Sustainability Feed

Does Novel “Greenwashing” Enforcement Action Portend a New Trend?

 

By: Todd C. Toral and PJ M. Novack

GreenLawsuits over alleged misleading environmental marketing claims, or “greenwashing,” are nothing new. It has been nearly 30 years since the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) released its first version of the “Green Guides,” which are intended to help marketers avoid the practice. Since then, there have been many greenwashing actions before the FTC. More broadly, the FTC has pursued a number of suits in federal court, such as false advertising claims over the terms “clean diesel” and “100% organic.” But last month, in a first, several environmental groups petitioned the FTC to use its Green Guides offensively against a fossil fuel company for “misleading consumers on the climate and environmental impact of its operations.”

On March 16, 2021, Earthworks, Global Witness, and Greenpeace USA filed a complaint against Chevron for misleading consumers through advertisements that exaggerate the company’s investment in renewable energy and its commitment to reducing fossil fuel pollution. The action comes on the heels of Chevron’s new “Climate Change Resilience” report, where Chevron outlined its contributions against climate change. The environmental groups argue that Chevron misrepresents its image to appear climate-friendly and racial-justice oriented, while actually doing more harm than good. In support of their claims, the environmental groups point out that Chevron is the second most polluting company in the world and had spent only 0.2% of its capital expenditures on low-carbon energy sources between 2010-2018.

Considering the recent change in administrations, this action may represent a new trend where consumer and environmental groups are willing to take on major oil companies by petitioning a potentially more consumer-friendly FTC. President Biden currently has an opportunity to fill the vacant FTC seat and tip the balance of power toward Democrats. Moreover, President Biden has signaled his personal support for environmental causes by halting oil and gas sales and canceling the Keystone XL crude pipeline. Given the shifting sands, companies should be prepared for new and perhaps more creative enforcement actions.

Resources:

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-03-16/chevron-greenwashing-targeted-in-complaint-filed-with-u-s-ftc

https://www.law360.com/articles/1365529

https://www.earthworks.org/media-releases/accountability-groups-file-first-of-its-kind-ftc-complaint-against-chevron-for-misleading-consumers-on-climate-action/#:~:text=March%2016%2C%202021%20%E2%80%94%20Earthworks%2C,to%20reducing%20fossil%20fuel%20pollution.

https://www.popsci.com/story/environment/chevron-greenwashing-ftc-complaint/

https://www.chevron.com/-/media/chevron/sustainability/documents/climate-change-resilience-report.pdf

https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/media-resources/truth-advertising/green-guides

https://apnews.com/article/why-is-biden-halting-federal-oil-and-gas-sales-b8f03552c2c2fa7ec0dfc5debeb3f882

https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/160329volkswagen_cmpt.pdf

https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/truly_organic_complaint.pdf

Environmental Organizations Petition EPA to Expand Enforcement of Clean Air Act’s General Duty Clause

LawsonBy Matthew G. Lawson

Air pollutionVarious environmental organizations, led by the Environmental Integrity Project (“EIP”), are urging the United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) to expand enforcement of Section 112(r)(1) of the Clean Air Act (CAA)—commonly known as the General Duty Clause (“GDC”)—in order to more closely regulate the handling of hazardous substances at industrial facilities permitted under the CAA. EIP’s ongoing efforts include petitioning EPA to require that the obligations of the GDC be incorporated in state-issued Title V air emission permits, such that these obligations may be enforced against permit holders by state regulators or through citizen suits. As explained below, efforts to expand enforcement of the GDC were for the most part blocked under the Trump Administration’s EPA, but it remains to be seen whether these efforts may achieve renewed success under the Biden Administration.

The GDC, which was first enacted as part of the 1990 amendments to the CAA, requires that owners and operators of regulated facilities that handle, process, or store “extremely hazardous substances” take certain actions to “prevent the accidental release and … minimize the consequences of any [] release” of such substances. Specifically, the GDC requires facility owners and operators to: (i) conduct a hazardous risk assessment to identify potential risks from extremely hazardous substances at their facilities; (ii) design and maintain safe facilities that protect against releases; and (iii) develop and implement protocols to minimize the consequences from any accidental releases. While “extremely hazardous substances” is not defined by the GDC, the Senate Report from the 1990 CAA amendments provides that “extremely hazardous substance” includes any agent “which may as the result of short-term exposures associated with releases to the air cause death, injury or property damage due to its toxicity, reactivity, flammability, volatility, or corrosivity.” Although not necessarily exhaustive, EPA has created a list of extremely hazardous substances in 40 CFR part 68. Jurisdiction for enforcement of the GDC remains an issue of contention between EPA and environmental organizations. While enforcement of the GDC has traditionally been left to the exclusive purview of EPA, environmental groups are increasingly arguing that state air authorities can and should request delegation authority from the EPA to enforce the GDC at permitted facilities within their jurisdiction. 

A key example of EIP’s efforts to increase enforcement of the GDC is provided in the organization’s April 14, 2020 Petition Objecting to a Title V Permit issued to Hazlehurst Wood Pellets LLC (“Hazlehurst”), a wood pellet mill operating in the State of Georgia. At the time of the petition, Hazlehurst’s Title V permit had been approved by state authorities, but remained subject to final review by EPA. EIP’s Petition asked EPA to deny Hazlehurst’s air emissions permit on the grounds that the permit failed to recognize or incorporate the requirements of the GDC. According to the Petition, ensuring compliance with the GDC was critical due to the fact that Hazlehurst regularly handles hazardous products, including “copious amount of wood dust,” which had previously caused flash fires at the facility. The Trump Administration EPA’s subsequent Order Denying the Petition rejected EIP’s request, finding that the GDC is not an “applicable requirement” for the purposes of Title V, and as such, “Title V permits need not—and should not—include terms to assure compliance with the [GDC] as it is an independent requirement…” EPA reasoned that if the requirements of the GDC were integrated into a Title V permit, the obligations would ostensibly be enforceable through citizen suits. Concluding that “neither citizens nor state and local air agencies may enforce the [GDC] under the CAA,” EPA rejected the Petition. At the same time, EPA clarified that because the GDC is “self-implementing,” it is independently enforceable by EPA and applies even when it is not expressed as part of a facility’s air permit.

