By Leah M. Song
On June 29, 2020, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) issued a termination addendum to the COVID‑19 temporary enforcement policy previously issued on March 26, 2020. As further discussed below, EPA’s temporary enforcement policy will now terminate no later than August 31, 2020.
The temporary enforcement policy discussed EPA enforcement of environmental legal obligations during the COVID‑19 pandemic. The temporary policy made clear that the EPA expected regulated facilities to comply with regulatory requirements, where reasonably practicable, and to return to compliance as quickly as possible. To be eligible for enforcement discretion, the policy also required facilities to document decisions made to prevent or mitigate noncompliance and demonstrate how the noncompliance was caused by the COVID‑19 pandemic. The temporary enforcement policy was analyzed in Jenner & Block’s Corporate Environmental Lawyer blog here.
In the recent termination addendum, EPA pointed to various federal and state guidelines developed in response to the pandemic, but noted that as restrictions begin to be relaxed or lifted, so too are compliance obstacles. However, EPA also noted that in some states, the resurgence of COVID‑19 cases could result in a pause in reopening and EPA acknowledged that “there will be a period of adjustment as regulated entities plan how to effectively comply both with environmental legal obligations and with public health guidance.”
EPA therefore selected August 31, 2020, as the termination date for the temporary enforcement policy. EPA stated that the termination date reflects “the changing circumstances on facility operations, worker shortages, and other constraints caused by the public health emergency,” but “ensures that there is adequate time to adjust to the changing circumstances.”
EPA reminded entities that “[a]s stated in the temporary policy, entities should make every effort to comply with their environmental compliance obligations and the policy applies only to situations where compliance is not reasonably practicable as a result of COVID‑19” which “should become fewer and fewer.” EPA made clear that it “will not base any exercise of enforcement discretion on this temporary policy for any noncompliance that occurs after August 31, 2020.” However, EPA will still consider exercising its enforcement discretion on a “case-by-case basis regarding any noncompliance, including noncompliance caused by the COVID‑19 public health emergency, before or after the temporary policy is terminated.”
Finally, EPA floated the possibility that the temporary enforcement policy could terminate even before August 31, 2020. EPA will continue to assess national and state conditions, such as “the expiration or lifting of ‘stay at home’ orders” and “the status of federal and/or state COVID‑19 public health emergency guidelines.” In the event that EPA determines conditions warrant earlier termination of the policy, EPA will provide at least 7 days’ notice prior to termination of the policy.
Jenner & Block’s Corporate Environmental Lawyer will continue to update on these matters, as well as other important COVID‑19 related guidance, as they unfold.
By Leah M. Song
As we have discussed in our previous blog posts, a growing form of climate change litigation in the United States consists of lawsuits filed by states or municipalities against private industry, and more specifically, the fossil-fuel industry. States, cities and other units of local government have filed lawsuits alleging state common law theories, including nuisance, trespass, failure to warn of the known impacts of climate change, and unjust enrichment.
The following cases are the primary cases that are currently ongoing: Rhode Island, Baltimore, Oakland, and San Mateo.
Defendants in these cases have universally tried to remove these cases to federal court where defendants presumably believe that they stand a much greater chance of getting the litigation dismissed. Generally, plaintiffs (including states, units of local government, and non-governmental organizations) asserting climate change claims against corporations prefer to be in state court where they can take advantage of perceived plaintiff-friendly common law or state statutes. On the other hand, defendants inevitably seek to remove such cases to federal court where they have had a higher level of success securing dismissals on the grounds that the issue is preempted by the Clean Air Act and/or addresses a “political question” which is better left to the discretion of Congress. See City of N.Y. v. BP P.L.C.. 325 F. Supp. 3d 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
As further discussed below, in most of these cases, the district courts have remanded the cases back to state court and those decision have been appealed to the appellate courts. At the same time, defendants have sought to stay the court’s remand orders while the appeals proceed in federal court. These efforts to stay these remand orders have universally been unsuccessful, with the U.S. Supreme Court refusing to stay these orders, as seen here.
