illegally attempt to prevent the home-rule municipality from implementing its own order, allowing a faster reopening. The restaurant owner claimed that the Executive Orders caused economic losses. The individual plaintiffs claimed that the Executive Orders caused personal isolation and restricted medically necessary exercise.

Based on Plaintiffs’ verified complaint, the facts of which were uncontested by the Governor at that early stage of proceedings, the court heard oral argument on June 30, 2020. The court ruled that Plaintiffs did not meet the standards for injunctive relief, which require them to show a “greater than negligible likelihood of success on the merits,” and that the balance of harms Plaintiffs may suffer as a result of their claimed injury are greatly outweighed by burdens on the Governor and the public interest. The court began its analysis of the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims by finding that “the COVID‑19 pandemic constitutes the very sort of extraordinary threat to public health and safety contemplated by the Supreme Court in Jacobson [v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905)].” Slip op. at 13. Pursuant to the standards in Jacobson, because Plaintiffs could not show that “the Executive Orders have a real or substantial relationship to preventing the spread of COVID‑19 or beyond all question plainly and palpably invade Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights,” Plaintiffs’ federal claims did not have more than a negligible chance of success. Id.

Moreover, even without relying on deference to state authority during a public health emergency recognized in Jacobson, Judge Wood also was unpersuaded by the merits of any of Plaintiffs’ federal claims when analyzed based on “traditional constitutional analyses.” Slip op. at 14. With respect to Plaintiffs’ procedural and substantive due process claims, while the complaint was unclear as to the liberty or property interests at stake, the court considered that Plaintiffs “may be asserting rights to work, rights to travel, or rights to freedom of association.” Slip op. at 15. However, the court found that Plaintiffs failed to show that they were deprived of those interests without due process of law. For example, the court reasoned that “there is no constitutional procedural due process right to state-mandated procedures.” Id. Even if Plaintiffs “are ultimately correct that the Governor should have complied with the procedures…in implementing his response to COVID‑19, they still will not have established a federal constitutional violation.” Id. The court also found that Plaintiffs could not establish that their rights were, in fact, violated. The court dispensed with Plaintiffs’ equal protection claim by noting the “many rational bases for the distinctions drawn among different types of business in the Executive Orders.” Slip op. at 23. The court also found that the Governor’s defense under the doctrine of sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution barred all of the state law claims in federal court. Slip op. at 27.

After finding that Plaintiffs had less than a negligible chance of prevailing on the merits of their claims, the court considered the balance of harms to “further demonstrate[ ] that a preliminary injunction would be inappropriate.” Id. “Granting a preliminary injunction to Plaintiffs would do extraordinary damage to the state’s interest (and the public interest) in preventing the spread of COVID‑19…. On the other side of the balance, Plaintiffs have made no showing that they are experiencing substantial harm as a result of the Executive Orders at this time or that they are likely to experience substantial harm in the near future.” Slip op. at 28. Therefore, the court denied Plaintiffs’ motion for injunctive relief.

On July 27, 2020, the Governor moved to dismiss the entire case for failure to state a claim and lack of jurisdiction. Judge Wood arranged a briefing schedule on the Governor’s motion, and set September 29, 2020, for the next telephonic hearing in the case.

The ruling in Village of Orland Park follows three other successes for the Governor thus far in federal court. Judge John Lee heard the first Northern District case opposing the Governor’s Executive Orders in a case filed by The Beloved Church and its pastor against the Governor and the Stephenson County Sheriff and other officials on April 30, 2020. Cassell v. Snyders, No. 20-cv-50153. The church claimed that the Governor’s April 30, 2020 Executive Order violated the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause and three state statutes. On May 2, 2020, the court denied the church's request for injunctive relief. In a written decision issued on May 3, 2020, after finding, based on Jacobson, that the “traditional tiers of constitutional scrutiny do not apply” during an epidemic (slip op. at 14), the court ruled that the Order was a “neutral, generally applicable law” that is supported by a rational basis (slip op. at 26). The court then invoked the Governor’s Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity with respect to the state law claims, and found the state law claims also unlikely to succeed on the merits. After this denial of injunctive relief in the district court, the church’s interlocutory appeal remains pending in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit as of this writing.