While EPA’s Order denied the environmental organization’s request to expressly require GDC compliance in Title V permits, the Order did make clear that facilities holding Title V permits are still subject to the GDC’s requirements which may be enforced by EPA. According to recently issued EPA Guidance on the GDC, owners and operators who maintain extremely hazardous substances must adhere, at a minimum, to recognized industry standards and any applicable government regulations for handling such substances. While it remains to be seen whether the Biden Administration EPA will continue to resist expressly incorporating the GDC in Title V permits, the Biden Administration’s emphasis on regulatory compliance and environmental justice indicates that future enforcement of the GDC is likely to increase. For this reason, facilities holding air emission permits should review their existing protocols for handling and storing hazardous substances and ensure these protocols are consistent with prevailing industry standards and the requirements of the GDC.


Oil Industry Scores Big Win in Second Circuit Greenhouse Gas Litigation

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BSteven M. Siros, Co-Chair, Environmental and Workplace Health & Safety Law Practice

Oil and gasBreaking from the pack and potentially creating a circuit split, the Second Circuit’s decision in City of New York v. Chevron, et al. dismissing New York’s City’s climate change lawsuit is a significant victory for the oil and gas industry.  The unanimous ruling from the Second Circuit affirmed a district’s court decision dismissing New York’s common law claims, finding that issues such as global warming and greenhouse gas emissions invoked questions of federal law that are not well suited to the application of state law.

Taking a slightly different tact than state and local plaintiffs in other climate change lawsuits, the State of New York sued five oil producers in federal court asserting causes of action for (1) public nuisance, (2) private nuisance, and (3) trespass under New York law stemming from the defendants’ production, promotion and sale of fossil fuels.  New York sought both compensatory damages as well as a possible injunction that would require defendants to abate the public nuisance and trespass.  Defendants filed motions to dismiss that were granted.  The district court determined that New York’s state-law claims were displaced by federal common law and that those federal common law claims were in turn displaced by the Clean Air Act.  The district court also concluded that judicial caution counseled against permitting New York to bring federal common law claims against defendants for foreign greenhouse gas emissions. 

The Second Circuit agreed with the district court, noting that the problems facing New York can’t be attributed solely to greenhouse gas emissions in the state nor the emissions of the five defendants. Rather, the greenhouse gas emissions that New York alleges required the City to launch a “$20 billion-plus multilayered investment program in climate resiliency across all five boroughs” are a byproduct of emissions around the world for the past several hundred years. 

As the Second Circuit noted, “[t]he question before it is whether municipalities may utilize state tort law to hold multinational oil companies liable for the damages caused by greenhouse gas emissions.  Given the nature of the harm and the existence of a complex web of federal and international environmental law regulating such emissions, we hold that the answer is ‘no.’” 

Finding that New York’s state common law claims were displaced by federal common law, the Second Circuit then considered whether the Clean Air Act displaced these federal common law claims.  The Second Circuit noted that the Supreme Court in Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut (AEP) (2011) had previously held that the “’Clean Air Act and the EPA actions it authorizes displace any federal common-law right to seek abatement’ of greenhouse gas emissions.”    As to the State’s damage claims, the Second Circuit agreed with the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Native Vill. Of Kivalina v. Exxonmobil Corp. (9th Cir. 2012) that the “displacement of federal common law does not turn on the nature of the remedy but rather on the cause of action.”  As such, the Second Circuit held that “whether styled as an action for injunctive relief against the Producers to stop them from producing fossil fuels, or an action for damages that would have the same practical effect, the City’s claims are clearly barred by the Clean Air Act. 

The Second Circuit was careful to distinguish its holding from the holdings reached by the First, Fourth, Ninth and Tenth circuits in prior climate change cases, noting that in those other cases, the plaintiffs had brought state-law claims in state court and defendants then sought to remove the cases to federal courts.  The single issue in those cases was whether defendants’ federal preemption defenses singlehandedly created federal question jurisdiction.   Here, because New York elected to file in federal as opposed to state court, the Second Circuit was free to consider defendants’ preemption defense on its own terms and not under the heightened standard applicable to a removal inquiry. 

Whether the Second Circuit’s decision has any impact on BP PLC, et al. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, a case that has now been fully briefed and argued before the Supreme Court remains to be seen.  The Baltimore case was one of the state court cases discussed above that was removed to federal court.  The defendants had alleged a number of different grounds for removal, one of which is known as the “federal officer removal statute” that allows removal to federal court of any lawsuit filed against an officer or person acting under that office of the United States or an agency thereof.  The limited issue before the Supreme Court was whether the appellate court could only consider the federal-officer removal ground or whether it could instead review any of the grounds relied upon in defendants’ removal petition. 

Some commenters have noted that the Second Circuit’s decision creates a circuit split that may embolden the Supreme Court to address these climate change cases in one fell swoop.  The more likely scenario, however, is that the Supreme Court limits its opinion to the narrow issue before it and leaves resolution of whether state law climate change nuisance actions are preempted by federal law for another day. 

Congressional Review Act Resolution Introduced to Revoke EPA Methane Rule—Does this Open the CRA Floodgates?

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BSteven M. Siros, Co-Chair, Environmental and Workplace Health & Safety Law Practice

PipelineOn March 25, 2021, Democrats in the Senate and House of Representatives introduced joint resolutions pursuant to the Congressional Review Act (CRA) that if approved by Congress and signed by President Biden would rescind the Trump-era rollback of Obama-era regulations that (1) imposed methane-specific emission limits on “production and processing” segments of the oil and gas industry and (2) required that transmission lines and storage equipment be inspected for methane leaks and repaired in a timely manner in accordance with the New Source Performance Standards for the Oil and Natural Gas Industry.  The CRA resolution, if approved by Congress and signed by President Biden, would reinstate these Obama-era regulations for the oil and gas industry.