The following provides a brief overview and status update on each of these cases:
- In Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. BP PLC, Baltimore brought action against various fossil-fuel companies for public nuisance, private nuisance, strict liability failure to warn, strict liability design defect, negligent design defect, negligent failure to warn, trespass, and violations of Maryland’s Consumer Protection Act. As noted above, defendants sought to remove the case to federal court but the district court remanded the case back to the state court.
On March 6, 2020, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s order remanding the case back to state court. The district court rejected each of the fossil-fuel companies’ stated grounds for removal, but the Fourth Circuit held that its appellate jurisdiction was limited to a review of the district court’s conclusion that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the federal-officer removal statute pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) and 28 U.S.C. § 1442. The Fourth Circuit found none of the three contractual relationships on which the fossil-fuel companies based their claims for federal officer removal were sufficient to justify removal from state court, either because the relationships failed to satisfy the requirement that the fossil-fuel companies were “acting under” the direction of a federal officer or because the contractual relationships were “insufficiently related” to Baltimore’s claims for purposes of the nexus prong.
On March 31, 2020, the fossil-fuel companies filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court, seeking review of the question of whether the statutory provision prescribing the scope of appellate review of remand orders “permits a court of appeals to review any issue encompassed in a district court’s order remanding a removed case to state court where the removing defendant premised removal in part on the federal officer removal statute… or the civil-rights removal statute.” Baltimore’s response was due by April 30, 2020, but has been extended to June 29, 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
- Rhode Island v. Chevron Corp. et al. was the first climate change damages case to be brought by a In this case, Rhode Island brought action against 21 different fossil-fuel companies for nuisance, strict liability, failure to warn, design defect, trespass, impairment of public trust resources, and violations of the Rhode Island Environmental Rights Act. Rhode Island’s lawsuit asserts that the state’s extensive coastline will be damaged through rising sea levels, increased frequency and severity of flooding and ocean acidification. The fossil-fuel companies had removed to federal court and Rhode Island tried to remand back to state court. On July 22, 2019, the federal court ordered the litigation to be remanded back to Rhode Island state court. While acknowledging that at least two federal courts had reached opposite conclusions, the court held that Rhode Island’s climate change claims were not preempted by the Clean Air Act and did not implicate a substantial federal question such that removal to federal court was appropriate. With respect to the Clean Air Act, the court found that the statute did not act to preempt all state-law causes of action for air pollution, including Rhode Island’s claims against defendants for releases of greenhouse gases. In addition, the court held that Rhode Island’s claims did not implicate a substantial federal question because “[t]he rights, duties, and rules of decision implicated by the complaint are all supplied by state law, without reference to anything federal.”
Rhode Island promptly notified the First Circuit of the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Baltimore, noting that that the Fourth Circuit’s decision “rejects the exact arguments raised … as to the proper scope of … appeal” as well as the fossil-fuel companies’ “tenuous justification for federal officer removal.” In response, Chevron filed a letter seeking to distinguish the Baltimore decision on the grounds that the Fourth Circuit “considered itself bound by [c]ircuit precedent” and had based its holding that federal officer removal was inapplicable on an incorrect characterization of plaintiffs’ claims in that case.
- On May 26, 2020, the Ninth Circuit joined the Fourth Circuit in Baltimore in concluding that these climate change cases alleging only state-common law claims (County of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp. et al. and City of Oakland v. BP p.l.c. et al.) belonged in state court. In County of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp. et al., six California municipalities and counties sued more than 30 fossil-fuel companies in California state court. The plaintiffs brought a variety of claims under state common law including nuisance, negligence, failure to warn, and trespass. In City of Oakland v. BP p.l.c. et al., the cities of Oakland and San Francisco sued five fossil-fuel companies in state court under a theory of nuisance. Defendants sought to remove both cases to federal court. The San Mateo district court remanded the case back to state court while the Oakland district court refused to remand its case, finding instead that plaintiffs’ public nuisance claims were governed by federal common law, but then proceeding to dismiss the lawsuit for failure to state a claim. Both cases were appealed to the Ninth Circuit.