In a second federal case brought by a religious institution, in Elim Romanian Pentecostal Church v. Pritzker, No. 20‑cv‑02782, two churches contested the Governor’s Executive Order, which limited gatherings of more than ten people and imposed social distancing requirements, including on churches. They filed their complaint and a motion for emergency injunctive relief on May 7 and 8, 2020, respectively. The complaint challenged the Governor’s Order on federal and state constitutional grounds and state statutory grounds, but their motion for injunctive relief rested only on U.S. First Amendment rights. On May 13, 2020, Judge Robert Gettleman found that the Governor’s Order was both neutral and of general applicability; therefore, because it was supported by a rational basis, it was not unconstitutional. The court further found that “Plaintiffs’ request for an injunction, and their blatant refusal to follow the mandates of the Order are both ill-founded and selfish.” Slip op. at 11. When the district court denied injunctive relief, the churches appealed to the Seventh Circuit. Their requests for injunctive relief were denied on appeal. In its June 16, 2020 decision, the Seventh Circuit, in part relying on Chief Justice Roberts’ concurring opinion to the denial of injunctive relief in a case brought by churches in the Ninth Circuit, ruled that “Illinois has not discriminated against religion and so has not violated the First Amendment.” Slip op. at 12. The Seventh Circuit then denied the churches’ request for rehearing en banc on July 27, 2020.

On June 15, 2020, several Illinois Republican Party organizations filed a complaint and motion for a TRO and preliminary injunction in the Northern District, alleging that because Governor Pritzker’s Executive Order prohibited gatherings greater than fifty people but exempted the free exercise of religion from this limit, the organizations’ rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments were violated. Illinois Republican Party v. Pritzker, No. 20-cv-03489. Specifically, the Republican organizations alleged that, by exempting the free exercise of religion from the gathering limit, Governor Pritzker created an unconstitutional content-based restriction on speech. On July 2, 2020. Judge Sara Ellis, denied plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunctive relief, ruling that their likelihood of success on the merits of their constitutional claims was less than negligible and the balance of harms weighed heavily against them. The court based its ruling on both Jacobson and a “traditional First Amendment analysis.” Slip op. at 9. The court found that “by exempting free exercise of religion from the gathering limit [in the Executive Order], the Order creates a content-based restriction.” Id. at 15. The court held, however, that the Executive Order survives “strict scrutiny” because the content-based restriction may “eliminate[ ] the increased risk of transmission of COVID‑19 when people gather while only exempting necessary functions to protect health, safety, and welfare and free exercise of religion. Therefore, the Governor has carried his burden at the stage in demonstrating that the Order is narrowly tailored to further a compelling interest….” Id. at 18. The political organizations filed for emergency relief on appeal. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ruled that the Governor’s compelling interest in controlling the spread of COVID‑19 passed strict scrutiny, and denied their motion for emergency relief on July 3, 2020, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied plaintiffs’ emergency application for write of injunctive relief on July 4, 2020. Further proceedings on appeal to the Seventh Circuit are pending as of this writing.

Although the Governor scored successes in the federal lawsuits brought against his COVID‑19 actions, he has not fared as well thus far in state court. The state court litigation against the Governor’s Executive Orders will be addressed in a separate blog, to be published shortly.

For regular updates about the impact of COVID‑19 in the workplace and on business generally, please visit Jenner & Block’s Corporate Environmental Lawyer blog and Jenner & Block’s COVID‑19 Resource Center.

By Leah M. Song and Gabrielle Sigel 

On July 27, 2020, Virginia became the first state to adopt an emergency workplace safety standard regarding exposure to COVID-19. Virginia is one of the 22 states which has jurisdiction to issue its own workplace safety and health regulations, which must be at least as stringent as regulations issued by U.S. OSHA, but can go beyond federal requirements. The Virginia regulation titled §16 VAC 25‐220, Emergency Temporary Standard, Infectious Disease Prevention: SARS‐CoV‐2 Virus That Causes COVID‑19 (“Emergency Standard”) was adopted during a meeting of the Virginia Safety and Health Codes Board on July 15, 2020. The Emergency Standard will expire “(i) within six months of its effective date, upon expiration of the Governor’s State of Emergency, or when superseded by a permanent standard, whichever occurs first, or (ii) when repealed by the Virginia Safety and Health Codes Board.” The Emergency Standard was available as of July 24, 2020, but will be formally published on July 27, 2020, and its legal effective date is July 27, 2020.