The CRA, which was enacted in 1996, is a tool that allows Congress to disapprove a range of regulatory rules issued by federal agencies by first approving a joint resolution of disapproval that then goes to the President for signature. If signed by the President, the disapproved rule either does not take effect or does not continue.  In addition, once a joint resolution of disapproval is enacted, the CRA provides that a new rule may not be issued in “substantially the same form” as the disapproved rule.  Congress has a limited window to act—the CRA requires that a joint resolution of disapproval must be introduced within 60 legislative working days of the date that the rule was submitted to Congress.

The CRA had not been widely used prior to the Trump administration and the Democrats had widely criticized President Trump's prior use of the CRA to rescind Obama-era regulations.  As such, there had been some uncertainty as to whether the Democrats would embrace this tool in light of their prior opposition and hostility to the use of the CRA by many environmental groups.  However, with this joint resolution and another March 23rd CRA resolution to disapprove of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s conciliation rule, the CRA floodgates may have opened.  The resulting deluge will likely be of short duration, however, as the window for CRA disapprovals for Trump-era actions is expected to close on April 4th

EPA Finalizes Revised Cross-State Air Pollution Rule Update: Emissions Reductions Required at Certain Power Plants Beginning in May

Torrence_jpgBy Allison A. Torrence

Pexels-pixabay-257775On March 15, 2021, EPA finalized the Revised Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (“CSAPR”) Update for the 2008 ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standards (“NAAQS”). This final rule is issued pursuant to the “good neighbor provision” of the Clean Air Act and in response to  the D.C. Circuit’s remand of the previous version of the CSAPR Update in Wisconsin v. EPA on September 13, 2019. The previous version of the CSAPR Update was issued in October 2016, and was found to be unlawful because it allowed certain states to continue their significant contributions to downwind ozone problems beyond the statutory dates by which the downwind states were required to be in compliance with the NAAQS. The Revised CSAPR Update attempts to address the deficiencies identified by the D.C. Circuit.

Beginning in the 2021 ozone season (the ozone season is May 1 through September 30), the Revised CSAPR Update will require additional emissions reductions of nitrogen oxides (“NOX”) from power plants in 12 states: Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and West Virginia. EPA determined that additional emissions reductions were necessary in these 12 states because projected 2021 ozone season NOX emissions from these states were found to significantly contribute to downwind states’ nonattainment and/or maintenance problems for the 2008 ozone NAAQS. NOX is an ozone precursor, which can react with other ozone precursors in the atmosphere to create ground-level ozone pollution (a/k/a smog). These pollutants can travel great distances, often crossing state lines and making it difficult for downwind states to meet or maintain the ozone NAAQS.

Continue reading "EPA Finalizes Revised Cross-State Air Pollution Rule Update: Emissions Reductions Required at Certain Power Plants Beginning in May" »


10th Circuit Lifts Injunction in Colorado Challenge of Trump Waters of the United States Rule

Torrence_jpgBy Allison A. Torrence

Pexels-omer-havivi-4084714On March 2, 2021, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a ruling from the United States District Court for the District of Colorado in the case of Colorado v. EPA, et al., Nos. 20-1238, 20-1262, and 20-1263, that had issued a preliminary injunction blocking implementation of the Trump Administration’s Navigable Waters Protection Rule (“NWPR”) in the State of Colorado. Under the Tenth Circuit ruling, the NWPR was put back into force, and the State of Colorado’s case was remanded back to district court for further proceedings challenging the rule.

The NWPR is the latest attempt by EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers to define “Waters of the United States” and thereby define the jurisdiction of the Clean Water Act. The agencies have been grappling with this definition for nearly 50 years, and have faced nearly constant legal challenges along the way. In 2017, the Trump Administration rescinded the definition that had been promulgated under the Obama Administration, and in 2020, offered up its own definition in the NWPR. The NWPR narrows the definition of “Waters of the United States” from past definitions–notably by excluding certain wetlands and ephemeral streams from the definition and thus excluding them from the jurisdiction of the Clean Water Act.

A number of lawsuits were filed challenging the NWPR, including Colorado v.  EPA. The Colorado case was significant because Colorado sought, and was granted, a preliminary injunction blocking implementation of the NWPR in the State of Colorado. The State had argued that by reducing the reach of the Clean Water Act, the NWPR caused irreparable injury to the State because Colorado would be forced to undertake additional enforcement actions in place of the federal government to protect the quality of its waterways. While the district court had found this to be sufficient injury to support the State’s preliminary injunction, the Tenth Circuit found that it was too speculative and uncertain. Thus, the preliminary injunction was rejected and reversed because the State of Colorado could not show irreparable injury. Notably, the Tenth Circuit did not address the merits of the State’s challenge to the NWPR.

Additionally, prior to the Tenth Circuit’s ruling, EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers had requested the court hold the appeal in abeyance for 60 days in light of the new leadership at the agencies following the election of President Biden. The court denied the request and issued its ruling lifting the preliminary injunction the following day. The Biden Administration has indicated it is reviewing the NWPR and may want to make changes to broaden the definition of “Waters of the United States” once again. If that is the case, the agencies may look to settle the Colorado case and other similar litigation with a promise of changes to come. The Corporate Environmental Lawyer Blog will monitor and report on these matters as they develop.