The Ninth Circuit agreed with plaintiffs that two climate change lawsuits had been improperly removed to the federal courts, continuing courts’ recent trend of remanding these types of cases back to state court. These cases were recently analyzed on Jenner & Block’s Corporate Environmental Lawyer here.
Shortly after these rulings, both Rhode Island and Boulder filed letters informing the respective courts of the Ninth Circuit’s San Mateo and Oakland decisions.
Although San Mateo and Oakland did not address the merits of plaintiffs’ common-law claims, these cases will certainly pose challenges for defendants seeking to remove these types of cases to federal court, and will likely affect plaintiffs’ and defendants’ strategies in climate change litigation moving forward.
Jenner & Block’s Corporate Environmental Lawyer will continue to update on climate change litigation cases as they unfold.
By Leah M. Song
On May 26, 2020, the Ninth Circuit agreed with plaintiffs that two climate change lawsuits—County of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp. et al. and City of Oakland v. BP p.l.c. et al.—had been improperly removed to the federal courts, continuing courts’ recent trend of remanding these types of cases back to state court.
A growing form of climate change litigation in the United States consists of lawsuits filed by states or municipalities against private industry, and more specifically, the fossil-fuel industry. States, cities and other units of local government have filed lawsuits alleging state common law theories, including nuisance, trespass, failure to warn of the known impacts of climate change, and unjust enrichment. The outcome of these cases thus far has hinged on whether or not the fossil fuel companies are able to successfully remove the litigation to federal court where they stand a much greater chance of getting the litigation dismissed. Generally, plaintiffs (including states, units of local government, and non-governmental organizations) asserting climate change claims against corporations prefer to be in state court where they can take advantage of perceived plaintiff-friendly common law or state statutes. On the other hand, defendants inevitably seek to remove such cases to federal court where they have had a higher level of success securing dismissals on the grounds that the issue is preempted by the Clean Air Act and/or addresses a “political question” which is better left to the discretion of Congress. See City of N.Y. v. BP P.L.C.. 325 F. Supp. 3d 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
In County of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp. et al., six California municipalities and counties sued more than 30 fossil-fuel companies in California state court. The plaintiffs brought a variety of claims under state common law including nuisance, negligence, failure to warn, and trespass. In City of Oakland v. BP p.l.c. et al., the Cities of Oakland and San Francisco sued five fossil-fuel companies in state court under a theory of nuisance. The fossil-fuel companies removed both cases to federal court. The San Mateo district court remanded the case back to state court while the Oakland district court refused to remand the case back to state court, finding that plaintiffs’ public nuisance claims were governed by federal common law, but then proceeding to dismiss the lawsuit. Both cases were appealed to the Ninth Circuit.
On May 26th, the Ninth Circuit joined the Fourth Circuit (Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. BP P.L.C., et al., No. 19-1644 (4th Cir. Mar. 6, 2020)) in concluding that these climate change cases alleging only state-common law claim belonged in state court. In County of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp. et al., the Ninth Circuit emphasized its limited authority to review an order remanding a case back to state court under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). The Ninth Circuit therefore limited its review to determining whether the district court erred in holding that the federal court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the federal-officer removal statute.
In order to determine whether the district court erred in holding that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit examined whether the companies were “acting under” a federal officer’s directions. The companies argued that they were “persons acting under” a federal officer based on several agreements with the government. However, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the companies’ activities under these agreements did not give rise to a relationship where they were “acting under” a federal officer. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit court held that the fossil fuel companies failed to meet their burden for federal-officer removal and therefore affirmed the district court’s remand order.
In City of Oakland v. BP p.l.c. et al., the Ninth Circuit considered whether “the district court erred in determining that it had federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331” and ultimately held that plaintiffs’ state common-law public nuisance claims did not arise under federal common law. The court acknowledged that there are exceptions to the well-pleaded complaint rule for claims that arise under federal law, but concluded that none of those exceptions applied here.