The Emergency Standard shall apply to every employer, employee, and place of employment in Virginia within the jurisdiction of the Virginia Occupational Safety and Health Program (“VOSH”), as described in §§ 16 VAC 25-60-20 and 16 VAC 25-60-30 for both public and private employers.

The “[a]pplication of this [Emergency Standard] to a place of employment will be based on the exposure risk level” (i.e., “very high,” “high,” “medium,” and “lower” of COVID-19 and “related hazards present or job tasks.” The Emergency Standard includes a minimum list of factors to be considered in determining exposure risk level, such as the work environment and employee contact, as well as employer requirements for each exposure risk level.

The Emergency Standard details mandatory requirements for all employers, regardless of exposure risk level, such as:

• Exposure assessment and determination, notification requirements, and employee access to exposure and medical records
• Return to work policies and procedures
• Physical distancing
• Limited access to common areas
• Compliance with respiratory protection and personal protective equipment standards
• Compliance with sanitation and disinfection standards

The Emergency Standard details additional requirements for each exposure risk level designated as “very high,” “high,” and “medium.” For all workplaces other than those with low exposure risk, the employer must develop and implement a written Infectious Disease Preparedness and Response Plan (“IDPR Plan”). The IDPR Plan, employers shall consider contingency plans for outbreaks, identify basic infection prevention measures, and address interaction with outside businesses.

In addition, the Emergency Standard requires that in workplaces in the “very high” and “high” exposure risk levels, the employer shall implement protective measures such as isolation facilities and physical barriers. For the “medium” exposure risk level, the employer shall consider protective measures such as flexible work arrangements and increasing physical distancing.

With regard to face coverings, the Emergency Standard defines “face covering” as not PPE. The Emergency Standard states: “Employee use of face coverings for contact inside six feet of coworkers, customers, or other persons is not an acceptable administrative or work practice control to achieve minimal occupational contact. However, when it is necessary for an employee to have brief contact with others inside the six feet distance a face covering is required.” §16 VAC 25‐220-30. At the “medium” exposure level, employers of "medium" exposure level workplaces are required, “to the extent possible,” to provide and have their employees wear face coverings where it is not feasible to physically distance between employees or in customer-facing jobs for the “medium” exposure level. Face coverings may not be required under certain circumstances, such due to the wearer’s medical condition and religious waivers.

To the extent that an employer actually complies with a recommendation contained in CDC guidelines, and those guidelines provide “equivalent or greater protection than provided by a provision of this [Emergency Standard], the employer’s actions shall be considered in compliance with this [Emergency Standard].” “An employer’s actual compliance with a recommendation contained in CDC guidelines … shall be considered evidence of good faith in any enforcement proceeding related to this [Emergency Standard].”

The Emergency Standard also expressly addressed the notification requirements when there is an employee with a positive COVID-19 case. Employers must notify (a) the building or facility owner if any employee in the building tests positive for COVID-19; (b) the Virginia Department of Health within 24 hours of the discovery of a positive case; and (c) the Virginia Department of Labor and Industry within 24 hours of the discovery of three or more employees who test positive for COVID-19 within a 14-day period.

Additionally, employers are prohibited from using antibody testing to “make decisions about returning employees to work who were previously classified as known or suspected to be infected” with COVID-19.

The Emergency Standard also confirms an employee’s right to “refus[e] to do work or enter a location that the employee feels is unsafe.” Section 16 VAC 25-60-110 provides requirements regarding the “discharge or discipline of an employee who has refused to complete an assigned task because of a reasonable fear of injury or death.” That provision states that such discharge or discipline will be considered retaliatory “only if the employee has sought abatement of the hazard from the employer and the statutory procedures for securing abatement would not have provided timely protection.”

Under Emergency Standard §16 VAC 25‐220‐80, covered employers will have until August 26, 2020, to train employees, covering topics such as the requirements of the Emergency Standard, COVID-19 symptoms and methods of transmission, safe and healthy work practices, and anti-discrimination provisions. It is important to note that training requirements for exposure risk levels “very high,” “high,” and “medium” differ from the less-comprehensive requirements for the “lower” risk level. Under subsection 16 VAC 25‐220‐70, if an employer is required to have an IDPR Plan, the employer must develop and train employees on their IDPR Plan by September 25, 2020.