Biden Administration Takes New Action to Ensure Increased Consideration of Climate Change Impacts by the Federal Government

HeadshotBy Matthew G. Lawson CEQ


On Friday, February 19, 2021, the Council on Environmental Quality (“CEQ”) rescinded prior draft guidance issued under the Trump Administration in 2019 (the “2019 Draft CEQ Guidance”), which had limited the degree to which federal agencies needed to consider and quantify climate change impacts under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).  The rescission of the 2019 Draft CEQ Guidance is the latest step by the federal government to implement President Biden’s Executive Order 13990, which was signed on President Biden’s first day in office (the “Day 1 EO”).  In addition to directing CEQ to rescind its prior guidance, President Biden’s Day 1 EO set forth numerous directives implementing the administration’s new climate change policy, including an order reinstating the Interagency Working Group (IWG) and directing the IWG to develop an updated “Social Cost of Carbon” (“SCC”) valuation to  better quantify the economic harms associated with the emission of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gasses (“GHGs”).  Under the Day 1 EO, the IWG was directed to publish its new interim SCC value within 30 days of the Order and publish a final SCC value by January 2022.  Together, the Day 1 EO’s rescission of the 2019 Draft CEQ Guidance and reinstatement of the IWG signal a clear intent from the Biden Administration to significantly increase the degree to which federal agencies must consider and account for climate change impacts when enacting future regulation or taking other agency actions.

Background

The origins of the SCC metric can be traced back to President Clinton’s 1993 Executive Order 12866, which required that federal agencies, to the extent permitted by law, “assess both the costs and the benefits of [their] intended regulation and…propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its costs.”  Compliance with Executive Order 12866 poses a unique challenge for federal agencies where a proposed regulation is expected to cause a significant increase or decrease of carbon dioxide or other GHG emissions, as the benefits or costs associated with these emissions cannot easily be quantified or compared to other metrics used in the agency’s cost-benefit analysis.

Continue reading "Biden Administration Takes New Action to Ensure Increased Consideration of Climate Change Impacts by the Federal Government " »

Biden Administration Confirms COVID-19 Liability Protections for Federal Contractors, Employees and Volunteers

Sigel

By Gabrielle Sigel, Co-Chair, Environmental and Workplace Health and Safety Law Practice

Covid-19

On February 16, 2021, Acting Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services (“HHS”) Norris Cochran, published in the Federal Register the Sixth Amendment to the Declaration Under the Public Readiness and Emergency Act [“PREP Act”].  86 Fed. Reg. 9516-9520 (Feb. 16, 2021).  This is the second amendment to the Declaration issued since President Biden took office and continues the Trump Administration’s practice of providing broad liability protection for those responding to COVID‑19.

The Declaration originally was issued on January 31, 2020, by former HHS Secretary Azar.  Pursuant to the PREP Act, the Declaration allows the Secretary to extend liability immunity to “covered persons” for taking allowed actions with respect to “covered countermeasures,” in prescribed circumstances, all as declared by the Secretary.  A “covered person” is “immune from suit and liability under Federal and State law for all claims of loss caused by, arising out of, relating to, or resulting from the administration or use of a covered countermeasure,” which includes FDA-authorized COVID‑19 vaccines and tests.  See 42 U.S.C. § 247d‑6d(a)(1).  Under the PREP Act, “covered persons” include “manufacturers,” distributors,” “program planners,” “qualified persons,” and their “officials, agents and employees.”  42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(i)(2). 

In the Sixth Amendment to the Declaration, the Acting Secretary augmented the “covered persons” protected from liability with an additional category of “qualified persons.”  Although the Unites States is, by statute, a “covered person,” the structure of the statutory provision defining “covered person” does not make clear that direct contractors and employees of the United States are similarly covered.  See 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(i)(2).  To clear up that ambiguity, the Sixth Amendment provides that a “qualified person” includes “any Federal government employee, contractor or volunteer who prescribes, administers, delivers, distributes or dispenses a Covered Countermeasure,” if the federal department or agency “has authorized or could authorize” that person “even if those authorized duties or responsibilities ordinarily would not extend to members of the public or otherwise would be more limited in scope than the activities such employees, contractors or volunteers are authorized to carry out under this declaration.”  86 Fed. Reg. at 9519 (Feb. 16, 2021).

This expanded liability protection is fully consistent with and will support President Biden’s National Strategy for the COVID‑19 Response and Pandemic Preparedness, which envisions federal vaccination sites and “deploy[ing] thousands of federal staff, contractors and volunteers to support state and local vaccination efforts.”  See National Strategy, pp. 9, 52.


OSHA Issues Proposed Update to Hazard Communication Standard

HeadshotBy Matthew G. Lawson Osha

On February 5, 2021, the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) issued a proposed rule updating its Hazard Communication (“Haz Com”) Standard to align its rules with those in the seventh version of the United Nation’s Globally Harmonized System of Classification and Labeling of Chemicals (GHS), published in 2017.  OSHA’s proposed regulatory update is being issued as the United States’ major international trading partners, including Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and those in Europe, similarly prepare to align their own hazard communications rules with the seventh version of the GHS.

Originally established in 1983, OSHA’s Haz Com Standard provides a systematized approach to communicating workplace hazards associated with exposure to hazardous chemicals.  Under the Haz Com Standard, chemical manufacturers and/or importers are required to classify the hazards of chemicals which they produce or import into the United States, and all employers are required to provide information to their employees about the hazardous chemicals to which they are exposed, by means of a hazard communication program, labels and other forms of warning, safety data sheets, and information and training.  At an international level, the GHS provides a universally harmonized approach to classifying chemicals and communicating hazard information.  Core tenants of the GHS include universal standards for hazard testing criteria, warning pictograms, and safety data sheets for hazardous chemicals.