The court reasoned that “[t]he question whether the Energy Companies can be held liable for public nuisance based on production and promotion of the use of fossil fuels and be required to spend billions of dollars on abatement is no doubt an important policy question, but it does not raise a substantial question of federal law for the purpose of determining whether there is jurisdiction under § 1331.” Furthermore, evaluation of the public nuisance claim would require factual determinations which are “not the type of claim for which federal-question lies.” The fossil fuel companies argued that the plaintiffs’ public nuisance claim was completely preempted by the Clean Air Act, but the court was not persuaded.
In response to defendants’ argument that by amending their complaint to assert a federal common law claim, the district court properly had subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the Ninth Circuit noted that plaintiffs only amended their complaint in response to the district court’s statements that plaintiffs’ claims were governed by federal common law. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit noted that since a party violates § 1441(a) “if it removes a cases that is not fit for federal adjudication, a district court must remand the case to state court, even if subsequent action conferred subject-matter jurisdiction on the district court.”
Notwithstanding these conclusions, the Ninth Circuit noted that the district court had not addressed alternative bases for removal raised by defendants and therefore remanded the case back to the district court. However, the Ninth Circuit specifically noted that if the district court concludes that there are no valid bases for federal jurisdiction, the case should be remanded back to state court.
Although these rulings did not address the merits of plaintiffs’ common-law claims, these cases will certainly pose challenges for defendants seeking to remove these types of cases to federal court, and will likely affect plaintiffs’ and defendants’ strategies in climate change litigation moving forward. Jenner & Block’s Corporate Environmental Lawyer will continue to update on those matters, as well as other important climate change litigation cases, as they unfold.
New Executive Order Presses Agencies to Continue to Seek Regulatory Flexibility in Response to the Covid-19 Pandemic
By Leah M. Song
On May 19, 2020, the President issued an executive order titled “Regulatory Relief to Support Economic Recovery” (“Executive Order”). The Executive Order seeks to “overcome the effects the virus has had on [the] economy” and to that end, directs agencies and executive departments to "continue to remove barriers to the greatest engine ever known: the innovation, initiative and drive of the American people." To do so, executive departments and agencies are encouraged and directed to take appropriate action.
The Executive Order directs agencies to respond to the economic consequences of COVID‑19 by “rescinding, modifying, waiving, or providing exemptions from regulations and other requirements that may inhibit economic recovery.” Agencies are directed, "to use, to the fullest extent possible and consistent with applicable law, any emergency authorities” to support the economic response to COVID-19. Agencies are charged with identifying “regulatory standards that may inhibit economic recovery” and take appropriate action to promote job creation and economic growth. This includes issuing proposed rules, exempting persons or entities from requirements, exercising appropriate temporary enforcement discretion or temporary time extensions.
The Executive Order further instructs agencies to provide compliance assistance for regulated entities and to “accelerate procedures by which a regulated person or entity may receive a pre-enforcement ruling.” Agencies should consider enforcement discretion policies for those that “have attempted in reasonable good faith to comply with applicable statutory and regulatory standards.” Additionally, the Executive Order emphasized that agencies should “consider the principles of fairness” and “revise their procedures and practices in light of them.” The Executive Order recommends that agencies review regulatory standards and “determine which, if any, would promote economic recovery if made permanent.”
Consistent with this Executive Order, the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) has previously issued a COVID-19-related policy regarding EPA's decision to exercise enforcement discretion with respect to non-compliance with certain environmental requirements (this enforcement policy was the subject of a prior Corporate Environmental blog). Although EPA's enforcement discretion policy has been challenged by several states and environmental organizations, the Executive Order would seem to diminish the likelihood that EPA will rescind its enforcement discretion policy in the near term.
Please feel free to contact the author with questions or for further information. For regular updates about the impact of COVID‑19 in the workplace and on business generally, please visit Jenner & Block’s Corporate Environmental Lawyer blog and Jenner & Block’s COVID‑19 Resource Center.