Training and outreach materials, including training PowerPoints, FAQs, an IDPR Plan template, and an exposure risk level flow chart, are being developed by the VOSH Cooperative Programs Division, with some available here, as of July 24, 2020.

At the federal level, OSHA has come under scrutiny for its decision not to adopt a COVID-19 emergency temporary standard. The American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations’ (“AFL-CIO”) and other unions asked OSHA to issue an Emergency Temporary Standard (“ETS”), rather than have employers rely solely on existing OSHA regulations and new COVID-19 guidance to no avail. On May 18, 2020, the AFL-CIO filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the U.S. Court of Appeals to compel OSHA to issue an ETS within 30 days. However, on June 11, 2020, the court held that “OSHA reasonably determined that an ETS is not necessary at this time” given the “unprecedented nature of the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as the regulatory tools that the OSHA has at its disposal to ensure that employers are maintaining hazard-free work environment.” On June 18, 2020, the AFL-CIO filed for a rehearing en banc. Please see Jenner & Block’s analysis of the AFL-CIO lawsuit here. In addition, the U.S. House of Representatives introduced legislation, titled “The COVID-19 Every Worker Protection Act” (H.R. 6559), which would require OSHA to issue an ETS. The provisions of H.R. 6559, including the provisions relating to the ETS, were included in H.R. 6800, The Heroes Act. H.R, passed by the House on May 15, 2020, and which is set to be part of the upcoming political debates and votes by the House and the Senate on new COVID-19 economic stimulus and related legislation.

Jenner & Block’s Corporate Environmental Lawyer will continue to update on these matters, as well as other important COVID‑19 related guidance, as they unfold.

By Leah M. Song

As an update to our July 1st blog regarding EPA’s notice that its COVID-19 Temporary Enforcement Policy will end on August 31, 2020, there have been some new developments in the lawsuits filed challenging that policy.

On July 8, 2020, Judge McMahon of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York ruled that the Natural Resources Defense Counsel and other environmental organizations (“Plaintiffs”) failed to show that they were injured by EPA’s purported “unreasonable delay” in responding to the petition. The Plaintiffs had petitioned EPA to publish an emergency rule requiring an entity to provide written notice if they were suspending monitoring and reporting because of COVID-19.

The court held that the Plaintiffs failed to establish the standing requirements. The Plaintiffs did not establish that they were “legally entitled to the information they seek” and lacked association standing as well. The Plaintiffs did not demonstrate that they “suffered a sufficiently concrete injury nor that that alleged injury is fairly traceable to EPA’s purported delay in responding to the Petition.”

The court said it was “perfectly obvious that, at the time Plaintiffs brought this lawsuit, the EPA had not ‘unreasonably’ delayed its response to the Petition.” Judge McMahon said that “the real litigation – over the legality of the [Enforcement Policy] itself – is presently being briefed in an action brought by nine State Attorneys General. That is where the action will – and should – take place.” Accordingly, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the EPA.

One day later on July 9, the State Attorneys General indicated that they will drop their lawsuit against EPA given the upcoming Enforcement Policy deadline. “EPA does not intend to extend the [Enforcement] Policy beyond August 31 and, should the policy terminate on (or before) August 31, Plaintiffs currently intend to voluntarily dismiss the Complaint without prejudice.” The parties prepared a “contingent, expedited briefing schedule” should EPA not terminate the Enforcement Policy by that date. This announcement is unlikely to cause Judge McMahon to revisit the summary judgment ruling since this decision doesn’t change that Plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the claims.

Jenner & Block’s Corporate Environmental Lawyer will continue to update on these matters, as well as other important COVID‑19 related guidance, as they unfold.

By Leah M. Song

On June 29, 2020, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) issued a termination addendum to the COVID‑19 temporary enforcement policy previously issued on March 26, 2020. As further discussed below, EPA’s temporary enforcement policy will now terminate no later than August 31, 2020. 

