Greenhouse Gas Feed

Remote Sensing as a Supplement to Emissions Monitoring and Quantification

Feltman-Frank  By:  Arie Feltman-Frank

GHGSat CO2 sensor

According to a recent Bloomberg article, a company did not report an August 2023 air emissions event to state environmental regulators until December, just days after the company was asked by Bloomberg Green about a methane plume detected in August over one of its compressor stations.

The methane plume was observed via a remote sensing instrument onboard the International Space Station (“ISS”) and publicized in November 2023 by Carbon Mapper, a California non-profit that is planning to launch satellites that it states will persistently (i.e., on a daily to weekly basis) pinpoint, track, and make available to the public methane and carbon dioxide emissions at individual facilities located within “high-priority areas.”

The launch of the first Carbon Mapper Coalition satellites is expected in 2024. These satellites will join other recently launched or soon-to-be launched satellites with sensors that can detect methane and carbon dioxide emissions (e.g., GHGSat, MethaneSat). Notably, GHGSat describes its sensor, Vanguard, launched into orbit on November 10, 2023, as the first orbital sensor able to pinpoint carbon dioxide emissions from individual industrial facilities.  

With Carbon Mapper’s satellites not yet launched, the organization’s online data portal includes data from airborne surveys, as well as global observations by NASA’s Earth Surface Mineral Dust Source Investigation (“EMIT”) instrument onboard the ISS (which is the instrument that observed the methane plume over the compressor station).

What’s New?

Pollution monitoring by satellite is not new. What is new is the fact that remote sensing technologies are advancing in their ability to continuously monitor, detect, and quantify emissions and attribute the emissions to individual sources. Moreover, satellite data is becoming increasingly accessible to enforcement agencies and the public. As a result, we are seeing an increased effort by governments, non-profit organizations, and industry to harness remote sensing technologies to better understand and reduce pollution.

The incident highlighted above is but one example of what happens when satellite-derived data goes public, allowing a third party to discover an emissions event—in some cases, before the source. This type of incident is not necessarily rare.

For example, the possibility of third-party detection is incorporated into EPA’s final rule setting new source performance standards and emissions guidelines for oil and natural gas facilities under the Clean Air Act (the “Methane Rule”). Under this rule, EPA-certified third parties will be able to use EPA-approved remote sensing technologies to notify the Agency of “super-emitter events” (100 kg/hr of methane or greater), ultimately requiring owners and operators to investigate the events and, if necessary, take corrective actions.

Legal Risks

The availability of advanced satellite-derived emissions data can lead to legal risks that can materialize in enforcement actions (which are likely to become more common, particularly with respect to methane emissions at oil and natural gas operations and landfills), as well as citizen suits and tort actions. Third-party detection can also make it harder to favorably resolve violations pursuant to enforcement policies that favor voluntary self-disclosure. Finally, third-party detection is not good for a company’s reputation and can lead to increased public scrutiny.   

Importantly, these legal risks are not limited to oil and natural gas production operations and landfills (though methane emissions from these sources are certainty a primary focus so far). Nor are these legal risks limited to methane and carbon dioxide emissions. For example, Tropospheric Emissions: Monitoring of Pollution (“TEMPO”), an instrument that was launched into space in August 2023, measures pollutants including nitrogen dioxide, ozone, aerosols, and sulfur dioxide on an hourly basis during the daytime over North America at neighborhood scales.

Preparing for What’s to Come

Companies and investors associated with emissions-intensive operations should do the following to prepare for what’s to come.

  • Familiarize yourself with what remote sensing technologies are out there (or may be soon) that can detect emissions, as well as the extent to which the detected emissions can be attributed to the relevant operations and reliably quantified. Also, consider whether the emissions data will be available to the public.
  • If necessary, conduct a tailored analysis of the legal risks that remote sensing technologies pose to your current and future operations and consider the admissibility of satellite data in administrative and civil proceedings.
  • Consider whether it is worth utilizing remote sensing technologies to supplement current pollution monitoring and quantification efforts (e.g., to comply with monitoring requirements, as well as future climate reporting requirements). Indeed, under EPA’s Methane Rule, referenced above, owners and operators of oil and natural gas facilities will be able to use advanced methane detection technologies as an alternative to ground-based methods to comply with monitoring requirements. With respect to climate reporting, remote sensing technologies may be especially helpful for companies seeking to better understand emissions that are outside of their direct control.

Also, note that remote sensing technologies may make their way into settlements. For example, on December 12, 2023, the owner of a municipal sanitary landfill agreed to spend approximately $30,000 to use drone technology to monitor methane emissions to resolve alleged violations of the Clean Air Act. This was the first settlement involving the use of drones for surface emissions monitoring.

We will continue to track remote sensing technologies on the Corporate Environmental Lawyer. Please do not hesitate to reach out if you have questions.

Montana State Court Sides with Youth Plaintiffs in Unique Climate Change Lawsuit

Siros    By Steven M. Siros, Co-Chair, Environmental and Workplace Health & Safety Law PracticeTX oil well

On August 14, 2023, a Montana state court found that a Montana environmental review statute (the Montana Environmental Policy Act or MEPA) that limited (and as amended in May 2023, precluded) consideration of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and corresponding impacts of those emissions on the climate in connection with environmental reviews was violative of Article IX, Section 1 of the Montana constitution that requires that “[t]he state and each person maintain and improve a clean and health environment in Montana for present and future generations.” 

The court’s ruling was almost entirely focused on the evidence presented by the plaintiffs in significant part because the defendants began and rested their defense on the same day, arguing primarily that the case presented an issue that should rightly be decided by the legislature and not the judiciary.  

In its 103-page order, the court found that plaintiffs had standing, noting that although plaintiffs’ mental health injuries directly resulting from state inaction or counterproductive action on climate change did not establish a cognizable injury, plaintiffs’ mental health injuries stemming from the effects of climate change on Montana’s environment, were cognizable injuries.  The court also found redressability, presuming that if the court declared MEPA unconstitutional, that would somehow compel Montana to deny future permits for fossil fuel activities thereby reducing the levels of GHG emissions in the state.   

In finding portions of the MEPA statute to be violative of the Montana constitution, the court stated that [b]y prohibiting consideration of climate, GHG emissions, and how additional GHG emissions will contribute to climate change … the MEPA Limitation violates Plaintiffs’ right to a clean and healthful environment and is facially unconstitutional”. 

Montana’s attorney general has already indicated the state intends to appeal the court’s ruling, noting that this “same legal theory has been thrown out of federal court and the courts in more than a dozen states.”  What impact this ruling might have, if any, on Juliana et al. v. United Stateswhich is pending in federal court in Oregon and involves claims that the actions of the federal government are violative of the federal constitution remains to be seen, especially since the U.S. constitution doesn’t contain similar language regarding the right to a clean environment as is contained in the Montana state constitution. 

In any event, we will continue to provide timely updates on breaking environmental, health and safety issues at the Corporate Environmental Lawyer blog.  

In a Choose Your Own Adventure - Approach, EPA Proposes Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for New and Existing Power Plants

Tatjana 

  image from environblog.jenner.com

Daniel BLOG

Feltman-Frank

     

By Tatjana Vujic  Allison A. Torrence  Daniel L. Robertson  and Arie Feltman Frank

Today, the US Environmental Protection Agency released its long-awaited proposal for New Source Performance Standards for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New, Modified, and Reconstructed Fossil Fuel-Fired Electric Generating Units; Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Existing Fossil Fuel-Fired Electric Generating Units; and Repeal of the Affordable Clean Energy Rule (Proposed GHG Rule). This article provides an overview of the Proposed GHG Rule and Power plant identifies some issues that may lie ahead.

I. Basic Architecture of the Proposed GHG Rule

The Proposed GHG Rule includes four parts. First, as a matter of housekeeping, the proposed rule officially rescinds the Affordable Clean Energy (ACE) Rule. The ACE Rule would have set emissions guidelines for states to incorporate into measures to address greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from existing coal-fired power plants and focused on efficiency improvements. The ACE Rule was promulgated in 2019 to replace the 2015 Clean Power Plan. In 2022, the Supreme Court issued its landmark decision in West Virginia v. EPA, which ruled that the Clean Power Plan exceeded EPA’s authority to regulate GHGs pursuant to the Major Questions Doctrine, an assessment of which can be found in our article West Virginia v. EPA: The Major Questions Doctrine Arrives to Rein in Administrative Power, published in Pratt’s Law Report.[1]

The Proposed GHG Rule then outlines standards of performance and emissions requirements based on the Agency's determination of the best system of emissions reduction (BSER), as required by Section 111 of the Clean Air Act (CAA), for three types of generating units: (A) existing coal-fired power plants, (B) new gas-fired power plants, and (C) existing gas-fired power plants. For each of these categories of generating units, EPA establishes stratified emissions standards and compliance dates dictated by the unit’s anticipated lifespan and capacity factor. Observers may recognize that the targets and dates proposed in the rules are consistent with climate goals already set by many power generators.

II. Operation of the Fuel-Type Subcategory Approach

Within the basic categories of existing coal plants, existing gas plants, and new gas plants, the Proposed GHG Rule applies a schedule for compliance and emissions reduction targets based on an individual plant’s capacity and anticipated lifespan. These standards and subcategories are guided by EPA’s determination of what constitutes the most cost effective and demonstrated technology available, thereby meeting BSER.

  • Existing Coal-Fired Generating Unit GHG Emissions Standards

For existing coal plants, EPA created four subcategories based on the projected lifespan of the individual operating unit. They include coal plants that have not committed to a date certain by which to cease operations, coal plants that have voluntarily committed to cease operations by 2040, coal plants that will retire by 2035, and coal plants that will retire by 2032.

(1) Coal Plants Anticipating Ongoing Operations

If a coal steam unit has not committed to ceasing operations, EPA will require it to meet a standard consistent with carbon capture and sequestration at a 90% capture rate.

(2) Coal Plants with a Voluntary Commitment to Cease Operations by 2040

For a coal plant that has committed to voluntary retirement before 2040, the plant must meet a standard consistent with co-firing 40% natural gas.

(3) Coal Plants Retiring By 2035

With respect to a coal plant retiring in the near term, i.e., it plans to discontinue operations by 2035, EPA proposes a more relaxed standard. The more relaxed standard requires, in addition to routine operation and maintenance activities, the plant to accept a capacity limitation of 20% by 2030 and each year of operation thereafter.

(4) Coal Plants Retiring By 2032

For coal plants with an imminent retirement schedule, which means a coal plant that commits to ceasing operations by 2032, no capacity limitations must be taken. The plant need only continue to fulfill routine operation and maintenance requirements.

The underlying message for coal plants is that if retirement looms near on the horizon, then there is not an expectation for significant investments to be made in the plant.

  • New Gas-Fired Electric Generating Units

In setting a BSER for GHG emissions from new gas-fired power plants, EPA also uses subcategories to stratify the BSER analysis. In doing so, EPA appears to be striving to strike a balance between a requirement that plants install demonstrated and achievable technology and the observation that infrastructure must exist to support the technology that would make it possible to meet the standards.

The subcategories thus include standards for peaker plants or plants that have a capacity factor of 20% or less, intermediate plants, which include plants with a 20 to an approximately 50% capacity factor (used over a certain amount of time per annum), and baseload plants, which constitute plants with a capacity factor over 50%. The standards are set based on the usage of the plant – the greater the annual operation of the plant, the greater controls and stricter emissions standards required.

(1) New Gas-Fired Peaker Plants / Plants with an Annual Capacity Factor of 20% or Less

Peaker plants include natural gas-fired power plants with a capacity factor of 20% or less. The Proposed GHG Rule would require peaker plants to use clean fuels, which include natural gas, with no other requirements.

(2) New Gas-Fired Intermediate Plants / Plants with an Annual Capacity Factor between 20% and 50%

The intermediate category includes plants with a capacity factor ranging from 20% to approximately 50%. This category generally includes the most efficient simple-cycle plants. By 2032, intermediate plants will be required to meet an emissions standard equal to blending 30% hydrogen by volume into the plant’s fuel stream. The hydrogen must qualify as low GHG hydrogen, which is a standard borrowed from the Inflation Reduction Act’s hydrogen tax credit and is defined in the Inflation Reduction Act as hydrogen generated via a process that results in a lifecycle GHG emissions rate of no more than 4 kilograms of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e) per kilogram of hydrogen.[2] In the Proposed GHG Rule, EPA identifies the low hydrogen standard but defers the determination of what constitutes low hydrogen to the Department of Treasury. The Treasury Department is currently developing guidance on the implementation of the production tax credit for clean hydrogen, which includes a decision on how to account for GHG emissions as part of the hydrogen production lifecycle analysis.

(3) New Baseload Gas-Fired Electric Generating Units / Plants with an Annual Capacity Over 50%

For natural gas-fired power plants with an annual capacity factor over 50%, EPA plans to require those plants to employ efficient combined cycle technology in the first phase of operation. This means that when the plant is built, it must implement the most efficient combined cycle technology and meet an emissions standard of 770 lb CO2/MWh-gross standard. Over time, the standard becomes stricter, seemingly to match the anticipated increased availability and advancements in technology in future years, with a choice of one of two pathways. The first pathway requires the increasing use of hydrogen, or an equivalent emissions outcome, and the second pathway would require carbon capture and storage (CCS) or an equivalent emissions outcome.

(3)(a) Hydrogen Pathway for New Baseload Gas-Fired Electric Generating Units

If a baseload plant were to choose to use hydrogen as its path for reducing its GHG emissions, it can anticipate a stepwise timeline. By 2032, the plant will have to reach a level that represents a 30% hydrogen blend by volume or reduce its emissions to an equivalent extent. Then, by 2038, the same plant will need to achieve a 96% blend of hydrogen by volume or reduce its emissions to an equivalent extent. In all instances, the source of hydrogen must meet the standards set for the lowest carbon-emitting hydrogen tax credits, which will be defined by the Department of Treasury.

(3)(b) Carbon Capture and Storage Pathway for New Baseload Gas-Fired Electric Generating Units

If a plant operator were to choose to employ CCS as a means of reducing its GHG emissions, the Proposed GHG Rule would require the plant to reach a 90% capture rate by 2035 or reduce its emissions to an equivalent extent. Note that the 90% capture rate achieves emissions reductions equivalent to a 96% blend of hydrogen in the fuel stream.

  • Existing Gas-Fired Generating Units

Finally, the Proposed GHG Rule not only sets standards for new gas-fired generating units, but also for the largest and most frequently used of the existing gas-fired power plants. These plants include those that generate 300 megawatts or more of electricity per year and operate at a 50% or greater capacity factor. Under the proposal, these plants will be required to meet the 2038 hydrogen pathway standard, the 2035 CCS pathway standard, or achieve the equivalent thereof. For existing gas-fired generating units that do not meet the 300MW and 50% annual capacity factor thresholds, EPA is seeking comment on how it should regulate such units.