In a pre-published version of the proposed rule, OSHA’s proposed modifications to the Haz Com Standard include codifying enforcement policies currently in OSHA’s compliance directive, clarifying requirements related to the transport of hazardous chemicals, adding alternative labeling provisions for small containers and adopting new requirements related to preparation of Safety Data Sheets.  Key modifications included in the proposed rule, include:

  • New flexibility for labeling bulk shipments of hazardous chemicals, including allowing labels to be placed on the immediate container or transmitted with shipping papers, bills of lading, or by other technological or electronic means that are immediately available to workers in printed form on the receiving end of the shipment;
  • New alternative labeling options where a manufacturer or importer can demonstrate that it is not feasible to use traditional pull-out labels, fold-back labels, or tags containing the full label information normally required under the Haz Com Standard, including specific alternative requirements for containers less than or equal to 100ml capacity and for containers less than or equal to 3ml capacity; and
  • New requirements to update the labels on individual containers that have been released for shipment but are awaiting future distribution where the manufacturer, importer or distributer becomes aware of new significant information regarding the hazards of the chemical.  

OSHA last updated its Haz Com Standard in 2012, to align the standard with the then recently published third version of GHS.  In its newly proposed rule, OSHA clarifies that it is “not proposing to change the fundamental structure” of its Haz Com Standard, but instead seeking to “address specific issues that have arisen since the 2012 rulemaking” and to provide better alignment with international trading partners.  According to OSHA, its proposed modifications to the Haz Com Standard “will increase worker protections, and reduce the incidence of chemical-related occupational illnesses and injuries by further improving the information on the labels and Safety Data Sheets for hazardous chemicals.” 

OSHA is currently accepting comments on its proposed rule until April 19, 2021.  Comments may be submitted electronically to Docket No. OSHA-2019-0001at http://www.regulations.gov, which is the Federal e-Rulemaking Portal.

DOJ Rescinds Nine Trump Environmental Policies

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US Department of Justice

 

BSteven M. Siros, Co-Chair, Environmental and Workplace Health & Safety Law Practice

On February 4, 2021, in accordance with President Biden’s Executive Order 13,990 (Protecting Public Health and the Environment and Restoring Science to Tackle the Climate Crisis), DOJ directed its ENRD Section and Deputy Section Chiefs to withdraw nine environmental policies that were put in place by the Trump Administration.  The February 4th memorandum identifies the following nine withdrawn policies:

  1. “Enforcement Principles and Priorities,” January 14, 2021;
  2. “Additional Recommendations on Enforcement Discretion,” January 14, 2021;
  3. “Guidance Regarding Newly Promulgated Rule Restricting Third-Party Payments, 28 C.F.R. § 50.28,” January 13, 2021;
  4. “Equitable Mitigation in Civil Environmental Enforcement Cases,” January 12, 2021;
  5. “Civil Enforcement Discretion in Certain Clean Water Act Matters Involving Prior State Proceedings,” July 27, 2020;
  6. “Supplemental Environmental Projects (“SEPs”) in Civil Settlements with Private Defendants,” March 12, 2020;
  7. “Using Supplemental Environmental Projects (“SEPs”) in Settlements with State and Local Governments,” August 21, 2019;
  8. “Enforcement Principles and Priorities,” March 12, 2018; and
  9. “Settlement Payments to Third Parties in ENRD Cases,” January 9, 2018.

In support of rescission of these policies, DOJ’s Deputy Assistant Attorney General noted that these policies were inconsistent with longstanding DOJ policy and practice and inappropriately impeded DOJ’s exercise of its enforcement discretion.  Two of the more controversial policies rescinded by DOJ’s February 4th memorandum related to the prohibition on the use of supplemental environmental projects (SEPs) in settlement agreements.  Under the Trump Administration, DOJ had argued that the use of SEPS violated the Miscellaneous Receipts Act which requires that monies paid to the Government be deposited into the Treasury so that Congress could decide how the monies would be appropriated.  

DOJ noted that it would continue to assess the matters addressed by the withdrawn policies and might elect to issue new guidance on these matters in the future.  We will continue to track efforts by the Biden Administration the environmental policies of the Trump Administration at the Corporate Environmental Lawyer

U.S. EPA Issues Final Guidance on PFAS SNUR

Linkedin_Steven_Siros_3130 EpaBy Steven M. Siros, Co-Chair, Environmental and Workplace Health and Safety Law Practice

On January 19, 2021, four days after the close of the comment period, U.S. EPA issued its final guidance document to aid in implementation of its Significant New Use Rule (SNUR) for long-chain perfluoroalkyl carboxylate and perfluoroalkyl sulfonate chemical substances (PFAS). Not surprisingly, in light of the short time between the close of comments and issuance of the guidance, the final guidance remained largely unchanged from the draft version. 

In July 2020, U.S. EPA finalized its PFAS SNUR that requires notice and U.S. EPA review before manufacturing and processing for use certain long-chain PFAS that have been phased out in the United States. In addition, articles containing these long-chain PFAS as part of a surface coating cannot be imported into the United States without submission of a Significant New Use Notice (SNUN).

The guidance provides examples of what would and would not be articles subject to the SNUR as well as clarification on what is meant as a “surface coatings.” Although U.S. EPA declined to provide a regulatory definition of “surface coating” in the PFAS SNUR, the guidance indicates that any long-chain PFAS meeting one of the following two criteria would be a surface coating covered by the SNUR:

  • Coating on any surface of an article that is in direct contact with humans or the environment during the article’s normal use or reuse, whether the coating is oriented towards the interior or exterior of the article; or
  • Coating on any internal component, even if facing the interior of the article, if that component is in contact with humans or the environment during the article’s normal use or reuse.

Many environmental groups noted that the “direct contact” standard and the refusal to consider potential exposures associated with the disposal and/or misuse of these articles was contrary to the provisions of the PFAS SNUR and these groups are urging the Biden Administration to revisit the guidance. Because the new guidance is not labeled as “significant”, it did not need to follow the formal notice-and-comment process but this would also arguably allow the incoming Biden administration to quickly rework and issue its own guidance for implementing the PFAS SNUR. 

We will continue to provide updates on efforts by the Biden Administration to implement the PFAS SNUR on the Corporate Environmental Lawyer blog.