The temporary enforcement policy discussed EPA enforcement of environmental legal obligations during the COVID‑19 pandemic. The temporary policy made clear that the EPA expected regulated facilities to comply with regulatory requirements, where reasonably practicable, and to return to compliance as quickly as possible. To be eligible for enforcement discretion, the policy also required facilities to document decisions made to prevent or mitigate noncompliance and demonstrate how the noncompliance was caused by the COVID‑19 pandemic. The temporary enforcement policy was analyzed in Jenner & Block’s Corporate Environmental Lawyer blog here.

In the recent termination addendum, EPA pointed to various federal and state guidelines developed in response to the pandemic, but noted that as restrictions begin to be relaxed or lifted, so too are compliance obstacles. However, EPA also noted that in some states, the resurgence of COVID‑19 cases could result in a pause in reopening and EPA acknowledged that “there will be a period of adjustment as regulated entities plan how to effectively comply both with environmental legal obligations and with public health guidance.”

EPA therefore selected August 31, 2020, as the termination date for the temporary enforcement policy. EPA stated that the termination date reflects “the changing circumstances on facility operations, worker shortages, and other constraints caused by the public health emergency,” but “ensures that there is adequate time to adjust to the changing circumstances.”

EPA reminded entities that “[a]s stated in the temporary policy, entities should make every effort to comply with their environmental compliance obligations and the policy applies only to situations where compliance is not reasonably practicable as a result of COVID‑19” which “should become fewer and fewer.” EPA made clear that it “will not base any exercise of enforcement discretion on this temporary policy for any noncompliance that occurs after August 31, 2020.” However, EPA will still consider exercising its enforcement discretion on a “case-by-case basis regarding any noncompliance, including noncompliance caused by the COVID‑19 public health emergency, before or after the temporary policy is terminated.”

Finally, EPA floated the possibility that the temporary enforcement policy could terminate even before August 31, 2020. EPA will continue to assess national and state conditions, such as “the expiration or lifting of ‘stay at home’ orders” and “the status of federal and/or state COVID‑19 public health emergency guidelines.” In the event that EPA determines conditions warrant earlier termination of the policy, EPA will provide at least 7 days’ notice prior to termination of the policy. 

Jenner & Block’s Corporate Environmental Lawyer will continue to update on these matters, as well as other important COVID‑19 related guidance, as they unfold.

By Leah M. Song and Gabrielle Sigel 

On June 18, 2020, U.S. OSHA issued its “Guidance on Returning to Work,” (“Reopening Guidance”) compiling best practices and existing regulatory standards to assist employers and workers return to work and reopen businesses characterized as non-essential in the earlier weeks of the COVID‑19 pandemic. OSHA described the purpose of the Reopening Guidance as a supplement to OSHA’s first COVID-19 guidance for all employers, issued on March 9, 2020, titled “Guidance on Preparing Workplaces for COVID‑19,” and to the White House’s April 16, 2020 “Guidelines for Opening Up America Again,” both of which have been analyzed on the Jenner & Block Corporate Environmental Lawyer blog here and here, respectively.  In its news release introducing the Reopening Guidance, OSHA states that “[n]on-essential businesses should reopen as state and local governments lift  stay-at-home … orders, and follow public health recommendations from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and other federal requirements or guidelines.”

The Reopening Guidance states that it “focuses on the need for employers to develop and implement strategies. . .” for safe work after reopening. Although OSHA does not directly state that employers must have written reopening plans, OSHA’s Reopening Guidance provides the following “guiding principles” that employers’ reopening plans “should address”:

• Hazard Assessment
• Hygiene
• Social distancing
• Identification and Isolation of Sick Employees
• Return to Work After Illness or Exposure
• Controls
• Workplace Flexibilities
• Training
• Anti-retaliation