III. Anticipated Questions and Challenges

In addition to the obvious legal challenges regarding whether the proposed rule implicates the Major Questions Doctrine and whether the technologies and timelines constitute BSER, there remain questions regarding the definition of what constitutes clean or green hydrogen. Are hydrogen and CCS as achievable as EPA contends? Are the target dates correct? Also, the proposed rule’s new gas turbine standards will apply to any plant for which construction commences after the date of publication of the Proposed GHG Rule. This CAA provision is intended to prevent a rush to commence construction on new plants to lock in the old standards. This may lead to an early challenge of this mechanism because it becomes controlling upon the publication of the proposal and prior to the rule’s finalization.

Another question is how will states, which have two years to develop state plans to incorporate the existing source standards, go about implementing the proposed rule. Will states be able to cooperate to achieve emissions reductions, such as through emissions trading regimes, particularly if such cooperative approaches allow states to achieve equivalent or better results? Why has EPA overlooked other significant emissions reduction options, such as renewable natural gas? How will plant operators pay for these upgrades? EPA has considered the Inflation Reduction Act’s many tax incentives and the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law’s incentives and payments in determining what is economically achievable, but how easy will it be to access such funds, and how can those funds be leveraged?

  • Immediate Takeaways

An initial review of the Proposed GHG Rule indicates EPA has been careful not to step outside the proverbial fenceline. EPA appears to be taking into account the implied guidance provided by the Supreme Court in West Virginia v. EPA that the Agency’s authority under the CAA to regulate power plants should focus on facilities on a unit-by-unit basis rather than an approach that relies on generation-shifting, which the Court determined exceeded EPA’s statutory authority. The rules also appear to be designed in a way and timed to align with other regulatory requirements for the power sector, such as regulations governing wastewater discharges and ozone and mercury emissions, which may streamline investments made in specific plants as well as across the power generation fleet.

Details on the findings that underlie the emissions standards and timing within the proposal will be well litigated. The ultimate question, however, will be whether the overall approach, which entails setting standards for individual plants while still providing options and flexibility by which plant operators can achieve those standards, can thread the judicial scrutiny needle. As you work through these issues, Jenner’s Transitions in Energy and Climate Solutions Practice and Environmental and Workplace Health and Safety Practice are here to help.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Existing Clean Power and Eligibility for Hydrogen Production Tax Credits: “Additionality” Doesn’t Add Up


By Matthew Price

        The Inflation Reduction Act promises to transform the energy sector in many ways, but among the most exciting is the hydrogen production tax credit, which provides a production tax credit, over a ten year period beginning with the date a facility is placed in service, of up to 60 cents per kilogram of “clean hydrogen” – that is, hydrogen “produced through a process” with a life-cycle greenhouse gas emissions rate below specified thresholds. 26 U.S.C. § 45V.   The credit is enhanced five-fold, up to $3 per kilogram, for clean hydrogen produced at facilities complying with certain prevailing wage and apprenticeship requirements.  Clean hydrogen can be used to decarbonize hard-to-electrify sectors, such as steel, cement, and chemical production, that today are responsible for a significant share of the Nation’s carbon emissions.  

        The Treasury Department is currently reviewing comments on the implementation of the hydrogen tax credit under Section 45V.  See IRS Notice 2022-58.  Several commenters have urged the agency to limit tax credits to hydrogen production powered by new renewable generation – thus eliminating the ability for hydrogen producers to receive tax credits if they source their electricity from existing renewable or nuclear plants.  Similar arguments are being raised at the Department of Energy as it seeks to finalize its Clean Hydrogen Production Standard to guide funding decisions under the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act. 

        The policy rationale for this limitation – which its proponents call “additionality” – is that if existing renewable or nuclear plants are used to produce hydrogen, they will no longer be available to serve the grid, and the result will be increased dispatch of fossil fuel plants to fill the gap, resulting in increased carbon emissions overall.  In their view, only “additional” clean generation – generation that would not otherwise exist, but for the electricity demand created by hydrogen production – should be allowed to be used by hydrogen producers claiming tax credits or federal funding. 

        An “additionality” requirement, however, is simply inconsistent with the statutory scheme.  If one is adopted, it is almost certain to be challenged in court – creating uncertainty that will discourage clean hydrogen production.  And, for the reasons I describe below, such a challenge is likely to succeed.

        First, the text of the Inflation Reduction Act forecloses such a requirement.  The statute makes tax credits available to “any qualified clean hydrogen,” 26 U.S.C. § 45V(b)(2)(A), (B), (C), (D) (emphasis added), and defines “qualified clean hydrogen” to focus on the process used to produce the hydrogen – not the indirect effects like the potential for other power sources to be dispatched to serve other load on the electric grid.  Thus, hydrogen counts as “clean hydrogen” if it is “produced through a process that results in a lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions rate” below a specified threshold.  Id. § 45V(c)(2)(A).  Lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions are to be calculated using a model known as “GREET,” developed by Argonne National Labs, and “shall only include emissions through the point of production” as determined by the GREET model.  Id. § 45V(b)(1) (emphasis added).  In calculating emissions through the point of production, the GREET model makes no distinction between sources of electricity based on whether they are existing or new.  Thus, there is no room for an “additionality” requirement in the definitions establishing eligibility for the tax credit.

        Second, if Congress had wanted to impose an “additionality” requirement, it knew how to do so.  For example, Section 45V contains other vintage-related requirements: a “qualified clean hydrogen production facility” is defined as one that begins construction before 2033.  § 45V(c)(3)(C).  Vintage requirements also limit which hydrogen production facilities are eligible for the increased credit amounts on account of compliance with certain prevailing wage and apprenticeship requirements.  § 45V(e)(2)(A).  But there is no vintage limitation on the resources used to provide energy to a clean hydrogen production facility. 

        Moreover, other provisions in the Inflation Reduction Act make clear that Congress anticipated the use of electricity generated by existing nuclear facilities to produce hydrogen and coordinated other clean energy credits with Section 45V on that assumption.  Section 45U, for example, establishes a nuclear production tax credit that is only available to nuclear facilities placed in service prior to enactment of the Inflation Reduction Act.  In Section 45U(c)(2), Congress incorporated special rules (set forth in Section 45(e)(13)) that would allow nuclear facilities receiving credits under Section 45U to use the electricity they generate to produce clean hydrogen receiving credits under Section 45V.  Congress would not have done so if it intended to limit Section 45V credits to hydrogen produced using energy generated by “additional” resources.  Indeed, an “additionality” requirement would make Section 45U(c)(2)’s incorporation of Section 45(e)(13) superfluous, conflicting with a basic principle of statutory interpretation and negating Congress’s intent. 

        Third, Congress sought to promote new renewable generation directly in the Inflation Reduction Act, through tax credit programs aimed directly at new clean generation, in Sections 45Y and 48E.  Especially in light of Sections 45Y and 48E, imposing an “additionality” requirement on Section 45V would be arbitrary.  After all, the purpose of Sections 45Y and 48E is to massively increase the amount of new renewable generation.  Against the backdrop of that expected influx, there is no reason to believe that new renewable generation providing electricity to hydrogen producers is “additional” just because it is new.  Such new renewable generation likely would have come online anyway.  And from the standpoint of the grid, such new renewable resources are just as available to serve load as existing renewable and nuclear resources are.  Consequently, the main effect of grafting an “additionality” requirement onto Section 45V is simply to favor one group of clean generators that otherwise would be serving load (new generators) over other clean generators that would otherwise would be serving load (existing generators).  That would be at odds with the purpose of Section 45V, which is to encourage hydrogen production—not promote new renewable generation.  From the standpoint of hydrogen producers, the main effect of an “additionality” requirement is to limit the options available to them in sourcing electricity—and thereby potentially make it more costly to produce clean hydrogen.  That is directly contrary to Congress’s objectives in Section 45V.

        Imposing an “additionality” requirement under the DOE’s Clean Hydrogen Production Standard, see 42 U.S.C. § 16166, which will guide funding decisions under the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, would face similar legal hurdles.  The Clean Hydrogen Production Standard concerns “the carbon intensity of clean hydrogen production that shall apply” to the various hydrogen-related activities carried out under 42 U.S.C. subchapter 8, id. § 16166(a), including the selection of regional clean hydrogen hubs. 

        An “additionality” requirement has no place there.  Section 16166(b) directs that the clean hydrogen production standard should “support clean hydrogen production from each source” listed in Section 16154(e)(2).  That provision, in turn, makes no distinction between new energy sources and existing energy sources, but instead lists “diverse energy sources” including “fossil fuels with carbon capture, utilization, and sequestration” and “nuclear energy.”  Id. § 16154(e)(2), (2)(A), (2)(D); see also id. § 16166(c) (listing numerous sources to which “the standard” shall apply, but making no distinction among resources based on vintage).  Similarly, Section 16166(b) requires “clean hydrogen” to be defined in terms of carbon emissions “produced at the site of production per kilogram of hydrogen produced.”  Id. § 16166(b)(1)(B) (emphasis added).  In other words, hydrogen’s carbon intensity is to be assessed based on the energy source used to produce the hydrogen—not the indirect effects that using that energy source for hydrogen production may have on the carbon intensity of the grid as a whole.  An “additionality” requirement would be inconsistent with this statutory text.   What is more, the purposes of the statute are squarely focused on promoting the development and commercialization of hydrogen technology.   42 U.S.C. § 16151.  Nothing in those purposes suggest that hydrogen should be pursued only to the extent it can be created by new carbon-free resources.

        The Inflation Reduction Act amounts to a once-in-a-generation opportunity to kick-start hydrogen production.  It could have a transformational effect on our energy economy.  Unless already committed to other uses, existing clean resources should be available to American manufacturers seeking to realize that transformation.  It would be unfortunate indeed if the transition to a hydrogen-based economy were delayed or thwarted because of an “additionality” requirement limiting hydrogen producers to electricity procured from new resources that need to be constructed and interconnected.  Moreover, an additionality requirement is likely to face litigation that will create significant regulatory uncertainty for this nascent industry.  The resulting chilling effect is exactly the opposite of what Congress hoped to achieve.

Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage: A Pathway for Greenhouse Gas Emission Reductions

Siros

Tatjana Feltman-FrankBy Steven Siros, Tatjana Vujic and Arie Feltman-Frank

 

 

As businesses continue to optimize their environmental, social, and governance (ESG) strategies, an important arrow in the ESG quiver may be carbon di Greenhouseoxide (CO2) capture and storage (CCS). CCS involves capturing, compressing, transporting, and then injecting CO2 into deep underground porous rock formations for long-term storage, known as geological sequestration (GS). These formations are often a mile or more beneath the surface and overlaid by impermeable, non-porous layers of rock that trap the CO2 and prevent it from migrating upward.

The effectiveness of carbon capture,[1] coupled with the robust storage capacity available in the United States,[2] make CCS a promising method to minimize the climate-forcing effects of CO2 emissions. Indeed, the Security and Exchange Commission’s (SEC’s) proposed climate-disclosure rule refers to investing in CCS technologies as one way by which companies can “take advantage of climate-related opportunities.” CCS may also be a viable compliance option for “major” federal contractors which, according to a recently proposed Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council rule, will be required to set “science-based targets” to reduce their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in order to do business with the federal government.

Injecting CO2 underground is not new. For decades, the oil and gas industry has been utilizing enhanced oil recovery (EOR), a process that involves injecting CO2 into oil-bearing formations to increase the amount of oil and gas produced from oil and gas reservoirs. What is relatively new, however, is the increased focus on GS as a vital, if not indispensable,[3] part of meeting CO2-reduction goals. This client alert will predominantly focus on the GS component of CCS and the permitting requirements associated with GS of CO2 for the purpose of meeting GHG reduction targets.

I    The Safe Drinking Water Act and Geological Sequestration of CO2

The primary federal program governing GS of CO2 is the Safe Drinking Water Act’s (SDWA’s) Underground Injection Control (UIC) program. According to EPA, the “chief goal” of the UIC program is the “protection” of underground sources of drinking water (USDWs).[4] Under the SDWA, EPA must publish regulations for state UIC programs that “contain minimum requirements for effective programs to prevent underground injection which endangers drinking water sources.”[5] Interested states can then apply for primary enforcement responsibility of the UIC program, known as “primacy.”[6]

The statutory vehicle for primacy applicable to GS of CO2 is section 1422, whereby states must demonstrate that, among other requirements, they have adopted and will implement a UIC program that meets the “minimum requirements” established by the federal regulations.[7] While the federal regulations establish a floor, they do not preclude states from adopting or enforcing “more stringent or [] extensive” requirements or “[o]perating a program with a greater scope of coverage.”[8] If EPA approves a state’s UIC program, the state achieves primacy; if EPA disapproves the program (or parts thereof), or if a state fails to apply, the federal UIC program applies.[9]

There are six classes of underground injection wells that are regulated under the SDWA.[10]  Of these classes, Class VI and Class II wells are most relevant to GS of CO2.

Class VI wells are used for non-experimental GS of CO2.[11] EPA promulgated regulations governing minimum federal requirements for Class VI wells by final rule on December 10, 2010.  The regulations are generally set forth at 40 C.F.R. Parts 124, 144, 145, and 146 and required EPA to establish a Federal UIC Class VI program in each state that did not submit a complete primacy application by September 6, 2011. Because no state applied by the deadline, on September 6, 2011, the federal Class VI program became effective nationwide.

Since then, only North Dakota and Wyoming have achieved Class VI primacy. In all other states, the federal program applies. Only two Class VI permits have been issued under the federal UIC program, both by EPA Region 5 to Archer Daniels Midland in Decatur, Illinois, which took EPA approximately three years to issue (measured from the date the applications were submitted to issuance). Another 28 Class VI permit applications are pending in California, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Ohio, and Texas. It is anticipated that over time, the permitting process will become both faster and more efficient, especially in light of increased funding provided by the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA), which appropriates $5 billion annually to EPA over the next five years for the permitting of Class VI wells as a way to facilitate more CCS.[12]

Class II wells, which include wells that inject fluids into oil and gas reservoirs for EOR,[13] are also relevant to GS of CO2 because long-term storage of CO2 in these wells can be incidental to the injection process. Notably, most states have achieved Class II primacy.[14] When EOR results in some “incidental storage” of CO2 in a Class II well, the owner or operator is likely not required to seek a Class VI permit. However, if the owner or operator elects to use a Class II well originally used for EOR to inject CO2 for the “primary purpose of long-term storage,” the regulations require that the owner or operator obtain a Class VI permit “when there is an increased risk to USDWs compared to Class II operations.”[15]

We are not aware of any instances where EPA has required an owner or operator to obtain a Class VI permit for a previously permitted Class II well. As such, one attractive option for owners or operators of Class II wells used for EOR may be to utilize these wells for long-term GS of CO2, given that the Class II requirements are less stringent. Because Class VI wells are the primary wells used for long-term CO2 storage, the remainder of this client alert will predominantly focus on Class VI wells.