DOE Final Rule Seeks to Streamline NEPA Review of LNG Projects

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By Steven M. Siros, Co-Chair, Environmental and Workplace Health and Safety Law Practice

LNG_tanker_ship ela.govThe Trump administration continues its efforts to issue new regulations in advance of January 20, 2021, with the Department of Energy (DOE) issuing a final rule that will exempt certain liquefied natural gas (LNG) projects from National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) review.  The final rule, published in the Federal Register on December 4, updates DOE’s NEPA implementing procedures with respect to authorizations issued under the Natural Gas Act in accordance with the recent revisions to the NEPA regulations as further described below.

According to DOE, the focus of the new rule is to clarify the scope of DOE’s NEPA obligations with respect to LNG projects and more specifically, to eliminate from the scope of DOE’s NEPA review potential environmental effects that the agency has no authority to prevent.  Because DOE’s discretionary authority under Section 3 of the Natural Gas Act is limited to the authorization of exports of natural gas to non-free trade agreement countries, the rule limits the scope of environmental impacts that DOE must consider to the impacts associated with the marine transport of the LNG commencing at the point of export.    

To that end, the final rule revises DOE’s existing Categorical Exclusions (CATEX) to reflect that the only elements of LNG projects subject to NEPA review is the following:

B5.7 Export of natural gas and associated transportation by marine vessel.

Approvals or disapprovals of new authorizations or amendments of existing authorizations to export natural gas under section 3 of the Natural Gas Act and any associated transportation of natural gas by marine vessel.

Based on prior NEPA reviews and technical reports, DOE has determined that the transport of natural gas by marine vessel normally does not pose the potential for significant environmental impacts and therefore qualifies for a CATEX.  As such, the only reason that DOE would be obligated to engage in a NEPA review of a LNG project would be if “extraordinary circumstances” were deemed to be present that could not be mitigated and therefore would preclude DOE's reliance on this CATEX.

The revised CATEX also removes the reference to import authorizations from CATEX B5.7 because DOE has no discretion with respect to such approvals.  Finally, the final rule also removes and reserves CATEX B5.8 and classes of actions C13, D8, D9 because these actions are outside of the scope of DOE’s authority or are covered by the revised CATEX B5.7.

Interestingly, although the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has responsibility for approving the construction of LNG export terminals, it has previously declined to analyze the greenhouse emissions associated with such projects, noting that DOE is the appropriate agency to consider such impacts.  However, with DOE now concluding that these projects are categorically excluded from such reviews, it remains to be seen if FERC will reconsider its approach to these operations.

The final rule is scheduled to take effect on January 4, 2021 and it remains to be seen what if any action a new Biden administration might take in response to this rule.  Assuming that the Republicans retain control of the Congress, DOE would be required to go through the formal withdrawal process.  Alternatively, if the Democrats take control of the Senate, the regulation could be repealed pursuant to the Congressional Review Act. 

We will continue to track the Trump administration’s ongoing effort to finalize regulations in advance of January 20th as well as efforts by any new administration to rollback these regulations on the Corporate Environmental Lawyer.

EPA Extends CDR Reporting Deadline

Linkedin_Steven_Siros_3130By Steven M. Siros Feds plan new guidelines on toxic algae in lakes, rivers | wgvu

The chemical industry has received some relief from a November 30th deadline to submit information to U.S. EPA pursuant to the Chemical Data Reporting Rule (“CDR”).  Section 8(a) of the Toxic Substances Control Act (“TSCA”) authorizes U.S. EPA to promulgate rules pursuant to which manufacturers and processors of chemical substances must maintain records and submit information to U.S. EPA.  To that end, U.S. EPA promulgated the CDR that requires entities that manufacture certain chemicals listed on the TSCA inventory in excess of 25,000 pounds annually (lower thresholds apply for certain listed chemicals) to report basic production information to U.S. EPA every four years.  The 2020 reporting deadline had been November 30, 2020.

U.S. EPA recently revised the CDR to comply with the 2016 TSCA amendments.  These revisions were intended to improve the reliability and usefulness of the data collected and reduce the overall reporting burden on regulated entities.  For example, the revised rule allows for the use of data and processing codes based on those already in use by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.  The rule also incorporates exemptions for certain byproducts and amends the requirements to claim that the submitted data constitutes confidential business information (“CBI”) (requiring the upfront substantiation of all CBI claims).    

On October 26th, the American Chemical Council requested a 60-day extension from the November 30th deadline, noting significant technical issues with the electronic CDR submission platform.  Notwithstanding objections from a variety of environmental groups, U.S. EPA has extended the CDR reporting deadline to January 29, 2021.  The extension is good news for the regulated community as it works to compile the substantial information necessary to comply with the CDR requirements. 

We will continue to track and provide updates on the CDR and other reporting obligations for chemical manufacturer on Jenner & Block’s Corporate Environmental Lawyer blog.          

Lawsuit Filed Challenging DOJ’s Policy on Supplemental Environmental Projects

Linkedin_Steven_Siros_3130By Steven M. Siros

On October 8, 2020, the Conservation Law Foundation filed a lawsuit challenging a DOJ policy that barred the use of supplemental environmental projects (SEPs) in federal enforcement settlements with private parties.  SEPs have been used since the 1980s and typically involve a project intended to provide some tangible environmental or public health benefit that could not necessarily be compelled by U.S. EPA. 

DOJ, in a March 12, 2020 memorandum, announced that it was terminating its policy of allowing companies to agree to perform SEPs in exchange for reductions in civil penalties in environmental enforcement settlements.  According to DOJ, the practice of using SEPs in lieu of civil penalties violates the Miscellaneous Receipts Act, a statute that prevents cash from legal settlements being diverted from the Treasury to third parties.  As further described in the March 2020 DOJ memorandum, DOJ claims that the SEPs basically substitute payments to third parties for payments to the Treasury, circumventing Congress’ Constitutional power of the purse. 