(Reopening Guidance, pp. 6-10.) OSHA then provides suggestions on how to implement each of the “guiding principles.” Id. For instance, the Hazard Assessment guiding principle includes “practices to determine when, where, how, and to what sources of SARS-CoV-2 workers are likely to be exposed in the course of their job duties.” The Reopening Guidance provides several examples of how to implement hazard assessments, such as assessing job tasks to determine which involve occupational exposure to the virus and exposure to other members of the public or coworkers. In the discussion of the guiding principle of “Controls,” OSHA addresses PPE and makes clear, as it did in its Face Coverings guidance on June 10, 2020, that face coverings are not PPE. (Reopening Guidance, p. 8.) OSHA repeats this distinction regarding PPE in its discussion of the guiding principle of “Training.” OSHA states that although employers should train workers on how to don/doff, clean, store, maintain, and dispose of PPE, face coverings are not PPE, indicating that those training procedures are not for face coverings. (Reopening Guidance, p. 9.)  The CDC, however, has issued more comprehensive guidelines regarding use of face coverings.  OSHA concludes its discussion of the guiding principles by stating:  “Regardless of the types of infection prevention and control measures employers incorporate into their reopening plans, they should consider ways to communicate about those measures to workers, including through training … and providing a point of contact for any worker questions or concerns.”  

In the Reopening Guidance, OSHA reiterates what it states on its COVID‑19 webpage, that during the pandemic, employers continue to be responsible for complying with OSHA regulations. In the Reopening Guidance, OSHA provides an Appendix A organizing those regulatory requirements in table format. In addition, OSHA states that “[w]here there is no OSHA standard specific to SARS-CoV‑2, employers have the responsibility to provide a safe and healthful workplace that is free from serious recognized hazards” under the OSH Act’s General Duty Clause. 29 CFR 654(a)(1). (Reopening Guidance, p. 11.)

The Reopening Guidance (pp. 11-16) concludes with a series of Employer FAQs, addressing the following topics:

1. OSH Act does not prohibit worksite COVID‑19 testing, but OSHA cautions that a negative result may not indicate no hazard;
2. OSH Act does not prohibit worksite temperature checks or health screenings;
3. OSHA requirements when performing tests and screening, including to protect employees who are performing screenings and to maintain records generating employee medical information;
4. Referencing the sources of other equal employment laws, other than the OSH Act, pertaining to health and medical issues;
5. Referencing the CDC as the source of guidelines for a sick employee’s safe return to work; and
6. Advising, in general, how employers can determine whether OSHA-required PPE is needed.

As with all its published guidance, OSHA states that it is “not a standard or regulation, and it creates no new legal obligations.”

Please feel free to contact the authors with questions or for further information. For regular updates about the impact of COVID‑19 in the workplace and on business generally, please visit Jenner & Block’s Corporate Environmental Lawyer blog and Jenner & Block’s COVID‑19 Resource Center.

By Leah M. Song and Gabrielle Sigel 

On June 11, 2020, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit denied the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations’ (“AFL-CIO”) petition for a writ of mandamus to compel OSHA to issue an Emergency Temporary Standard for Infectious Diseases (“ETS”), providing regulations to protect workers against coronavirus exposure in the workplace.

The three-judge panel, consisting of Judges Henderson, Wilkins, and Rao, found that “OSHA reasonably determined that an ETS is not necessary at this time” given the “unprecedented nature of the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as the regulatory tools that the OSHA has at its disposal to ensure that employers are maintaining hazard-free work environments, see 29 U.S.C. § 654(a).” The statutory section referenced by the court, includes the General Duty Clause of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (“the OSH Act”), which states that each employer “shall furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees.” 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1). The statute also requires that each employer shall “comply with occupational safety and health standards promulgated under this Act.” 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(2). The panel held that “OSHA’s decision not to issue an ETS is entitled to considerable deference.”

Following the Court’s ruling, Solicitor of Labor Kate O’Scannlain and OSHA Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Loren Sweatt stated in a news release: “We are pleased with the decision from the D.C. Circuit, which agreed that OSHA reasonably determined that its existing statutory and regulatory tools are protecting America’s workers and that an emergency temporary standard is not necessary at this time. OSHA will continue to enforce the law and offer guidance to employers and employees to keep America’s workplaces safe.” The ALF-CIO has the right to ask for a rehearing, including en banc, i.e., by all the judges appointed to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.

The lawsuit grew out of written requests that the AFL-CIO and more than 20 unions, including unions for healthcare workers, sent to OSHA in early March.  They asked OSHA to issue an ETS, rather than have employers rely solely on existing OSHA regulations and new COVID-19 guidance.  They requested an ETS that would include a requirement that all employers devise and implement an infection control plan and implement the necessary controls. After the AFL-CIO sent a letter on April 28, 2020, to the Secretary of Labor calling on the agency “to take immediate action to protect the safety and health of workers from exposure to COVID-19 on the job,” the Secretary responded two days later and stated that an ETS was not necessary.