    A.    Geological Sequestration Projects in States Where the Federal UIC Class VI Program Applies.

In states in which the federal UIC Class VI program applies, to receive a Class VI permit that would allow for GS of CO2, businesses need to submit a Class VI permit application to the appropriate EPA regional office within “a reasonable time before construction is expected to begin.”

Because the primary requirement of the UIC program is to ensure that GS of CO2 will not threaten any USDWs, businesses need to carefully choose where to locate their wells. In particular, wells need to be placed at sites of “suitable” geology.  Of suitable geology means that the injection zone can receive the total anticipated volume of the CO2 stream, while the confining zone, i.e., the area in which the CO2 will be stored, must be free of transmissive faults or fractures and sufficient to contain the injected CO2 stream. The confining zone also must be able to withstand injection without initiating or propagating fractures that would allow the CO2 to migrate outside its bounds.[16] GS of CO2 must also be beneath the lowermost formation containing a USDW unless a waiver of the injection depth requirements has been granted.[17]

In their applications, Class VI permit applicants must include information regarding the proposed injection well, its construction, the proposed operations, and geologic, hydrologic, and other information regarding the area around the project where USDWs may be endangered, which is known as the “area of review.” The area of review is “delineated using computational modeling.”[18] Applications must also include plans related to the area of review and the types of corrective action, testing and monitoring, injection well plugging, post-injection site care and site closure, and emergency and remedial response that will be provided. Lastly, applications must provide proof that the applicants meet financial responsibility requirements.[19]

Throughout the application process, applicants should consider whether the information submitted to EPA can be claimed as confidential business information. If so, they should be sure to make a confidential business information assertion in their applications or else risk the possibility that their applications could be subject to public disclosure.[20]

Once cessation of injection occurs, owners and operators must continue to monitor the site for “at least 50 years” or until EPA decides that the GS project no longer poses an endangerment to USDWs. Owners and operators also must report any evidence that the injected CO2 stream or associated pressure front may cause endangerment to a USDW.[21]

If any indication of movement of any contaminant into an USDW exists, the permittee will be subject to “additional requirements . . . as are necessary to prevent such movement,” which are imposed by modifying the permit or terminating the permit if “cause” exists. In addition, in the absence of “appropriate” state or local action, EPA may take “emergency action” when “a contaminant which is present in or likely to enter a public water system or [USDW] may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to the health of persons.”[22]

    B.    Geological Sequestration Projects in States That Have Achieved Class VI Primacy

As noted previously, only North Dakota and Wyoming have achieved Class VI primacy.[23] Thus, businesses interested in pursuing GS in these states will have to do so in accordance with the states’ respective Class VI regulations. North Dakota’s Class VI program is administered by the North Dakota Oil & Gas Division. To date, North Dakota’s Oil & Gas Division has issued two Class VI permits and has one permit application under review. Wyoming’s Class VI program, on the other hand, is administered by the Wyoming Department of Environmental Quality. To date, Wyoming has received two Class VI permit applications, each of which are still under review.

In contrast to the three-year permitting time for the two Class VI permits issued by EPA Region 5, the time to review and approve the two permits issued by the North Dakota Oil & Gas Division was approximately eight months. It is expected, however, that the annual $50 billion in grant funding made available through the IIJA over the next five years[24] will drive more states to seek Class VI primacy. The likely result will be that more projects may be able to get permitted faster.

II    Obstacles, New Developments, and Other Considerations

Despite the significant funding and attention given to CCS as a climate mitigation tool, businesses interested in pursuing CCS should be aware of potential obstacles they may encounter and be required to navigate. These obstacles include high project costs, public opposition, and uncertainties associated with subsurface pore space ownership and long-term liability. While other project specific requirements are likely to arise, such as compliance with additional federal, state, and local laws,[25] a review of these additional requirements is beyond the scope of this client alert. 

    A.    High Project Costs.

High project costs are a key challenge to CCS development. Whether a project’s costs are high or not will depend on several factors, including the type of facility, the facility’s proximity to the injection site, the availability of CO2 transportation infrastructure, and tax credits and grants.

Taking each of these factors in turn, certain facilities will be at an advantage when it comes to cost thanks to characteristics like the concentration of the CO2 stream. In particular, CO2 capture is most cost-effective for facilities that generate highly concentrated CO2 streams.[26]

With respect to transportation, the closer the CO2-producing facility is to the injection site, the lower the overall costs will be. Also, CCS is likely to be most cost-effective in areas with a history of oil and gas extraction and EOR, such as California, Illinois, Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas, where the approximately 5,000 miles of CO2 pipelines established in the United States are largely located.[27] While the expansion of CO2 pipeline infrastructure will be necessary for large-scale CCS development, the need for additional pipeline to deliver the CO2 to the injection site creates not only more infrastructure costs but also more requirements with which more costs, such as permit and land acquisition and related compliance with pipeline safety regulations, are likely associated.[28]

Importantly, the cost equation may be changing owing to the expanded 45Q tax credits established by the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), which are available in addition to funding provided by the IIJA. Although a detailed overview of these statutes’ provisions is beyond the purview of this client alert, at a high level, the IRA increased the 45Q tax credits for certain facilities or equipment placed in service after December 31, 2022, to $85 per ton of CO2 disposed of in secure geologic storage and $60 per ton of CO2 used for EOR and disposed of in secure geologic storage or otherwise utilized in a qualified manner.[29] As mentioned above, in addition to the IRA-driven tax credits, the IIJA provided significant funding for CCS, some of which was allocated to the U.S. Department of Energy, which recently released three funding opportunity announcements and established a new finance program that may help CCS developers reduce costs further.

    B.    Public Opposition.

Despite its upsides, it is possible that CCS projects may draw opposition from the public, which can present serious developmental challenges. To address potential opposition, businesses would be wise to consider how to authentically engage with community stakeholders at the outset of project development to try to avoid contentious permitting processes to the extent possible.

However, should public opposition escalate into formal attempts to prohibit or restrict GS of CO2, businesses should consider whether these efforts may be preempted.[30] Although the SDWA contains a savings clause that provides that “[n]othing in this subchapter shall diminish any authority of a State or political subdivision to adopt or enforce any law or regulation respecting underground injection,”[31] some courts have found local actions to be preempted, as best exemplified in EQT Prod. Co. v. Wender.[32]

In the case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed a district court’s determination that the West Virginia UIC program established under the West Virginia Water Pollution Control Act (WPCA) preempted a county ordinance that imposed a blanket ban on the disposal of wastewater anywhere within the county.[33]

The Fourth Circuit explained that municipal ordinances that are inconsistent or in conflict with state law are preempted and further concluded that the ordinance’s prohibition was inconsistent with West Virginia’s UIC program because the permanent disposal of wastewater in Class II wells “is licensed and regulated by the state pursuant to a comprehensive and complex permit program.” The court also rejected the county’s argument that the WPCA’s savings clause, which preserves the power of local entities to “suppress nuisances,” permitted the county to broadly designate UIC wells as nuisances and then categorically ban them. The court refused to give the savings clause this broad and less logical reading absent express language and instead interpreted the clause as allowing local regulation that “touch[ed] on the licensed activity.” This had the effect of preserving the county’s right to bring a common law public nuisance action against a state permitted UIC well on a case-by-case basis.

This case suggests that local actions, at least those that have the effect of banning or prohibiting otherwise permitted GS projects, may be preempted by state or federal law.

    C.    Subsurface Pore Space Ownership and Long-Term Liability.

Finally, businesses interested in pursuing GS should consider uncertainties associated with subsurface pore space ownership and long-term liability. Ways to circumvent pore space ownership and liability issues are described below.

First, to effectuate GS of CO2, businesses will need to acquire ownership or control of the pore space in which the CO2 will be stored. This step, in turn, will require determinations as to subsurface ownership rights, which are influenced by whether the pore space is located under federal or non-federal land. For projects located under non-federal land, who owns subsurface pore space will ultimately depend on the language employed in legal instruments related to the property rights at issue and state law. The “majority rule,” however, appears to be that the surface rights owner has the relevant property interest and holders of mineral rights do not, merely by virtue of these rights, have ownership or control of subsurface pore space.[34] States like Wyoming and North Dakota have enacted laws to address uncertainties associated with subsurface pore space ownership by specifying that surface rights owners own the underlying pore space.[35]

With respect to long-term liability, as explained previously, owners and operators must continue to conduct monitoring post-injection for at least 50 years or until the GS project no longer poses an endangerment to USDWs before site closure. In addition to post injection site care and site closure, owners and operators must maintain financial responsibility over emergency and remedial response.[36] Some states like Indiana, Texas, and Louisiana have established processes for transferring long-term liability to the state to alleviate the chilling effect that concerns over long-term liability might have on GS development.[37]

III.    Conclusion

As businesses explore ways to execute their GHG emissions reduction targets, CCS looms large.  Jenner & Block’s Environmental and Workplace Health & Safety, and Transitions in Energy and Climate Solutions Practices not only can help businesses assess whether CCS is a viable option for them, but also can strategically and efficiently navigate each stage of the CCS process to accelerate desired outcomes in a cost-effective manner.

 

[1] For example, one type of CO2 capture, post-combustion capture, typically captures 85% to 95% of the CO2. Angela C. Jones & Ashley J. Lawson, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R44902, Carbon Capture and Sequestration (CCS) in the United States 4 (2022), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R44902.pdf [hereinafter Oct. 2022 CRS Report].

[2] The United States Department of Energy estimates there to be a total storage capacity of between about 2.6 trillion and 22 trillion metric tons of CO2. Id. at 9. Theoretically, the United States contains enough storage capacity to store all CO2 emissions from large stationary sources, at the current rate of emissions, for centuries. Cong. Rsch. Serv., Injection and Geological Sequestration of Carbon Dioxide: Federal Role and Issues for Congress 3 (2022), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46192[hereinafter Sept. 2022 CRS Report].

[3] For example, according to the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), GS of CO2 will “likely [be] needed to deliver on the Paris Agreement goals to hold warming well below 2 degrees Celsius and pursuing efforts to hold warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius, which is necessary to prevent the worst impacts of climate change.” CEQ, Report to Congress on Carbon Capture, Utilization, and Sequestration 6 (2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/CEQ-CCUS-Permitting-Report.pdf [hereinafter CEQ Report].

[4] 75 Fed. Reg. 77,230, 77,235 (Class VI Rule); see also 42 U.S.C. §300h(b)(1)(B); 40 C.F.R. §144.12.

[5] 42 U.S.C. §§300h(a)-(b); 40 C.F.R. Part 145, Subpart B (imposing minimum requirements for permitting, compliance evaluation programs, enforcement authority, and sharing of information).

[6] 42 U.S.C. §300h-1(b)(1); 40 C.F.R. §144.1(f)(2). Indian tribes may, too. 42 U.S.C. §§300h-1(e); 40 C.F.R. Part 145, Subpart E.

[7] See 42 U.S.C. §300h-1; Class VI Rule at 77,241 (explaining that states must demonstrate that their “regulations are at least as stringent as those promulgated by EPA”).

[8] 40 C.F.R. §145.1(g). Though where an approved state program has a greater scope of coverage, the additional coverage is not part of the federally approved program. Id. §145.1(g)(2).

[9] 42 U.S.C. §§300h-1(b)(3), (c).

[10] 40 C.F.R. §144.6.

[11] Notably, Class V wells are used for experimental injection of CO2 (e.g., Department of Energy-supported research wells). See id. §144.81(14). “The construction, operation, or maintenance of any non-experimental Class V GS well is prohibited.” Id. §144.15. By December 10, 2011, owners or operators of experimental technology wells no longer being used for experimental purposes were required to apply for a Class VI permit. Id. §146.81(c). EPA has noted that it “anticipates that few, if any Class V experimental technology well permits will be issued under SDWA for future GS projects.” 76 Fed. Reg. 56,982, 56,983.

[12] 42 U.S.C. §300h-9.

[13] 40 C.F.R. §144.6(b)(2).

[14] Sept. 2022 CRS Report, supra note 2, at 15.

[15] See 40 C.F.R. §144.19(a).

[16] 40 C.F.R. §146.83(a). According to the United States Geological Survey, areas with the most storage potential are the Coastal Plains region, which includes coastal basins from Texas to Georgia, Alaska, and the Rocky Mountains – Northern Great Plains. Which area is the best for geologic carbon sequestration?, USGS, https://www.usgs.gov/faqs/which-area-best-geologic-carbon-sequestration (last visited Dec. 12, 2022).

[17] 40 C.F.R. §§144.6(f), 146.95

[18] See id. §§146.82(a), 146.81.

[19] Id.; id. §146.85(a)(2). Applicants will likely need to hire environmental consultants to provide support at every phase of the GS project.

[20] See id. §144.5.

[21] Id. §§146.93(b), 146.91(c)(1).

[22] Id. §144.12; 42 U.S.C. §300i.

[23] Other states are also moving towards primacy; Texas, Arizona, and West Virginia are in the “pre-application” phase, while Louisiana’s primacy application is being evaluated.

[24] Id. §300h-9.

[25] See CEQ Report, supra note 3, at 30.

[26] Adam Baylin-Stern & Niels Berghout, Is Carbon Capture Too Expensive?, IEA (Feb. 17, 2021), https://www.iea.org/commentaries/is-carbon-capture-too-expensive.

[27] Oct. 2022 CRS Report, supra note 1, at 8, 23.

[28] See CEQ Report, supra note 3, at 25-31. Using marine vessels may also be a feasible option for CO2 transport. Oct. 2022 CRS Report, supra note 1, at 8.

[29] According to CEQ, “[c]arbon utilization is a broad term used to describe the many different ways that captured . . .  CO2 . . . can be used [] to produce economically valuable products or services.” CEQ Report, supra note 3, at 13. The IRA-driven tax credits are an increase from the previous tax credits of $50 and $35, respectively. To qualify for the tax credits, qualified facilities must begin construction by December 31, 2032.

[30] For example, in a recent lawsuit filed against Livingston Parish in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana, developer Air Products is arguing that the parish’s attempts to restrict its proposed GS project are preempted by state and federal law.

[31] 42 U.S.C. §300h-2(d).

[32] 870 F.3d 322, 332 (2017).

[33] The court refused to decide the question of federal preemption on constitutional avoidance grounds. The court clarified that the question posed by the ordinance’s prohibition was whether the county could effectively “nullify” the Class II permit issued by DEP pursuant to the WPCA. The case did not require the court to consider “the authority of a county to regulate matters that are only related to or associated with a state-permitted activity.”