The lawsuit claims that DOJ’s conclusion that the use of SEPs violates the Miscellaneous Receipts Act is arbitrary and capricious and otherwise lacks reasoned decision-making.  The lawsuit highlights U.S. EPA’s history of using SEPs and its various guidance documents encouraging the use of SEPs in environmental enforcement matters.  The lawsuit asks that the Court declare that DOJ’s March 2020 memo violates the Administrative Procedures Act, vacate the memo, and enjoin DOJ from implementing or relying on the memo in the future. . 

We will continue to provide updates on this lawsuit as well as other important environmental, health and safety issues on Jenner & Block’s Corporate Environmental Lawyer Blog.

Supreme Court Grants Review on Key Climate Change Case

Headshot

By Matthew G. Lawson

US Supreme CourtOn Friday, October 2, 2020, the United States Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to review of a decision by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals holding that climate change litigation brought against various fossil fuel were not subject to federal court subject matter jurisdiction.  While the Supreme Court’s review is limited to a somewhat narrow, jurisdictional question regarding the ability of an appellate court to review a district court’s order remanding a case to state court, the decision will likely have far reaching impacts on whether the growing number of climate changes cases in the United States will be litigated in state or federal courts. 

As previously discussed by the Corporate Environmental Lawyer, the underlying litigation involves claims asserted in Maryland state court by the City of Baltimore against various fossil-fuel companies for damages associated with Climate Change.  In its complaint, Baltimore asserted claims against the industry for public nuisance, private nuisance, strict liability failure to warn, strict liability design defect, negligent design defect, negligent failure to warn, trespass, and violations of Maryland’s Consumer Protection Act. 

In response, the fossil fuel companies sought to remove the action to federal court.  However, the district court remanded the case back to state court after finding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the asserted claims following the lead of several other district courts that have decided similar issues.  On March 6, 2020, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s remand order.  Importantly, the Fourth Circuit found that its appellate jurisdiction was limited to reviewing the district court’s conclusion that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the Federal-Officer Removal Statute pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) and 28 U.S.C. § 1442 notwithstanding that the fossil fuel companies had raised and the district court ruled on additional arguments in support of the removal petition.  The Fourth Circuit found that it lacked jurisdiction to consider whether the district court should have granted removal to federal court on these alternative grounds. 

With respect to the Federal Officer Removal Statute, the Fourth Circuit rejected the companies’ arguments that the case belonged in federal court because the companies had entered into fuel supply and strategic petroleum reserve agreements with the federal government.  The court concluded that these contractual agreements failed to establish that the companies were “acting under” the direction of a federal officer and were “insufficiently related” to Baltimore’s claims.  On March 31, 2020, the fossil-fuel companies filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, seeking review of the question of whether the statutory provision prescribing the scope of appellate review of remand orders “permits a court of appeals to review any issue encompassed in a district court’s order remanding a removed case to state court…”  The companies argued that the Fourth Circuit had improperly ignored several alternative grounds justifying removal of the case to federal court, including that federal common law governs claims of interstate air pollution.

While the Supreme Court’s review of the case will be limited to the appellate jurisdictional question, the decision will undoubtedly influence the growing trend of climate change litigation.  At present, twenty-one U.S. States and numerous municipalities have brought lawsuits in state court against the fossil fuel industry for damages related to climate change.  In nearly all such cases, the industry has sought to remove the case to federal court where it is believed the companies have a better chance of successfully securing dismissals on the grounds that such claims are preempted by the Clean Air Act and/or addresses a “political question” which is better left to the discretion of Congress.  Thus, the Supreme Court’s decision will likely impact the ability of the fossil fuel industry to seek appellate review of unfavorable district court remand orders.  

U.S. EPA Issues New Rule on EPA Guidance Documents

Linkedin_Steven_Siros_3130By Steven M. Siros

Epa logoOn September 14, 2020, the United States Environmental Protection Agency (“U.S. EPA”) issued a final rule intended to promote transparency and establish consistent requirements and procedures for the issuance of guidance documents. Consistent with Executive Order 13891 (Promoting the Rule of Law Through Improved Agency Guidance Documents) that directs federal agencies to finalize regulations that “set forth processes and procedures for issuance of guidance documents,” U.S. EPA’s final rule establishes internal policies and procedures for U.S. EPA’s issuance of future guidance documents and codifies the requirement that U.S. EPA maintain an internet portal that identifies all effective, active U.S. EPA guidance documents.

Under this new regulation, all active “guidance documents” shall appear on the U.S. EPA Guidance Portal. The regulation defines a “guidance document” as “an Agency statement of general applicability, intended to have future effect on behavior of regulated parties, that sets forth a policy on a statutory, regulatory, or technical issues, or an interpretation of a statute or regulation.” Any guidance document that is not posted to the Guidance Portal is not an active U.S. EPA guidance document and will have no effect except to establish historical facts. However, it is important to note the Guidance Portal is only intended to identify documents meeting the definition of “guidance documents,” and documents falling outside of this definition that are not posted to the Guidance Portal may still be in effect. 

The new regulation also provides for public notice and comment for “significant guidance documents,” defined as guidance documents determined to be “significant” pursuant to Executive Order 12866 and Executive Order 13891 and includes guidance documents that would have an annual effect on the economy in excess of $100 million or that raise novel legal or policy issues. The regulation provides that U.S. EPA would seek a significance determination from the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs pursuant to Executive Order 12866. 

Finally, the new regulations establish procedures to allow the public to petition U.S. EPA for modification and/or withdrawal of any active guidance document posted on the Guidance Portal. In addition, in response to comments that the new rule will allow U.S. EPA to quietly rescind previously issued guidance by simply not posting the guidance on the Guidance Portal, the new regulations also establish a formal mechanism to allow the public to request that a rescinded guidance document be reinstated and added to the Guidance Portal.