On May 18, 2020, the AFL-CIO filed its petition for a writ of mandamus in the U.S. Court of Appeals to compel OSHA to issue an ETS within 30 days. The petition was based on Section 6(c) of the OSH Act, which states that OSHA “shall provide…for an emergency temporary standard to take immediate effect upon publication in the Federal Register if [it] determines (A) that employees are exposed to grave danger from exposure to substances or agents determined to be toxic or physically harmful or from new hazards, and (B) that such emergency standard is necessary to protect employees from such danger.” 29 U.S.C. § 655(c)(1). The AFL-CIO argued in its court petition that the COVID-19 pandemic is “exactly the type of workplace catastrophe that Congress intended an emergency temporary standard to address.” Given the risks facing essential workers and those returning to work, the AFL-CIO requested an expedited briefing and disposition of the petition and for OSHA to be given 10 days to respond.

On May 29, 2020, OSHA filed its response to the AFL-CIO’s petition, describing its efforts to protect workers during the pandemic through enforcing “existing rules and statutory requirements” and providing “rapid, flexible guidance.” OSHA emphasized the extreme nature of an ETS and how an ETS is rarely used as it “imposes a mandatory standard immediately without public input” and “stays in place…until a permanent rule informed by comment is put in place just six months later.” OSHA argued that 1) the AFL-CIO failed to demonstrate legal standing to bring the petition for a writ of mandamus; 2) an ETS is not “necessary” given OSHA’s existing specific rules, the general duty clause and would otherwise be counterproductive to OSHA’s COVID-19 efforts; and 3) “an ETS would foreclose ongoing policy assessments by the executive branch, Congress, and the states.” The National Association of Home Builders of the United States and other business associations filed amicus curiae briefs in support of OSHA’s position.

On June 2, 2020, the AFL-CIO filed its reply brief  defending its legal standing to bring the case based on its representation of workers in highly impacted industries and that at least 660 of its members have died as a result of COVID-19. The AFL-CIO continued to stress that an ETS is necessary given the “urgent situation” and “grave danger” that COVID-19 presents. Additionally, the AFL-CIO stated that “Congress required OSHA to issue standards despite inevitable scientific uncertainty,” and an ETS does provide flexibility navigating new scientific information since “an ETS can be issued and modified without notice and comment.” The AFL-CIO clarified that the OSH Act requires the agency to issue an ETS, “not that it requires a static, uniform, or all-encompassing ETS.”

In denying AFL-CIO’s petition, the court did not address OSHA’s standing argument, ruling solely on the substance of AFL-CIO’s petition.

Of note, OSHA regulations do not have direct application to the 22 states who have their own state occupational safety and health agencies and regulations governing private employers. One of those “state plan states” is California.  On May 20, 2020, the Labor & Employment Committee of the National Lawyers Guild and Worksafe, a California nonprofit “dedicated to ensuring occupational safety and health rights of vulnerable workers,” filed a petition for a temporary emergency standard before the California Occupational Safety & Health Standards Board (“the Board”). The petitioners requested that the Board create two new California safety regulations. First, the petitioners requested “a temporary emergency standard that would provide specific protections to California employees who may have exposure to COVID-19, but are not protected by the Aerosol Transmissible Diseases standards (Sections 5199 and 5199.1).” The petitioners recommended that the Board consider their draft emergency temporary standard for the Board’s consideration of language for an emergency standard. The petitioners’ draft parallels the framework of the Injury and Illness Prevention Program, but adding COVID-19 related provisions, such as identifying an employee representative, establishing various procedures, and analyzing job hazards and implementing preventative measures. Second, the petitioners requested that the Board enter into “a permanent rulemaking effort to protect workers from infectious diseases including novel pathogens,” such as COVID-19. As of June 11, 2020, the Board has not yet issued its decision on the petition.

Please feel free to contact the authors with questions or for further information. For regular updates about the impact of COVID‑19 in the workplace and on business generally, please visit Jenner & Block’s Corporate Environmental Lawyer blog and Jenner & Block’s COVID‑19 Resource Center.