[34] Cong. Rsch. Serv., RL34307, Legal Issues Associated with the Development of Carbon Dioxide Sequestration Technology (2011), https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/RL34307.html. Though the mineral rights owner could have priority over uses of the land, including the ability of the surface rights owner to make use of the pore space, that would interfere with the mineral rights holder’s ability to remove minerals.

[35] Wyo. Stat. §§34 -1-152, 34-1-153 (2009); N.D. Cent. Code §47-31-02 et seq. (2009).

[36]  40 C.F.R. §146.85(a).

[37] See CEQ Report, supra note 3, at 43.

Jenner & Block Wishes Bon Voyage to Gay Sigel as She Starts Her Next Adventure with the City of Chicago

G. Sigel SuperwomanAs Gay Sigel walked through the doors at One IBM Plaza in Chicago, fresh out of law school and ready to launch her career as an attorney at Jenner & Block, she could not have envisioned the tremendous impact she would have on her clients, her colleagues, and her community over the next 39 years. Gay started her legal career as a general litigator, but Gay and Bob Graham were quick to realize how the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) was creating a new and exciting area of the law that was increasingly important for the firm’s clients: Environmental Law. Gay and Bob saw an opportunity to specialize in that area and founded Jenner & Block’s Environmental Health and Safety Practice. Gay has been an ever-present force in the EHS community ever since.

Over her 39-year career at Jenner & Block, Gay has worked on some of the most significant environmental cases in the country for clients ranging from global Fortune 50 corporations to environmental organizations to individuals. For more than a decade, she taught environmental law at Northwestern University, helping shape the next generation of environmental lawyers. She has worked on issues of global impact, like those affecting climate change, issues of local impact like those related to combined sewer overflows to the Chicago River, and issues of individual impact like those involving employee safety and health. No matter the subject, Gay has always been a tireless advocate for her clients. We often describe her as the Energizer Bunny of environmental lawyers: she is the hardest working attorney we have ever met. 

Gay’s true passion is to make this world a better, more just place for others. So, throughout her career as an environmental, health, and safety lawyer, Gay has devoted her time, energy, and emotional resources to innumerable pro bono cases and charitable and advocacy organizations. Her pro bono work includes successfully protecting asylum applicants, defending criminal cases, asserting parental rights, and defending arts organizations in OSHA matters. Among her many civic endeavors, Gay was a founding member of the AIDS Legal Council of Chicago (n/k/a as the Legal Council for Health Justice); she was the Secretary and active member of the Board of Directors for the Chicago Foundation for Women; and she was on the Board of the New Israel Fund. Gay continues to promote justice wherever she sees injustice, including as an advocate for women’s rights, particularly for women’s reproductive rights.

In both her environmental, health, and safety practice as well as her pro bono and charitable work, Gay is a tremendous mentor to younger (and even older) attorneys. She is curious, committed, exacting, fearless, and demanding (though more of herself than of others). We all give Gay much credit for making us the lawyers we are today.

Gay is leaving Jenner & Block to embark on her next adventure. She is returning to public service as Assistant Corporation Counsel Supervisor with the City of Chicago's Department of Law where she will be focusing on environmental issues. The City and its residents will be well served as Gay will bring her vast experience and unparalleled energy to work tirelessly to protect the City and its environment. We will miss working with and learning from Gay on a daily basis, but we look forward to seeing the great things she will accomplish for the City of Chicago. We know we speak for the entire firm as we wish Gay bon voyage—we will miss you! 

Steven M. Siros, Allison A. Torrence, Andi S. Kenney

EHS

Inflation Reduction Act: Is the U.S. Finally Poised to Tackle Climate Change?

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By
Allison A. Torrence 


CapitalIn a compromise move many months in the making, on August 7, 2022, the Senate passed a spending bill dubbed the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, which contains provisions aimed at lowering drug prices and health care premiums, reducing inflation, and most notably for our readers, investing approximately $369 billion in energy security and climate change programs over the next ten years. The Inflation Reduction Act, which is the Fiscal Year 2022 Budget Reconciliation bill, passed on entirely partisan lines in the Senate, with all 50 Democratic senators voting in favor, all 50 Republicans voting against, and Vice President Harris breaking the tie in favor of the Democrats. The bill is currently pending before the House of Representatives, where it is expected to be hotly contested but ultimately pass.

According to Senate Democrats, the Inflation Reduction Act “would put the U.S. on a path to roughly 40% emissions reduction [below 2005 levels] by 2030, and would represent the single biggest climate investment in U.S. history, by far.” There are a wide variety of programs in this bill aimed at achieving these lofty goals, including:

  • Clean Building and Vehicle Incentives
    • Consumer home energy rebate programs and tax credits, to electrify home appliances, for energy efficient retrofits, and make homes more energy efficient.
    • Tax credits for purchasing new and used “clean” vehicles.
    • Grants to make affordable housing more energy efficient.
  • Clean Energy Investment
    • Tax credits to accelerate manufacturing and build new manufacturing plants for clean energy like electric vehicles, wind turbines, and solar panels.
    • Grants and loans to retool or build new vehicle manufacturing plants to manufacture clean vehicles.
    • Funding for EPA, DOE and NOAA to facilitate faster siting and permitting of new energy generation and transmission projects.
    • Investment in the National Labs to accelerate breakthrough energy research.
  • Reducing Carbon Emissions Throughout the Economy
    • Tax credits for states and electric utilities to accelerate the transition to clean electricity.
    • Grants and tax credits to reduce emissions from industrial manufacturing processes like chemical, steel and cement plants.
    • Funding for Federal procurement of American-made clean technologies to create a stable market for clean products—including purchasing zero-emission postal vehicles.
  • Environmental Justice
    • Investment in community led projects in disadvantaged communities, including projects aimed at affordable transportation access.
    • Grants to support the purchase of zero-emission equipment and technology at ports.
    • Grants for clean heavy-duty trucks, like busses and garbage trucks.
  • Farm and Rural Investment
    • Funding to support climate-smart agriculture practices and forest conservation.
    • Tax credits and grants to support the domestic production of biofuels.
    • Grants to conserve and restore coastal habitats.
    • Requires sale of 60 million acres to oil and gas industry for offshore wind lease issuance.

Drilling down on some of these many provisions, the clean vehicle consumer tax credit has already sparked controversy due to the requirement that certain manufacturing or components be sourced in North America. The Inflation Reduction Act would maintain the existing $7,500 consumer tax credit for the purchase of a qualified new clean vehicle. The Act would get rid of the previous limit that a single manufacturer could only offer up to 200,000 clean vehicle tax credits—a limit that many manufacturers were hitting. However, under the new bill, that tax credit is reduced or eliminated for electric vehicles if the vehicle is not assembled in North America or if the majority of battery components are sourced outside of North America and if a certain percentage of the critical minerals utilized in battery components are not extracted or processed in a Free Trade Agreement country or recycled in North America. Manufacturers have indicated these battery sourcing requirements are currently difficult to meet, and may result in many electric vehicles being ineligible for this tax credit in the near term.

Another controversial point in the Act is the handling of oil and gas rights vis-à-vis wind farm projects. The Act would allow the sale of tens of millions of acres of public waters to the oil and gas industry as part of an overall plan to require offshore oil and gas projects to allow installation of wind turbines. A group of 350 climate groups, including Senator Bernie Sanders, criticized this and other provisions they saw as favorable to the oil and gas industry in the Act. Despite his criticism of certain aspects of the Inflation Reduction Act, Senator Sanders ultimately voted for the bill.

The House is expect to vote on the Inflation Reduction Act very soon and if it is passed by the House, President Biden will sign it into law. We will continue to track the Act’s progress and its impact on the regulated community. You can follow the Corporate Environmental Lawyer Blog for all of the latest developments.

West Virginia v. EPA: The Major Questions Doctrine Arrives to Rein in Administrative Powers

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By
Allison A. Torrence and Tatjana Vujic

 

On the final day of its 2022 term, the Supreme Court issued its highly-anticipated opinion in the case of West Virginia v. EPA, 579 U.S. __ (2022), addressing EPA’s authority to regulate greenhouse gases (“GHGs”) under the Clean Air Act (“CAA”), but having much broader implications for the authority of all administrative agencies. The opinion signals a significant shift in the standards used to review administrative actions. Chief Justice Roberts wrote the opinion for the Court, joined by Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett. Justice Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Alito joined, and Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Breyer and Sotomayor joined.

Major Questions Doctrine Has its Day in the Sun

In a significant yet long-predicted move, the six-to-three opinion rejected EPA’s approach to regulating GHG emissions under the Obama Administration’s Clean Power Plan (“CPP”), under which EPA intended to regulate existing coal-and natural-gas-fired power plants pursuant to Section 111(d) of the CAA.[1] Of greater significance, however, the Court took the opportunity to fully embrace the “major questions doctrine,” a standard several Justices had endorsed but which had not yet been fully unveiled by the Court. The doctrine now requires agencies, in instances in which a regulation will have major economic and political consequences, to point to clear statutory language showing congressional authorization for the power claimed by the agency. In particular, in “extraordinary cases” in which “the history and the breadth of the authority that the agency has asserted and the economic and political significance of that assertion” is significant or major, courts have “a reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress meant to confer such authority.” Slip op. at 17. In such extraordinary cases, the Court will not read into ambiguous statutory text authority that is not clearly spelled out. Instead, “something more than a merely plausible textual basis for the agency action is necessary”; specifically, “[t]he agency instead must point to clear congressional authorization for the power it claims.” Slip op. at 19.

As support for the adoption and application of the major questions doctrine, the Court cited numerous cases in which agency authority was curtailed because of extraordinary circumstances that it determined required a clear congressional directive. The cases included the FDA’s attempt to regulate tobacco (FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000), the CDC’s effort to issue an eviction moratorium during the COVID-19 pandemic (Alabama Assn. of Realtors v. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 594 U.S. __ (2021)), EPA’s assertion of permitting authority over millions of small sources like hotels and office buildings (Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302 (2014)), and OSHA’s endeavor to require 84 million Americans either obtain a COVID-19 vaccine or undergo weekly testing (National Federation of Independent Business v. OSHA, 595 U.S. __ (2021)), all of which, according to the Court, involved an agency overstepping its authority to act in situations not dissimilar from the extraordinary circumstances presented in West Virginia v. EPA. The dissent, on the other hand, regarded the majority’s use of the major questions doctrine to be without precedent, observing that “[t]he Court has never even used the term ‘major questions doctrine’ before.” Dissent at 15.

As discussed below, when the Court determines that the major questions doctrine applies, even if the administrative action arguably fits within what may seem like a broad grant of statutory authority, it is not necessarily enough to authorize the agency to act. Rather, if the court finds that the administrative rule is an “extraordinary case”, i.e., will have a significant economic or political impact, the agency must base its action on very clear congressional authorization to justify the power it is attempting to assert.

Clean Power Plan is Out But Regulating GHGs Still OK

Turning back to the regulation at issue in West Virginia, the Court reviewed the Clean Power Plan, which dates back to the Obama Administration’s EPA. At that time, EPA promulgated the CPP pursuant to its authority under the New Source Performance Standards (“NSPS”) in Section 111(d) of the CAA. The Court’s review thus centered on Section 111(d), which gives EPA authority to select the “best system of emission reduction” for existing sources of pollution, like power plants. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d). Under the CPP, the Obama Administration’s EPA used the NSPS to set GHG emission standards for existing power plants which would require many operators to shut down older coal-fired units and/or shift generation to lower-emitting natural gas units or renewable sources of electricity. The Court viewed EPA’s CPP, which would have required power producers to significantly change the generation mix, as an “extraordinary case” because it would have a major impact on the economy and was a “transformative expansion in [EPA’s] regulatory authority” based on “vague language” in the CAA. Slip op. at 20. In addition, the Court noted that EPA was using an “ancillary provision” in the CAA to regulate GHGs and stated that “the Agency’s discovery [of Section 111(d)]”—which the Court described as a “gap filler”—"allowed it to adopt a regulatory program that Congress had conspicuously and repeatedly declined to enact itself.” Slip op. at 20.

Best System of Emission Reduction

Notably, the Court acknowledged that “as a matter of definitional possibilities, generation shifting can be described as a system” (and thus a “best system of emission reduction”), but nevertheless determined that the CAA’s grant of authority was too vague. Slip op. at 28. According to the Court, almost anything could be described as a “system”, and therefore the CPP was based on a vague grant of authority and did not pass the major questions doctrine test. Slip op. at 28. The majority found such a broad grant of authority questionable, particularly because climate change legislation has been debated in Congress for years with no action, signaling that EPA could not exercise such broad authority when Congress had clearly declined to take such action itself.

By contrast and contrary to the majority’s narrow reading of “best system of emission reduction,” the dissent argued that the generation shifting prescribed by the CPP was precisely the type of “system” of emission reduction permitted under the CAA. In particular, the dissent contended that the term “system” is not vague (which Justice Kagan defined as unclear, ambiguous or hazy) but intentionally expansive to allow for such system-wide programs. Thus, the crux of the disagreement between the majority and dissent is that the dissent saw the CAA as having bestowed broad authority on EPA to regulate complex and important issues of air pollution—including and especially climate change, particularly considering the severity of the problem—in the manner that EPA determines is most appropriate, while the majority required further scrutiny for large-scale administrative endeavors like the CPP, which it held require very clear and specific authorization.

What’s Next?

In terms of the implications of West Virginia, what is clear is that the major questions doctrine is here to stay and EPA’s ability to regulate GHG’s under Section 111(d) of the CAA may be curtailed but has not been rejected. In fact, the Court specifically endorsed EPA’s authority to regulate GHGs. So, what does this mean, not only for GHG regulation but also for agency rulemaking in general?

First, while the ruling marks a significant setback for EPA, it does not shut the door on the agency’s ability to regulate GHGs. The CPP rules at issue raised the specter of the major questions doctrine because the regulation would have required generation shifting across the entire energy industry—an action viewed by the Court as having a significant impact on the national economy. The Court, however, declined to opine on “how far our opinion constrains EPA,” indicating that EPA’s authority had not been disallowed. Slip op. at 31, fn5. In fact, the opinion unequivocally states that it is within EPA’s purview to set a specific limit on GHG emissions. Slip op. at 6 (“Although the States set the actual rules governing existing power plants, EPA itself still retains the primary regulatory role in Section 111(d). The Agency, not the States, decides the amount of pollution reduction that must ultimately be achieved.”) Nothing in the opinion suggests that EPA cannot choose to regulate GHGs at power plants with more traditional technology-based requirements. Indeed, an inside-the-fence-line regulation that requires technology like carbon-capture would likely be within EPA’s traditional expertise and less likely to implicate large swaths of the economy like generation switching, and hence not be struck down.