On March 26, 2020, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) announced a temporary policy regarding EPA enforcement of environmental legal obligations during the COVID-19 pandemic. EPA Administrator Andrew Wheeler stated that the “EPA is committed to protecting human health and the environment, but recognizes challenges resulting from efforts to protect workers and the public from COVID-19 may directly impact the ability of regulated facilities to meet all federal regulatory requirements.”
This temporary enforcement discretion policy applies to civil violations during the COVID-19 outbreak. To clarify, the policy does not apply to: a) any criminal violations or conditions of probation in criminal sentences, b) activities that are carried out under Superfund and RCRA Corrective Action enforcement instruments, and c) imports. Additionally, the policy does not relieve any entity from preventing, responding to, or reporting accidental releases.
The temporary policy makes it clear that the EPA expects regulated facilities to comply with regulatory requirements, where reasonably practicable, and to return to compliance as quickly as possible. To be eligible for enforcement discretion, the policy also requires facilities to document decisions made to prevent or mitigate noncompliance and demonstrate how the noncompliance was caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.
The policy addresses different categories of noncompliance differently and is broken into the following sections:
By Leah M. Song
In our previous blog post, we discussed the case of Kristen Giovanni, et al. v. Navy. As an update, on January 15, 2020, the district court judge said that the Navy did not have to pay to monitor residents for potential health issues linked to PFOS and PFOA exposure.
The court dismissed the suit finding that the regulator's failure to designate the chemicals as hazardous substances precluded the plaintiffs from filing under state law. To qualify for medical monitoring, Section 1115 of Pennsylvania’s Hazardous Sites Cleanup Act (HSCA) stated that citizens must have been exposed to a hazardous substance, a designation that PFOA and PFOS lack under either federal or state law. The judge reasoned that “merely having the essential qualities of a hazardous waste…is not enough to be a hazardous substance under HSCA.”
Another basis for the Court’s ruling was that the state and federal governments are “well on their way to classifying PFAS as hazardous substances.” This may increase efforts to designate PFAS as hazardous substances under the federal Superfund law.
The plaintiffs’ attorney said that the decision would not be appealed but they would see what could be done in the future if the substances are designated as hazardous substances.
By Leah M. Song
Following a three-week bench trial, the New York Supreme Court ruled in favor of Exxon Mobil Corp. in the climate fraud case brought by New York’s attorney general, who accused the energy company of deceiving its investors about climate change-related risks to its business. In reaching this holding, Justice Barry Ostrager found that the attorney general “failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that ExxonMobil made any material misstatements or omissions about its practices and procedures that misled any reasonable investor,” which was the threshold for sustaining claims under the Martin Act.
As noted in Jenner & Block’s previous blog post, the attorney general began its investigation into Exxon Mobil in 2015. The attorney general’s investigation was grounded in New York's shareholder-protection statute, the Martin Act, as well as New York’s consumer protection and general business laws. After a three-year investigation, the attorney general’s office sued Exxon on October 24, 2018.
Exxon Mobil’s victory was foreshadowed when the attorney general dropped two of its four claims, one for common law fraud and one for equitable fraud, on the last day of trial. These claims were important to the state’s case because they alleged that Exxon Mobil’s misstatements were part of a scheme to mislead its investors and that Exxon Mobil’s investors had in fact relied on the misstatements when purchasing the company’s stock. Only two Martin Act investor fraud claims remained, which did not require the government to prove fraudulent intent.
An Exxon spokesperson said the ruling affirmed the position Exxon has held throughout the investigation and trial. "The court agreed that the attorney general failed to make a case, even with the extremely low threshold of the Martin Act in its favor," the spokesperson said.
Despite ruling against the attorney general, Judge Ostrager clarified that “nothing in [the] opinion is intended to absolve ExxonMobil from responsibility for contributing to climate change through the emission of greenhouse gases in the production of its fossil fuel products.” The judge continued “ExxonMobil is in the business of producing energy, and this is a securities fraud case, not a climate change case.”
Exxon is battling similar accusations in other state and federal courts. Jenner & Block's Corporate Environmental Lawyer will continue to update on those matters, as well as other important climate change litigation cases, as they unfold.