Looking beyond EPA and GHG regulation, additional fallout from the Court’s embrace of the major questions doctrine is sure to occur. In addition to the Court’s explicit adoption of the major questions doctrine, Justice Gorsuch—a longstanding proponent of the doctrine—used his concurring opinion to lay out what he saw as the appropriate elements to consider when evaluating administrative rules under the doctrine. While Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence is not binding, future courts and administrative agencies likely will look to both the Court’s majority opinion and the Gorsuch concurrence for guidance. Administrative regulations will face increased challenges and heightened judicial scrutiny thanks to the major questions doctrine, and we can expect to see not only the number of challenges increase but also the number of successful challenges rise. Additionally, administrative agencies may proactively rein in regulatory actions they were planning to promulgate—keeping the rules more modest or tailored in an attempt to avoid challenges based on the major questions doctrine.

Undoubtedly, this will not be the last word on EPA regulation of GHGs or the use of the major questions doctrine. EPA will issue new GHG regulations, which certainly will invite future litigation. The decision will also certainly trigger many more challenges of agency authority under the newly minted major questions doctrine.

 

[1] Notably, the CPP was revoked by the Trump EPA, and the Biden EPA has stated that it intends to promulgate new GHG regulations different from the previous rules under past administrations. Nevertheless, the Court held that the parties had standing to proceed and the case was not moot. Slip op. at 14, 16.


Earth Week Series: The Future of Environmental Regulation

Torrence_jpgBy Allison A. Torrence

Earth Week
As we near Earth Day 2022, the United States may be headed toward a profound change in the way EPA and similar administrative agencies regulate the complex areas of environmental law. EPA began operating more than 50 years ago in 1970, and has been tasked with promulgating and enforcing some of the most complex regulations on the books. From the Clean Air Act to the Clean Water Act; to CERCLA and RCRA and TSCA; and everything in between.

EPA has penned voluminous regulations over the past 50 years to implement vital environmental policies handed down from Congress—to remarkable effect. While there is certainly progress left to be done, improvements in air and water quality in the United States, along with hazardous waste management, has been impressive. For example, according to EPA data, from 1970 to 2020, a period in which gross domestic product rose 272% and US population rose 61%, aggregate emissions of the six criteria pollutants decreased by 78%.

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(source: epa.gov)

For the past 50 years the environmental administrative law process has worked mostly the same way: First, Congress passes a law covering a certain environmental subject matter (e.g., water quality), which provides policy objectives and a framework of restrictions, prohibitions and affirmative obligations. Second, EPA, the administrative agency tasked with implementing the environmental law, promulgates detailed regulations defining terms used in the law and explaining in a more comprehensive fashion how to comply with the obligations outlined in the statute. Depending on the subject matter being addressed, Congress may leave more details up to EPA, as the subject matter expert, to fill in via regulation. In some instances, there is a third step, where additional authority is delegated to the states and tribes to implement environmental regulations at the state-level based on the framework established by Congress and EPA. Occasionally someone thinks EPA overstepped its authority under a given statute, or failed to act when it was supposed to, and litigation follows to correct the over or under action.

Currently, this system of administrative law is facing challenges from parties that believe administrative agencies like EPA have moved from implementing Congress’s policy to setting their own. The most significant such challenge has come in the consolidated Clean Air Act (“CAA”) cases pending before the U.S. Supreme Court, West Virginia v. EPA, Nos. 20-1530, 20-1531, 20-1778, 20-1780.[1] In West Virginia v. EPA, challengers object to the Obama-EPA’s Clean Power Plan (“CPP”), which used a provision in the New Source Performance Standards (“NSPS”) section of the CAA to set greenhouse gas emission standards for existing power plants. The biggest issue with the CPP, according to challengers, is that the new standards would require many operators to shut down older coal-fired units and shift generation to lower-emitting natural gas or renewable units. Challengers, which include several states, power companies and coal companies, argue the CPP implicates the “major questions doctrine” or “non-delegation doctrine”. These doctrines provide that large-scale initiatives that have broad impacts can't be based on vague, minor, or obscure provisions of law. Challengers argue that the NSPS provision used as the basis for the CPP is a minor provision of law that is being used by EPA to create a large-scale shift in energy policy. EPA argues that, although it is currently revising its greenhouse gas regulations, the actions taken in the CPP were authorized by Congress in the CAA, are consistent with with the text of the CAA as written, and do not raise the specter of the major questions or non-delegations doctrines.

While this case will certainly dictate how EPA is permitted to regulate greenhouse gases under the CAA, it will likely have broader impacts on administrative law. On the one hand, the Court may issue a narrow opinion that evaluates the CPP based on the regulations being inconsistent with the text or intent of the CAA. On the other hand, the Supreme Court may issue a broader opinion that invokes the major questions or non-delegation doctrines to hold that based on the significant-impacts of the regulation, it is an area that should be governed by Congress, not an administrative agency. If the Supreme Court takes the latter route, it could set more limits on Congress’s ability to delegate regulatory authority to administrative agencies like EPA.

Indeed, in the Supreme Court’s recent decision on the OSHA emergency temporary standard on employer vaccine or test mandate (“the OSHA ETS”), Ohio v. Dept. of Labor, et al., 595 U.S. ____ (2022), the Court struck down an administrative regulation in a preview of what might be coming in the EPA CAA case. As everyone knows by now, the Supreme Court struck down the OSHA ETS, holding it was an overstep of the agency’s authority to regulate safety issues in the workplace. The Court’s opinion focused on the impact of the OSHA ETS—that it will impact 84 million employees and it went beyond the workplace—instead of the statutory language. The Court stated, “[i]t is telling that OSHA, in its half century of existence, has never before adopted a broad public health regulation of this kind—addressing a threat that is untethered, in any causal sense, from the workplace.” Slip op. at 8.  

Justices Thomas, Alito and Gorsuch invoked the major questions doctrine in their concurring opinion, stating that Congress must speak clearly if it wishes to delegate to an administrative agency decisions of vast economic and political import. In the case of OSHA and COVID-19, the Justices maintained that Congress did not clearly assign to OSHA the power to deal with COVID-19 because it had not done so over the past two years of the pandemic. Notably, the fact that when Congress passed the Occupational Safety and Health Act, it authorized OSHA to issue emergency regulations upon determining that “employees are exposed to grave danger from exposure to substances or agents determined to be toxic or physically harmful” and “that such emergency standard[s] [are] necessary to protect employees from such danger[s]”, was not a sufficient basis for the Court or the three consenting Justices. In their view, in order to authorize OSHA to issue this vaccine or test mandate, Congress had to do more than delegate to OSHA general emergency powers 50 years ago, but instead would have had to delegate authority specific to the current pandemic.

Applying this logic to EPA and the currently-pending CAA case, Justices Thomas, Alito and Gorsuch may conclude that provisions of the CAA written 50 or 30 years ago, before climate change was fully on Congress’s radar, should not be used to as the basis for regulations that impact important climate and energy policy. Of course, many questions remain: Will a majority of the court adopt this view, and how far they will take it? If Congress can’t delegate climate change and energy policy, what else is off the table—water rights? Hazardous waste? Chemical management? If Congress can’t delegate to EPA and other administrative agencies at the same frequency as in the past, how will Congress manage passing laws dealing with complex and technical areas of law?

All of these questions and more may arise, depending on how the Supreme Court rules in West Virginia v. EPA. For now, we are waiting to see what will happen, in anticipation of some potentially significant changes on the horizon.

 

[1] Jenner & Block filed an Amicus Curiae brief in this case on behalf of Former Power Industry Executives in support of EPA.

Earth Week Series: Imagine a Day Without Environmental Lawyers

Sigel

 

By Gabrielle Sigel, Co-Chair, Environmental and Workplace Health and Safety Law Practice

Earth Week
On this 52nd anniversary of Earth Day, I am not writing yet another, typically not very funny, riff on one of Shakespeare’s most famous lines.[1] Instead, I am inspired by one of the most popular of our blogs, written in 2017 by our talented former partner, E. Lynn Grayson, “Imagine a Day Without Water.” To start our Earth Week series of daily blogs by our firm’s EHS department, I offer words of hope and gratitude for the vast amount of work that has been done to improve and protect the environment – work done by lawyers, scientists, policy makers, and members of the public, to name a few.

Imagine what lawyers and scientists faced in 1970, the year of the first Earth Day. There was oppressive soot and polluted air throughout urban and industrial areas in the United States. The Cuyahoga River was so blighted it had caught fire. Although there was a new federal Environmental Protection Agency and two new environmental statutes – the National Environmental Policy Act and the Clean Air Act, one of the most highly complex and technical statutes ever written – both needed an entire regulatory structure to be created in order to be operationalized and enforced. This foundational work had to be done when there was not even an accepted method for determining, much less regulating, environmental and public health risk. Then two years later, in 1972, a comprehensively overhauled Clean Water Act was enacted, followed within the next decade by TSCA, RCRA, and CERCLA, to address the consequences of past waste and chemical use, and to control their future more prudently. Other laws were also passed in that time period, including the Safe Drinking Water Act and the Endangered Species Act.

Although Earth Day was created in the U.S. – the idea of Senator Gaylord Nelson (WI-D) and supported by Representative Pete McCloskey (CA-R) (both lawyers) and grass roots organizers – environmental consciousness also was growing worldwide. The 1972 Stockholm Declaration, from the first UN Conference of the Human Environment, recognized the importance of environmental protection amid the challenge of economic disparities. That work, including of the United Nations Environment Programme, led to the 1992 “Earth Summit” issuing the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, which adopted a focus on sustainable development and the precautionary approach to protecting the environment in the face of scientific uncertainty, and creating the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, which itself led to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol and the 2015 Paris Agreement, as well as other global efforts focusing on climate change and resource conservation.

Thus, within a split-second on our earth’s timeline, humans were able to tangibly improve and focus attention on the environment, through laws, agreements, governmental and private commitments, and public support. I note these developments, which were stimulated by lawyers on all sides, not to naively suggest that the global climate change, water accessibility, toxic exposure, and other environmental challenges that we face today can easily be solved, nor do I suggest that only lawyers can provide the solution. Instead, let’s take hope from the fact that in fewer years than the average for human life expectancy, there have been significant environmental improvements in our air, land, and water, and our collective focus on preserving the planet has been ignited.

These past efforts have improved the environment – not perfectly, but demonstrably. The legal structure that helped make these improvements happen has worked – not perfectly, but demonstrably. Hopefully, we will continue to work on these issues, despite their seeming intractability, under a system of national laws and global agreements. The alternative is too painful to contemplate.

Closing on a personal note, our firm’s Environmental Law Practice lost one of the best environmental lawyers in the profession, when Stephen H. Armstrong passed away last week. Steve was one of the first in-house environmental counsel I had the opportunity to work with when I began my focus on environmental law in the 1980s. He demonstrated how to respect the science, embrace the legal challenges, fight hard for your client, and always act with integrity. Although I was a young woman in a relatively new field, he consistently valued my opinions, supported my professional development, and with his deep, melodious laugh and sparkle in his eye, made working together feel like we shared a mission. And a ”mission” it was for him; I have never met any lawyer who cared more or wrestled harder about their clients’ position, while always undergirded by a deep reverence for doing the right thing. Once he joined our firm more than a decade ago, he continued being a role model for all of us. Our firm’s Environmental Law Practice, and all those who worked with him, will miss having him as a devoted colleague, friend, and mentor. Our earth has been made better for his life on it.

 

[1]“The first thing we do, let’s kill all the lawyers.” William Shakespeare, Henry VI, Part 2, Act Iv, Scene 2 (circa 1591).

The SEC’s Proposed Climate-Related Disclosure Rules: Are They the “Core Bargain,” a “Watershed Moment,” or “Undermin[ing] the Existing Regulatory Framework”?

May Riely Sigel Greubel Kim

By Alexander J. MayCharles D. RielyGabrielle SigelMichael R. Greubel, and TaeHyung Kim

Earlier this week, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) approved the issuance of proposed new disclosure rules [cited as “PR, p. __”], titled The Enhancement and Standardization of Climate-Related Disclosures for Investors, that would require both domestic and foreign public companies to provide certain climate-related information in their registration statements and annual reports and certain ongoing updates in their quarterly reports. The long-awaited proposed rules are the SEC’s most direct move yet to transform disclosure requirements related to Climate and ESG issues and passed only after what appears to have been significant internal debate. The SEC’s lone Republican Commissioner, Hester M. Peirce, dissented from the proposed rule, and the Chair and the other two Democratic commissioners released statements in support of the proposed rules. Their accompanying statements previewed the wide range of debate—in the courts, political sphere, and public discussion—destined to accompany these rules through the likely lengthy administrative process before (or if) they become final. 

This Client Alert previews the disclosure obligations for public companies if the proposed rules are ultimately adopted, summarizes the ongoing debate about the wisdom of the proposed changes and previews the potential legal challenges to the proposed rule. For additional details regarding the proposed amendments, the SEC has posted a press release summarizing the proposal and public comment period, a fact sheet, and the text of the proposed amendments.

I. Summary of Proposed Disclosure Requirements

The SEC emphasized that its goal in proposing the rules was to enhance and standardize climate-related disclosures for investors. To do so, the SEC would impose a number of new and enhanced disclosure requirements for public companies. These new proposed disclosure requirements include information about a company’s climate-related risks (and opportunities) that are reasonably likely to have a material impact on its business or consolidated financial statements, as well as disclosure of the company’s Scopes 1 and 2 (direct and indirect) greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions, regardless of their materiality, and Scope 3 GHG emissions if material or relied upon by the company. The SEC also proposed new rules that would require companies to disclose certain climate-related financial metrics in their audited financial statements and information about the company’s internal governance with respect to climate-related issues. 

A. Climate-Related Disclosures

The proposed new Item 1500 of Regulation S-K would require registrants to disclose certain climate-related information ranging from governance, business strategy impact and risk management of climate-related risks, to GHG emissions and climate-related goals and targets. “Climate-related risks” are defined as “the actual or potential negative impacts of climate-related conditions and events on a registrant’s consolidated financial statements, business operations, or value chains, as a whole.”  PR, p. 61. Those risks include both acute and chronic “physical risks,” such as extreme weather events and longer-term decreased availability of water supply, as well as “transition risks,” defined as “risks related to a potential transition to a lower carbon economy.” PR, pp. 61-62. The disclosure required by Item 1500 of Regulation S-K must be included in the domestic company’s registration statements and annual report on Form 10-K, and material updates are required to be provided in Form 10-Q. Broadly, the categories of required information include:

Governance and oversight: Board of directors’ oversight of climate-related risks and, if applicable, opportunities; management’s role in assessing and managing climate-related risks and if applicable, opportunities.[1]

Strategy, business model, and outlook: 

- Climate-related risks (and opportunities) reasonably likely to have a material impact, including on the company’s business or consolidated financial statements and business activities, which may manifest over the short, medium, and long term, with each registrant defining how many years are encompassed within each of those terms.

- Actual and potential impacts of any climate-related risks on the company’s strategy, business model, and outlook, including the time horizon of such impact.

- Whether and how any such impacts are considered as part of the company’s business strategy, financial planning, and capital allocation.

- Whether and how any identified climate-related risks have affected, or are reasonably likely to affect, the company’s consolidated financial statements.

- Information on the company’s internal carbon price, if available, but the use of a carbon price is not required.

- Resilience of the company’s business strategy considering potential future changes in climate-related risks. If the registrant utilizes a scenario analysis to assess the impact of climate-related risks on its business and financial statements, and to support the resilience of its strategy and business model, companies must disclose the scenarios considered, providing both qualitative and quantitative information.

Risk management: 

- The company’s processes for identifying, assessing, and managing climate-related risks (and opportunities).

- Whether and how any such processes are integrated into the company’s overall risk management system or processes.

- The company’s transition plan as part of its climate-related risk management strategy, if applicable.

Targets and goals: If the company has set any targets or goals related to GHG emissions reduction, or any other climate-related target or goal, it must provide information on the scope of activities and emissions included in the target, unit of measurement, time horizon, baseline targets, interim targets, and strategy for meeting the target or goal. 

- If carbon offsets or renewable energy credits (“RECs”) have been used as part of the company’s plan to achieve climate-related targets or goals, the company must disclose certain information including carbon reduction from such offsets or RECs and related costs.

Continue reading "The SEC’s Proposed Climate-Related Disclosure Rules: Are They the “Core Bargain,” a “Watershed Moment,” or “Undermin[ing] the Existing Regulatory Framework”?" »

PFAS Linked to Climate Change According to Environmental NGO

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BSteven M. Siros, Co-Chair, Environmental and Workplace Health & Safety Law Practice 

In the latest attack on per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS), a recent report issued by the environmental group, Toxic-Free Future (TFF), seeks to link PFAS utilized in the manufacture of food packaging to the release of greenhouse gases.  The report focuses on the use of PFAS in food packaging, and more specifically, releases of chlorodifluoromethane (HCFC-22 or R22) in connection with the manufacture of PFAS for use in food packaging.  HCFC-22 is an ozone depleting substance with a global-warming potential estimated at more than 1,800 times that of carbon dioxide.  HCFC-22 has been phased out in the United States in accordance with the Montreal Protocol and as of January 1, 2020, can no longer be produced, imported or used in the United States (except for continued servicing needs of existing equipment). 

According to the TFF report, however, because HCFC-22 is produced as an intermediate (a substance formed as part of a larger chemical reaction but that is then consumed in later stages of the production process) during the manufacture of PFAS, it is not subject to the above-referenced use prohibitions.   As such, according to the TFF report, facilities that are manufacturing these PFAS compounds are releasing significant amounts of HCFC-22 into the environmental (notwithstanding being classified as "intermediates") in contravention of the prohibitions in the Montreal Protocol.  Because of this loophole, the TFF report argues for “class-based” limits on PFAS chemicals at the federal and/or state level. 

U.S. EPA continues to assess regulation of PFAS compounds through a variety of regulatory regimes, including setting an MCL under the Safe Drinking Water Act and designating some or all PFAS-compounds as “hazardous substances” under CERCLA.  Efforts to link PFAS production to climate change will only increase the pressure on U.S. EPA to move forward with these regulatory efforts.  We will continue to provide timely updates with respect to these efforts on the Corporate Environmental Lawyer blog. 

The Need to Be Green: Focus on Environmental Sustainability Can Inure to Bottom Line for Cannabis Industry

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BSteven M. Siros, Co-Chair, Environmental and Workplace Health & Safety Law Practice 

A recent article published in Politico highlights some of the potential impacts of cannabis production on the environment.   As the production of cannabis accelerates across the United States, it is becoming increasingly likely that the environmental impacts of cannabis production will become more regulated especially in the areas of energy use and water reliance.   Cannabis companies would be well served to ensure that they have effective environmental management strategies in place to not only ensure continued compliance but also to reduce the companies’ environmental footprint that could in turn result in significant cost savings.   

For example, according to the article, a typical growing operation can consume up to 2,000 watts of electricity per square meter for indoor growing operations as compared to 50 watts of electricity for growing other leafy greens such as lettuce.  According to a recent study, at least one expert estimates that cannabis production accounts for about one percent of electricity consumption in the United States.  Depending on the source of electricity, greenhouse gas emissions may be generated in the course of energy production that could be attributable to the cannabis operation’s carbon footprint.  President Biden is focused on reducing greenhouse gas emissions and one the key focus industries for President Biden is the agricultural industry.  Implementing an energy efficiency program with a focus on renewable energy sources may allow cannabis companies to be better positioned to comply with future regulations while at the same time reducing overall energy costs.       

Although not discussed in the article, cannabis production can be a fairly water intensive process with some studies estimating usage as high as six gallons per plant.  A recent study concluded that by 2025, total water use in the legal cannabis market is expected to increase by 86%.  As water scarcity issues become more prevalent especially in light of the changing climate, ensuring adequate sources of water will be critical to ensuring the ability to continue to grow cannabis plants.  At the same time, adopting effective water conservation procedures will allow facilities to reduce their environmental footprint with resulting cost savings. 

For more detailed insight on these issues, please click here for an article that was recently published in the Cannabis Law Journal. 

Oil Industry Scores Big Win in Second Circuit Greenhouse Gas Litigation

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BSteven M. Siros, Co-Chair, Environmental and Workplace Health & Safety Law Practice

Oil and gasBreaking from the pack and potentially creating a circuit split, the Second Circuit’s decision in City of New York v. Chevron, et al. dismissing New York’s City’s climate change lawsuit is a significant victory for the oil and gas industry.  The unanimous ruling from the Second Circuit affirmed a district’s court decision dismissing New York’s common law claims, finding that issues such as global warming and greenhouse gas emissions invoked questions of federal law that are not well suited to the application of state law.

Taking a slightly different tact than state and local plaintiffs in other climate change lawsuits, the State of New York sued five oil producers in federal court asserting causes of action for (1) public nuisance, (2) private nuisance, and (3) trespass under New York law stemming from the defendants’ production, promotion and sale of fossil fuels.  New York sought both compensatory damages as well as a possible injunction that would require defendants to abate the public nuisance and trespass.  Defendants filed motions to dismiss that were granted.  The district court determined that New York’s state-law claims were displaced by federal common law and that those federal common law claims were in turn displaced by the Clean Air Act.  The district court also concluded that judicial caution counseled against permitting New York to bring federal common law claims against defendants for foreign greenhouse gas emissions. 

The Second Circuit agreed with the district court, noting that the problems facing New York can’t be attributed solely to greenhouse gas emissions in the state nor the emissions of the five defendants. Rather, the greenhouse gas emissions that New York alleges required the City to launch a “$20 billion-plus multilayered investment program in climate resiliency across all five boroughs” are a byproduct of emissions around the world for the past several hundred years. 

As the Second Circuit noted, “[t]he question before it is whether municipalities may utilize state tort law to hold multinational oil companies liable for the damages caused by greenhouse gas emissions.  Given the nature of the harm and the existence of a complex web of federal and international environmental law regulating such emissions, we hold that the answer is ‘no.’” 

Finding that New York’s state common law claims were displaced by federal common law, the Second Circuit then considered whether the Clean Air Act displaced these federal common law claims.  The Second Circuit noted that the Supreme Court in Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut (AEP) (2011) had previously held that the “’Clean Air Act and the EPA actions it authorizes displace any federal common-law right to seek abatement’ of greenhouse gas emissions.”    As to the State’s damage claims, the Second Circuit agreed with the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Native Vill. Of Kivalina v. Exxonmobil Corp. (9th Cir. 2012) that the “displacement of federal common law does not turn on the nature of the remedy but rather on the cause of action.”  As such, the Second Circuit held that “whether styled as an action for injunctive relief against the Producers to stop them from producing fossil fuels, or an action for damages that would have the same practical effect, the City’s claims are clearly barred by the Clean Air Act. 

The Second Circuit was careful to distinguish its holding from the holdings reached by the First, Fourth, Ninth and Tenth circuits in prior climate change cases, noting that in those other cases, the plaintiffs had brought state-law claims in state court and defendants then sought to remove the cases to federal courts.  The single issue in those cases was whether defendants’ federal preemption defenses singlehandedly created federal question jurisdiction.   Here, because New York elected to file in federal as opposed to state court, the Second Circuit was free to consider defendants’ preemption defense on its own terms and not under the heightened standard applicable to a removal inquiry. 

Whether the Second Circuit’s decision has any impact on BP PLC, et al. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, a case that has now been fully briefed and argued before the Supreme Court remains to be seen.  The Baltimore case was one of the state court cases discussed above that was removed to federal court.  The defendants had alleged a number of different grounds for removal, one of which is known as the “federal officer removal statute” that allows removal to federal court of any lawsuit filed against an officer or person acting under that office of the United States or an agency thereof.  The limited issue before the Supreme Court was whether the appellate court could only consider the federal-officer removal ground or whether it could instead review any of the grounds relied upon in defendants’ removal petition. 

Some commenters have noted that the Second Circuit’s decision creates a circuit split that may embolden the Supreme Court to address these climate change cases in one fell swoop.  The more likely scenario, however, is that the Supreme Court limits its opinion to the narrow issue before it and leaves resolution of whether state law climate change nuisance actions are preempted by federal law for another day. 

EPA Finalizes Rollback of Obama-Era Methane Regulations for the Oil and Natural Gas Industry

Torrence_jpgBy Allison A. Torrence

PipelineOn August 13, 2020, EPA issued two final rules that will have a significant impact on methane emissions, a potent greenhouse gas. The final rules were issued under the Clean Air Act’s New Source Performance Standards (“NSPS”) for the oil and natural gas industry and rescind Obama-era rules issued in 2012 and 2016. EPA categorized the two new rules as (1) Policy Amendments and (2) Technical Amendments.

Key provisions from these two rules include the following:

  • Policy Amendments:
    • Removes the natural gas transmission and storage segment of the oil and natural gas industry from regulation.
    • Rescinds methane and volatile organic compounds (“VOCs”) emissions standards for the natural gas transmission and storage segment of the oil and natural gas industry.
    • Rescinds methane emissions standards for the production and processing segments of the oil and natural gas industry and finds that EPA is no longer required or authorized to issue emission guidelines for methane from existing sources in the industry’s production and processing segments.
    • Finds that the Clean Air Act requires, or authorizes, EPA to make a “significant contribution finding” as a predicate to regulating any air pollutant that was not considered when EPA first listed or regulated an industry “source category.”
  • Technical Amendments:
    • Reduces the frequency of required fugitive emissions monitoring for gathering and boosting compressor stations from quarterly to twice a year and exempts low-production wells from fugitive monitoring requirements altogether.
    • Reduces the recordkeeping and reporting requirements of the fugitive emissions program.
      • Changes include allowing owners and operators to determine the best means to ensure all components are monitored, rather than having to include a site map and an observation path in the monitoring plan.
    • Updates fugitive emissions repair requirements.
    • Provides additional technical updates covering fugitive emissions monitoring and repairs, alternative means of emissions limitations, pneumatic pumps, engineer certifications for closed vent systems, and storage vessels.

As we discussed on this Blog previously, these rules were originally proposed on August 28, 2019. EPA held public hearings on the proposed amendments, and received nearly 300,000 written comments on the Policy Amendments and more than 500,000 written comments on the Technical Amendments.

According to EPA’s analysis:

The Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) for the two rules estimates that, combined, the two actions will yield $750 to $850 million in net benefits over the period from 2021-2030, (7 percent and 3 percent discount rates, respectively), the annualized equivalent of nearly $100 million in net benefits a year.

EPA also estimates that from 2021-2030, the combined rules will result in an increase in 850,000 short tons of Methane emissions and 140,000 tons of VOC emissions.

Environmental groups, liberal states and other interest groups are all but certain to sue to try to block implementation of the new rules, with Earthjustice staff attorney Tim Ballo recently making the following statement:

The Trump administration is once again putting industry interests over people and public health by gutting these common-sense emission standards. The rollback would only further exacerbate a climate crisis that is already near a point of no return. We cannot afford to go back. We’ve successfully sued the Trump administration in their attempt to dismantle methane emission standards in the past, and we’ll sue again to keep these standards in place.

More information about these rules is available at EPA’s website. The rules will take effect 60 days after they are published in the Federal Register.


Trump Administration Issues Final Rule Substantially Modifying NEPA Regulations

Lawson Headshot By Matthew G. Lawson

SealOn Wednesday, July 15, 2020, the Trump Administration announced the publication of comprehensive updates to federal regulations governing the implementation of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).  The updated regulations—issued by the Council on Environmental Quality (“CEQ”)—are provided in the agency’s final rule titled “Update to the Regulations Implementing the Procedural Provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act” (the “Final Rule”), which is expected to be published in a forthcoming Federal Register publication.  The Final Rule significantly overhauls the responsibilities of federal agencies under NEPA, and represents the first major overhaul to NEPA’s regulations in over 30 years.  During his announcement, President Trump promised that the overhaul would remove “mountains and mountains of bureaucratic red tape in Washington, D.C.” and speed up the approval and construction of major projects such as interstate highways and pipelines. 

NEPA requires federal agencies to quantify and consider the environmental impacts of proposed actions “with effects that may be major and which are potentially subject to Federal control and responsibility.” The federal agency must conduct its NEPA review prior to “any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources” towards the proposed action.  To fulfill its obligations under NEPA, federal agencies much first complete an “Environmental Assessment” (“EA”) that analyzes whether a proposed action will have a significant impact on the environment.  If the EA concludes that an action could have significant environmental impacts, the agency is obligated to take the next step under NEPA and prepare a detailed “Environmental Impact Assessment” (“EIS”) that describes and quantifies the anticipated impacts.  Federal agencies are required to undertake an EA and potentially an EIS before commencing public infrastructure projects such as roads, bridges and ports, or before issuing permits to certain private actions that require federal approval, such as the construction of pipelines or commencement of mining operations. 

The Trump Administration has repeatedly voiced displeasure with the existing NEPA process, which the President has characterized as “increasingly complex and difficult to manage.”  Legal challenges initiated under the existing NEPA regulations have also stalled a number of energy projects publicly supported by the administration, including the Keystone XL, the Dakota Access pipelines.  The administration's new regulations are expected to reduce the obligations imposed on federal agencies under NEPA through a variety of measures, including reducing the types of environmental impacts that must be considered during a NEPA review; shortening the permitted time period for reviews; and exempting certain types of actions from the review requirements.

While the Final Rule provides numerous modifications to the language of the existing regulations, three changes expected to have substantial impact on the NEPA process include:

  • Narrowing of “Effects” that Agencies Must Consider: The Final Rule seeks to narrow the scope of the environmental consequences that must be considered during an agency’s NEPA review by striking from NEPA’s definition of “effects” references to “direct”, “indirect”, and “cumulative” effects. Instead, the new definition provides that federal agencies must only consider environmental “effects” that “are reasonably foreseeable and have a reasonably close casual relational to the proposed action…” According to CEQ, NEPA’s existing definition of “effects” “had been interpreted so expansively as to undermine informed decision making, and led agencies to conduct analyses to include effects that are not reasonably foreseeable or do not have a reasonably close causal relationship to the proposed action or alternatives.”  Under the Final Rule’s definition of “effects”, it is unclear whether agencies are ever required to consider a proposed project’s incremental contribution to “global” environment effects, such as Climate Change. Since global effects arguably do not have a “close causal relationship” with any single action, these impacts may now fall outside of NEPA’s purview.

By eliminating the reference to “indirect” emissions and requiring a “close causal relationship” between a project and its environmental effects, the Final Rule also appears to limit federal agencies’ obligation to consider indirect “upstream” and/or “downstream” impacts associated with a project. This issue is of particular significance to the ongoing legal debate regarding the scope of greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions that must be considered in NEPA reviews of interstate pipeline projects. Because the volume of GHG emissions caused by the burning of fossil fuels transported by a pipeline often far exceed the emissions directly associated with the pipeline’s construction, litigation can often arise as to whether these subsequent “downstream” emissions must be considered during the pipeline’s NEPA review. Under the Final Rule, it appears that upstream / downstream GHG emissions will often be excluded from NEPA’s requirements unless the emissions have a close relationship with the specific project. Ultimately, the manner in which federal agencies and courts interpret “close causal relationship” in the Final Rule has the potential to significantly reduce the scope of federal agencies’ evaluation of climate change impacts associated with federal projects.

  • Limitations on Review Period and Report Length: The Final Rule seeks to expedite the NEPA review process by requiring federal agencies to limit all NEPA reviews to a maximum of two years.  In addition, the final EIS issued by an agency may not exceed 150 pages of text or, for proposals of unusual scope of and complexity, 300 pages of text.  Exceptions from the review period and/or EIS page limitations may only be granted through specific written approval from a senior agency official.  The limitations imposed by the Final Rule appear to represent a significant departure from the existing NEPA process.  According to a CEQ Report issued on June 12, 2020, the average final EIS is currently 661 pages in length and takes approximately 4.5 years to complete.
  • Directive for Agencies to Expand Categorical Exclusions of NEPA Requirements for Certain Types of Projects: The Final Rule requires federal agencies to develop a list of actions that the agency does not expect to have a significant effect on the environment.  Outside of “extraordinary circumstances,” agencies will not be required to conduct an EA for any projects falling within these categorical exclusions.  Furthermore, the Final Rule clarifies that a NEPA review is not required where a proposed action would only have “minimal Federal funding or minimal Federal involvement,” such that the agency cannot control the outcome of the project.

The updated regulations are set to take effect 60 days after the publication of the Final Rule in the Federal Register.  CEQ has further clarified that federal agencies may apply the updated regulations to any ongoing NEPA reviews, including environmental reviews started before the effective date of the regulations.  However, environmental groups have already publicly stated that they intend to challenge the new rule, claiming at least in part that CEQ failed to respond to the more than one million comments that were submitted in response to the proposed new rules.

 


The Ninth Circuit Sends Climate Change Cases Back to State Court

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By Leah M. Song

EarthOn May 26, 2020, the Ninth Circuit agreed with plaintiffs that two climate change lawsuits—County of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp. et al. and City of Oakland v. BP p.l.c. et al.—had been improperly removed to the federal courts, continuing courts’ recent trend of remanding these types of cases back to state court.

A growing form of climate change litigation in the United States consists of lawsuits filed by states or municipalities against private industry, and more specifically, the fossil-fuel industry. States, cities and other units of local government have filed lawsuits alleging state common law theories, including nuisance, trespass, failure to warn of the known impacts of climate change, and unjust enrichment. The outcome of these cases thus far has hinged on whether or not the fossil fuel companies are able to successfully remove the litigation to federal court where they stand a much greater chance of getting the litigation dismissed. Generally, plaintiffs (including states, units of local government, and non-governmental organizations) asserting climate change claims against corporations prefer to be in state court where they can take advantage of perceived plaintiff-friendly common law or state statutes. On the other hand, defendants inevitably seek to remove such cases to federal court where they have had a higher level of success securing dismissals on the grounds that the issue is preempted by the Clean Air Act and/or addresses a “political question” which is better left to the discretion of Congress. See City of N.Y. v. BP P.L.C.. 325 F. Supp. 3d 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).

In County of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp. et al., six California municipalities and counties sued more than 30 fossil-fuel companies in California state court. The plaintiffs brought a variety of claims under state common law including nuisance, negligence, failure to warn, and trespass. In City of Oakland v. BP p.l.c. et al., the Cities of Oakland and San Francisco sued five fossil-fuel companies in state court under a theory of nuisance. The fossil-fuel companies removed both cases to federal court. The San Mateo district court remanded the case back to state court while the Oakland district court refused to remand the case back to state court, finding that plaintiffs’ public nuisance claims were governed by federal common law, but then proceeding to dismiss the lawsuit. Both cases were appealed to the Ninth Circuit.

On May 26th, the Ninth Circuit joined the Fourth Circuit (Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. BP P.L.C., et al., No. 19-1644 (4th Cir. Mar. 6, 2020)) in concluding that these climate change cases alleging only state-common law claim belonged in state court. In County of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp. et al., the Ninth Circuit emphasized its limited authority to review an order remanding a case back to state court under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). The Ninth Circuit therefore limited its review to determining whether the district court erred in holding that the federal court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the federal-officer removal statute.

In order to determine whether the district court erred in holding that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit examined whether the companies were “acting under” a federal officer’s directions. The companies argued that they were “persons acting under” a federal officer based on several agreements with the government. However, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the companies’ activities under these agreements did not give rise to a relationship where they were “acting under” a federal officer. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit court held that the fossil fuel companies failed to meet their burden for federal-officer removal and therefore affirmed the district court’s remand order.

In City of Oakland v. BP p.l.c. et al., the Ninth Circuit considered whether “the district court erred in determining that it had federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331” and ultimately held that plaintiffs’ state common-law public nuisance claims did not arise under federal common law. The court acknowledged that there are exceptions to the well-pleaded complaint rule for claims that arise under federal law, but concluded that none of those exceptions applied here.

The court reasoned that “[t]he question whether the Energy Companies can be held liable for public nuisance based on production and promotion of the use of fossil fuels and be required to spend billions of dollars on abatement is no doubt an important policy question, but it does not raise a substantial question of federal law for the purpose of determining whether there is jurisdiction under § 1331.” Furthermore, evaluation of the public nuisance claim would require factual determinations which are “not the type of claim for which federal-question lies.” The fossil fuel companies argued that the plaintiffs’ public nuisance claim was completely preempted by the Clean Air Act, but the court was not persuaded.

In response to defendants’ argument that by amending their complaint to assert a federal common law claim, the district court properly had subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the Ninth Circuit noted that plaintiffs only amended their complaint in response to the district court’s statements that plaintiffs’ claims were governed by federal common law. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit noted that since a party violates § 1441(a) “if it removes a cases that is not fit for federal adjudication, a district court must remand the case to state court, even if subsequent action conferred subject-matter jurisdiction on the district court.”

Notwithstanding these conclusions, the Ninth Circuit noted that the district court had not addressed alternative bases for removal raised by defendants and therefore remanded the case back to the district court. However, the Ninth Circuit specifically noted that if the district court concludes that there are no valid bases for federal jurisdiction, the case should be remanded back to state court.

Although these rulings did not address the merits of plaintiffs’ common-law claims, these cases will certainly pose challenges for defendants seeking to remove these types of cases to federal court, and will likely affect plaintiffs’ and defendants’ strategies in climate change litigation moving forward. Jenner & Block’s Corporate Environmental Lawyer will continue to update on those matters, as well as other important climate change litigation cases, as they unfold.

 

New York Bans PFAS Chemicals in Firefighting Foam as Industry Fights for Exemptions

HeadshotBy Matthew G. Lawson

On December 23, 2019, New York Governor Andrew M. Cuomo gave conditional approval to a state ban on firefighting foams containing per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (known as “PFAS”).  PFAS, commonly referred to as “forever chemicals” due to their ongoing persistence in the environment, are a family of man-made chemicals commonly found in a variety of products, including food packaging, cookware, stain-resistant clothing, and, in the case of perfluorooctane sulfonic acid (PFOS), many types of firefighting foams.  According to the U.S. EPA, PFAS chemicals are not only “extremely persistent in the environment,” but have also been linked to numerous health conditions including cancer in humans.

The legislation (“A445A”) requires the New York Office of Fire Prevention and Control to promulgate regulations that will provide guidance for state agencies and local government to avoid the purchase of firefighting foams containing PFAS compounds and outright prohibits the manufacture of PFAS containing firefighting foams within two years of the effective date of the bill.  As a condition to his approval, Governor Cuomo noted that an amendment to the current legislation was needed to allow discretionary use of firefighting agents containing PFAS where no other viable options exist.  On the basis of an agreement with the New York legislature to implement these amendments, the Governor conditionally approved the bill.    

With the enactment of the legislation, New York becomes the third U.S. state to ban PFAS chemicals behind Washington and New Hampshire. In addition, six other states have enacted some form of partial prohibitions on the use of foams containing PFAS chemicals.  In response to the recent state legislation, the FluoroCouncil has affirmed that use of firefighting foam containing PFAS “is credited with saving lives and property” and that use of such foams may be essential for extinguishing fires caused by flammable liquids.

Regulation of PFAS chemicals is also being considered at the federal level.  As noted in a prior blog by the Corporate Environmental Lawyer, a federal bill is currently being considered that would require the U.S. EPA to promulgate drinking water standards for PFOS as well as perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA), another common chemical in the PFAS family.  According to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the estimated cost of implementing these federal standards across the country are likely to exceed “several billion dollars.” The Corporate Environmental Lawyer will continue to update on forthcoming or pending state and federal legislation regarding PFAS chemicals.

International Shipping Industry Plots New Course to Battle Climate Change

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By Matthew G. Lawson 

GHGIn recent years, the global maritime shipping industry has faced pressure to reduce the large quantity of greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions associated with international shipping. About 90 percent of the world’s trade goods are transported by ship, and, according to one 2014 study, the shipment of these good via maritime vessels emits approximately 1.9 billion tonnes of GHG annually, or approximately 4% of human-made emissions worldwide. The annual GHG output of the shipping industry has been projected to rise by as much as 250% by 2050 if direct actions are not taken to modify industry practices.

Because of its international nature, global shipping is extremely difficult to regulate on a national basis, and therefore is often addressed through international agreements. To this end, in 2018, the International Maritime Organization (“IMO”), a branch of the United Nations, approved the world’s first broad agreement designed to reduce GHG from worldwide ocean shipping. The agreement reached by the IMO member provides the following target metrics:

(1) Reduce CO2 emissions per “transport work” (product of cargo transmitted and distance sailed) by at least 40% by 2030 and 70% by 2050; and

(2) Reduce total CO2 emissions from shipping by at least 50% by 2050.

The targets were designated to fall in line with the GHG reductions goals set out in the 2015 Paris Climate Accords (the "2015 Paris Agreement"). Though the 2015 Paris Agreement does not include an agreement to reduce GHGs in international shipping, the IMO has stated that it is committed to reducing GHGs in the industry to match the commitment put forward in the agreement.

On December 18, 2019, ship owner associations representing over 90% of the world’s merchant fleets formally presented to IMO their proposed strategy for meeting the international body’s 2018 GHG reduction goals. The industry’s plan proposed the creation of a $5 Billion USD research fund that will be used to research and develop more environmentally friendly fuels and ship propulsion systems. The fund would be fully funded from a $2 per ton tax on marine fuel purchased by shippers over a 10-year period. The associations argued that the fund would be critical to the development of alternative fuels—such as synthetic fuels created by renewable energy sources—which had the potential to drastically reduce the industry’s carbon footprint.

IMO’s environmental goals expand to areas beyond just GHG reduction. For example, in January 2020, the IMO’s new cap on the amount of Sulphur permitted fuel oil will take effect. The effort is aimed at reducing maritime vessel’s emissions of Sulphur oxides (SOx), which are known to be harmful to human health and can lead to acid rain and ocean acidification.  on December 10, 2019, the United States Environmental Protection Agency (“USEPA”) enacted a new Final Rule to help refiners comply with the IMO’s new global sulfur standard. As provided by the USEPA, the Final Rule was designed to “ensure that U.S. refiners can permissibly distribute distillate marine fuel up to the 5,000 ppm sulfur limit, which will facilitate smooth implementation of the 2020 global marine fuel standard.”

Dan Brouillette, Acting Secretary of Energy, Confirmed by Senate for Top DOE Spot

BandzaBy Alexander J. Bandza

BrouilletteThe Senate in a 70-15 vote confirmed Dan Brouillette this week as the new Secretary of Energy to succeed Secretary Rick Perry. All 47 Republicans who were present for the vote backed confirmation, as did 22 Democrats, including Joe Manchin III of West Virginia, Tom Udall of New Mexico, and Richard J. Durbin of Illinois, and one Independent, Angus King of Maine.

At his confirmation hearing, Mr. Brouillette stressed the role of the DOE in advancing research, including focusing his tenure on pushing direct air capture, carbon capture and sequestration (CCS), nuclear reactors, and the DOE commercialization work that fosters novel technologies in the private sector. He stated he would “absolutely” devote more DOE resources to researching DAC, and praised ongoing work on CCS and demonstrations of the technology in Wyoming in particular, nothing that he is “very excited about the work I see being done in Wyoming and within DOE writ large.” 

Wyoming has become a focal point of the tension as to the future of coal under climate change policies or other environmental laws and the potential opportunity for CCS to resolve this tension. (Wyoming supplies 40% of the United States’ coal to 29 states.) The Wyoming Public Service Commission Chair has recently spoke about the need for a hard look at the benefits of CCS before shuttering coal plants. Also this week, the University of Wyoming announced a partnership with DOE to accelerate research on carbon capture technology at two of the state’s coal-fired power plants. In light of Mr. Brouillette’s extensive comments in support of Wyoming and CCS, we can anticipate much more on this front.

As noted by the New York Times, before becoming deputy energy secretary, Mr. Brouillette was chief of staff to the House Energy and Commerce Committee and was assistant secretary of energy for congressional and intergovernmental affairs in the George W. Bush administration. He also worked as an executive at the United Services Automobile Association, a financial services provider to members of the military, and Ford Motor Company. He once was a member of Louisiana’s State Mineral and Energy Board.

D.C. Circuit Rejects Attempts by Trump Administration to Fast-Track Litigation on EPA Climate Rule

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By Matthew G. Lawson Power plant

On November 22, 2019, the D.C. Circuit rejected a bid by the Trump Administration to fast-track litigation over the United States Environmental Protection Agency’s (“USEPA”) Affordable Clean Energy Rule governing greenhouse gas emissions from power plants. The Order similarly rejected an opposing bid by environmental groups and twenty U.S. States which sought to stall the litigation.

The litigation revolves around the Trump Administration’s implementation of the Affordable Clean Energy Plan, a replacement for the Clean Power Plan enacted by the Obama Administration. The Obama-era Clean Power Plan—which itself was stalled by legal challenges—sought to impose carbon emissions caps on power plants and reduce the United States’ greenhouse gas emissions by 32% from 2005 levels by the year 2030. In contrast, the Trump-era Affordable Clean Energy Plan seeks a more modest reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and provides further latitude for individual U.S. States to design their own plans for paring carbon dioxide emissions at power plants. The challengers to Trump’s rule assert that the Affordable Clean Energy Plan does not meaningfully reduce greenhouse gas emissions and is a violation of USEPA’s duty to address pollution from power plants under the Clean Air Act. 

In its response to the challenges, the USEPA asserted that an “[e]xpeditious resolution of the petitions … would provide certain over EPA’s authority under the Clean Air Act, and the validity of the Affordable Clean Energy Rule promulgated under the Act.” The Trump Administration’s attempt to quickly resolve challenges to the Affordable Clean Energy Plan stems from the Administration’s goal to fully implement its final rule prior to any potential administration changes from the 2020 elections. A swift ruling in the Trump Administration’s favor would secure the validity of final rule and limit any future administration’s options for imposing additional regulations of greenhouse gas emissions under Clean Air Act. However, as a result of the D.C. Circuit’s ruling, it is estimated that the court will not hear oral arguments on the case until summer or fall of 2020, likely placing a final ruling after the results of the 2020 presidential election.

Available Company Defenses to Climate Change Shareholder Activism: Trends in Climate Change Litigation, Part 5

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By Matthew G. Lawson

As noted in Jenner & Block’s prior blog post, Shareholder Activism: Trends in Climate Change Litigation, Part 4, an emerging issue for public companies in high greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emitting industries is increased pressure from environmentally focused “activist shareholders.” These shareholders often seek to leverage their ownership shares to influence companies into taking action to decrease GHG emissions and/or increase public disclosure of such emissions. These efforts may be undertaken through negotiations with company management or through the introduction of specific shareholder proposals and proxy materials to be presented and voted on at annual shareholder meetings.

Several recent actions taken by the SEC may now help shield public companies from certain attempts by shareholders to introduce climate change related proposals for consideration at shareholder meetings. Under SEC rule 14a-8(i)(7), public companies may exclude from shareholders’ voting ballots any proposals which seek to “micromanage” the company’s ordinary business operations. In recent months, the SEC has asserted that rule 14a-8(i)(7) may be utilized by companies to block certain types of climate change related proposals. The agency has articulated this position by issuing “no-action” letters to public companies seeking to block climate-change proposals from their shareholders. In effect, these letters act as an assurance that the SEC will not recommend enforcement action against the companies for blocking the respective proposals because the agency agrees that the proposal falls under the purview of rule 14a-8(i)(7). However, the SEC has, in a few instances, refused to issue “no-action” letters to companies seeking to block shareholder climate change proposals.

Whether a shareholder’s climate change proposal is excludable under rule 14a-8(i)(7) therefore appears to be a case-by-case determination which depends on the specific demands of a proposal. As a general rule, the SEC has found that proposals which only seek greater disclosure of a company’s GHG emissions cannot be excluded under rule 14a-8(i)(7), but proposals which impose GHG emission reduction targets on the company or require specific methods for reporting or calculating GHGs may be excluded under rule 14a-8(i)(7). A few instructive examples of these general conclusions are provided below:

  • On February 14, 2019, the SEC issued a no-action letter to J.B. Hunt Transport Services, Inc. approving the company’s request to block a shareholder proposal that, if implemented, would require the company to adopt quantitative targets for reducing GHG emissions and issue a report demonstrating its progress towards achieving these targets. The SEC found that the proposal sought to micromanage the business by probing into complex matters that were better left to the informed judgment of management.
  • On March 4, 2019, the SEC refused to issue a no-action letter to Anadarko Petroleum Corporation after the company sought to block a proposal requesting that the company describe if, and how, it planned to reduce its total contribution to climate change to fall in line with the global temperature objectives of Paris Agreement.
  • On April 2, 2019, the SEC issued a no-action letter to ExxonMobil which affirmed that the company could exclude a shareholder proposal which would require the company to adopt and disclose certain GHG emission reduction targets. The SEC noted that the proposal sought to replace the ongoing judgments of the company’s management with “specific methods” for implementing complex policies.

Of course, the threat of potential governmental enforcement actions is only one reason why a company may hesitate to block shareholder proposals. Beyond the business considerations of such a decision, public companies may also need to consider whether adopting certain types of shareholder proposals—particularly those calling for increased disclosure and transparency of GHG emissions—may be beneficial to protect the company from the risk of future lawsuits by the company’s shareholders.

EPA Proposes Rule to Rescind Methane Regulations for the Oil and Gas Industry

Torrence_jpgBy Allison A. Torrence

Fernwärmeleitung_Dü_StPö_mit_Kraftwerk_DürnrohrOn August 28, 2019, EPA issued a proposed rule titled Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, and Modified Sources Review (the “Proposed Rule”). The Proposed Rule, if adopted, would rescind certain parts of the New Source Performance Standards (“NSPS”) related to methane and volatile organic compounds (“VOCs”) in the oil and gas industry.

First, EPA is proposing to redefine the operations included in the NSPS source category for the oil and gas industry. The original source category listing for the oil and gas industry, issued in 1979, included the production and processing segments of the industry. In 2012 and 2016, EPA expanded the oil and gas industry source category to include the transmission and storage segment of that industry. The Proposed Rule would remove sources in the transmission and storage segment from the oil and natural gas source category and would rescind the methane and VOC emission limits, adopted in 2012 and 2016, which currently apply to those sources.

Second, EPA is proposing to rescind emissions limits for methane (but keep limits for VOCs) in the production and processing segments of the oil and gas industry.  

Continue reading "EPA Proposes Rule to Rescind Methane Regulations for the Oil and Gas Industry" »

Exploring the E-Suite with Jonah Greenberger, Co-founder and President, Bright, Inc. (San Francisco, CA, and Mexico City, Mexico)

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Exploring the E-Suite with Jonah Greenberger, Co-founder and President, Bright, Inc. (San Francisco, CA, and Mexico City, Mexico) 

  1. Tell us about Bright, including what the organization does and your role.

Bright is the leading rooftop solar company in Mexico. We provide the financing and software that enable thousands of ambassadors to offer cheaper electricity to millions of homes, at no upfront cost, and we work with our network of hundreds of local installers and distributors to satisfy the resulting demand. Our first market is Mexico, which has more sun, higher electricity rates, and lower labor costs than the US. Bright's investors include First Round Capital, Y Combinator, and other top Silicon Valley firms.

  1. What is your professional background that led you to become involved in the clean energy and international fields?

I studied thermodynamics at Stanford and found energy fascinating - it felt like magic that a fuel could be converted into the motion of a car. I wanted to learn more and see how I could advance such a fascinating (and important) field.

  1. What do you think are the emerging issues in the energy field, especially clean energy and/or in the international context?

The largest topic is around how projects are allowed to use the existing grid, or the utility wires that move electricity from one place to another. It makes sense to only have one set of grids (vs telecom where you have many), but this means innovation is stifled unless there’s an easy way to access and use this grid.

  1. What aspects of working in the energy field have you enjoyed most?

I love how international energy is - everyone needs energy and it’s a national priority in almost every country to become more sustainable. Energy is an amazing way to see how the world works across borders.

  1. What do you find are some of the most challenging aspects of your work in the energy field?

Similar to what I mentioned earlier about connecting to the grid, innovation is largely at the whim of what the utilities will or have to allow in terms of connecting to the grid. Figuring out how to navigate these nuances is tricky but incredibly important.

  1. How did you make the transition from working for one of the world’s largest energy firms (Chevron) to becoming a clean energy startup founder?

Chevron taught me how the world consumes and produces energy and how to run a large international business. However, given how slow decisions were and career advancement as well, starting a company allowed me to release all of this pent up energy that I had to move fast and build.

  1. As a startup founder that operates in the clean energy and international spaces, what can policymakers learn from your challenges and successes?

One of the largest learnings we’ve had is that the platform has to be opened to create real innovation and impact. The internet, for instance, is a place anyone can build a webpage, create a company etc. But the grid in many countries is still the equivalent of if the internet required a DMV in person visit if you wanted to connect. Policy to free up the ability to connect to this platform could enable incredible value.

  1. What and/or who have helped you succeed as a clean energy startup founder?

YCombinator’s network has been incredibly helpful as has First Rounds to connect me to any expert I could need on any topic.

  1. What advice would you give a young person today who is considering starting out in the energy field?

I would advise to think about scalability from the start. Many energy projects are highly customized and so take forever and a vast amount of capital to have an impact. Solutions that will transform the way we use energy will be those that are far more standardized and can be repeated over and over again.

Mr. Greenberger was interviewed by Alexander J. Bandza, Associate, Energy and Environmental and Workplace Health and Safety Law Practices, Jenner & Block LLP

Climate Change Lawsuits Brought by Coastal Municipalities and States Against the Fossil Fuel Industry: Trends in Climate Change Litigation, Part 3

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By Matthew G. Lawson Air pollution

 

In the third installment of Jenner & Block’s Corporate Environmental Lawyer's discussion of emerging trends in Climate Change Litigation, we are discussing a quickly proliferating form of litigation—lawsuits filed by U.S. states and municipalities against companies that operate in industry sectors which have historically had high levels of greenhouse gas emissions.

At present, the most common target for this litigation in the United States has been the oil and gas industry. In these cases, plaintiff cities or states will often bring suit against a large number of oil and gas companies as members of the collective industry. These claims are usually brought in state court, where the plaintiffs can take advantage of potentially favorable state common law. Using this strategy, plaintiffs have asserted claims against the fossil-fuel industry under state law theories such as nuisance, failure to warn of the known impacts of climate change, and unjust enrichment. Of course, as a counter to this strategy and in hopes of demonstrating preemption under the Clean Air Act, defendants will often look to remove climate change cases to federal court.

In order to satisfy Article III Standing requirements, Plaintiffs in these cases have generally been coastal communities which allege that they have suffered harm or are uniquely at risk of suffering harm from rising sea levels as a result of climate change.

Several examples of this ongoing litigation includes:

  • County of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp. et al. (2018): claims brought by six California municipalities and counties against 37 fossil-fuel companies in California state court. The plaintiffs, alleging they will be damaged by the effects of climate change, brought a variety of claims under state common law including nuisance, negligence, failure to warn, and trespass. Following defendants’ removal of the case to federal court, plaintiffs successfully remanded back to state court on the grounds that their claims did not implicate a federal question or raise preemption issues. Defendants have filed an interlocutory appeal in the Ninth Circuit which is currently being briefed by the parties.
  • City of Oakland v. BP p.l.c. et al. (2018): claims brought by the City of Oakland and San Francisco against fossil-fuel companies under California common and statutory law. Plaintiffs asserted that the industry’s GHG emissions amounted to a “public nuisance” under California law. However, unlike San Mateo, the defendants in City of Oakland were able to successfully remove and ultimately retain the matter in federal court. The Northern District of California court denied plaintiff’s motion to remand the case back to state court based on its finding that federal common law necessarily governed the nuisance claims. The district court subsequently dismissed the suits on the grounds that the plaintiffs’ claims raised a “Political Question” best addressed by the legislature as opposed to judicial branch. This dismissal has also been appealed to the Ninth Circuit.
  • Rhode Island v. Chevron Corp. et al. (2018): The first such case to be brought by a U.S. State, Rhode Island asserted claims for nuisance, strict liability, failure to warn, design defect, trespass, impairment of public trust resources, and violations of the Environmental Rights Act against 21 fossil-fuel companies. Rhode Island’s lawsuit asserts that the state’s extensive coastline will be damaged through rising sea levels, increased frequency and severity of flooding, extreme precipitation events, and ocean warming and acidification. Defendants have removed the case to federal court, and the parties are currently briefing Rhode Island’s attempt to remand the case back to state court.

Trends in Climate Change Litigation: Part 2—Investigations & Litigation by State Attorneys General

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By Matthew G. Lawson

 

In the second installation of Jenner & Block’s Corporate Environmental Lawyer's discussion of emerging trends in Climate Change Litigation, we are highlighting recent investigations brought by US state attorneys general against private companies for allegedly misleading the public and/or company shareholders regarding the potential climate impacts of their operations. 

In recent years, several major state investigations were launched following investigative journalism reports of private companies’ failures to disclose the causes and effects of climate change. One such example is the Los Angeles Times 2015 exposé into Exxon Mobil Corp.’s historic in-house research on climate change.

Approximately one month after the publication of the Los Angeles Times’ article, the New York Attorney General subpoenaed Exxon, seeking documents related to the company’s research on the causes and effects of climate change; the integration of its research findings into business decisions; and the company's disclosures of this information to shareholders and the Securities and Exchange Commission. The attorney general’s investigation was grounded in New York's shareholder-protection statute, the Martin Act, as well as New York’s consumer protection and general business laws.

In 2016, New York’s investigation was publically supported by a coalition of top state enforcement officials from Vermont, Virginia, Massachusetts, Maryland, Connecticut, and the Virgin Islands, all of which agreed to share information and strategies in similar climate change investigations and future litigation. Exxon responded by filing its own lawsuit seeking to block New York and Massachusetts’ investigations.

After a three-year contentious investigation, the New York Attorney General's office sued Exxon on October 24, 2018, alleging that Exxon engaged in “a longstanding fraudulent scheme” to deceive investors by providing false and misleading information about the financial risks the company faced from its contributions to climate change. 

Jenner & Block’s Corporate Environmental Lawyer will continue to update on this matter, as well as other important climate change litigation cases, as they unfold.