OEHHA Proposes Additional Safe Harbor Levels for Cooked or Heat-Processed Foods Containing Proposition 65 Chemicals

Lawson HeadshotBy Matthew G. Lawson

OEHHA California Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment home page

On Tuesday, August 4, 2020, the California Environmental Protection Agency Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment (OEHHA) issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to adopt amendments to the regulations implementing the Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986 (“Proposition 65”).  Specifically, OEHHA is proposing to amend Title 27 of the California Code of Regulations, by adopting a new Section 25505, to address listed chemicals formed by cooking or heat processing foods.  The proposed amendments, if adopted, would provide new, specific “safe harbor” levels for Proposition 65 listed chemicals that are caused by cooking or heat processing in certain food groups.  Manufacturers and sellers of these food products in California could then rely on these levels to demonstrate that their products do not require a consumer warning label under Proposition 65.

In general, Proposition 65 requires that parties manufacturing, distributing, or selling consumer products in California provide a “clear and reasonable warning” to the consumer whenever their product may expose the purchaser to a chemical that OEHHA has identified and listed as a carcinogen or reproductive toxin, unless an exception applies.  A key exemption to Proposition 65’s warning requirements includes where a consumer product will not exposure a consumer to a listed chemical in quantities above certain OEHHA-designated Safe Harbor Levels.  Safe Harbor Levels, which include No Significant Risk Levels (NSRLs) for cancer-causing chemicals and Maximum Allowable Dose Levels (MADLs) for chemicals causing reproductive toxicity, have been established for many of the chemicals listed under Proposition 65 and represent the maximum level of exposure to a chemical that has been deemed “safe” by OEHHA.  Products that expose consumers to chemicals at or below a designated Safe Harbor Level are not required to provide a warning label or otherwise warn consumers about potential exposure to the listed chemical in their product.  Critically, Proposition 65’s warning requirements are almost entirely forced through litigation brought by private party plaintiffs.  In 2018 alone, defendants paid over $35 million in settlements to private party plaintiffs, with over 75% going to attorneys’ fees.

Of particular significance to OEHHA’s proposed regulatory amendment is the Proposition 65 listed chemical acrylamide, which can often form in certain plant-based foods during high-temperature cooking processes, such as frying, roasting, or baking.  Acrylamide was first added as a Proposition 65 listed chemical in 1990 after studies showed it had the potential to produce cancer in laboratory mice.  Acrylamide was additionally listed as a reproductive toxin in February 2011, when OEHHA determined that the chemical could cause reproductive effects in mice.  Despite the relatively long period of time Acrylamide has been listed as a Proposition 65 regulated chemical, private party enforcement actions over the chemical have spiked heavily in recent years.  In response, on October 7, 2019, the California Chamber of Commerce filed suit in federal court against the California Attorney General, Xavier Becerra, seeking to block enforcement of Proposition 65’s warning requirements for foods containing acrylamide as the result of the normal cooking process.  The Chamber’s complaint alleged that more than 461 companies have received Proposition 65 notice of violations “in connection with alleged exposures to acrylamide in their food products over the past three years.”  The complaint further noted that the creation of acrylamide is an unavoidable effect of cooking many plant-based foods and that “there is a lack of reliable scientific evidence suggesting a causal relationship between acrylamide in food products and cancer risk in humans.” 

OEHHA’s proposed regulatory amendment appears aimed at addressing the specific concerns asserted in the Chamber of Commerce litigation.  In its Statement of Reasons for the proposed amendments, OEHHA acknowledge that the regulatory amendment was needed because “some degree of formation of listed chemicals in many foods is unavoidable when the foods are cooked or otherwise processed with heat.”  In addition, OEHHA noted that the agency would consider adding additional food groups to the proposed regulations at a later date.

The proposed regulations provide that a Proposition 65 “exposure” does not occur where a listed chemical in a food product “was created by cooking or other heat processing” and “the producer, manufacturer, distributor, or holder of the food has utilized quality control measures that reduce the chemical to the lowest level currently feasible.”  In conjunction with this amendment, the amended regulations provide new Safe Harbor maximum concentration levels for listed chemicals in certain cooked or heated foods that are deemed by OEHHA to be the “lowest level currently feasible.”  Food products containing a listed chemical at or below the listed levels are not required to provide a warning under Proposition 65.  Listed food groups with specific new Safe Harbor Levels covered by the regulation include:

  • Almonds, roasted, roasted almond butter, and chocolate-covered almonds;
  • Bread, wheat and non-wheat-based products including loaves, rolls, buns, and baguettes;
  • Cookies, including animal crackers, thin and crispy cookies, and sandwich wafers;
  • Potatoes and sweet potato products, including french fried potatoes, sliced chips, and other potato products such as hash browns and potato puffs;
  • Prune juice, including made from concentrate and non-concentrate; and
  • Waffles

Notwithstanding the new proposed Safe Harbor Levels, the last sentence in new Section 25505(a) could still result in Proposition 65 claims.  The sentence provides “[i]f a person does not reduce the level of the chemical in a food to the lowest level currently feasible, the resulting exposure must be calculated without regard to the levels set out in subsection (d).”  Although this may not have been the intent of OEHHA, this language could be read to allow a Proposition 65 plaintiff to still claim that a manufacturer failed to utilize control measures that reduce the chemicals to the “lowest level currently feasible” even if below the Safe Harbor Level.  Hopefully OEHHA will clear up this potential ambiguity in any final rule. 

We also note that while the newly proposed amendments may assist many potential defendants, the updated Safe Harbor Levels explicitly will not apply “to parties to an existing court-ordered settlement or final judgment to the extent that such settlement or judgment establishes a concentration of the chemical in a specific product covered in the settlement or judgment.” 

OEHHA is currently accepting written comments concerning its proposed regulatory action and intends to close its comment period no later than October 6, 2020.  At present, OEHHA has not announced an intended final publication date for the proposed regulations, but the agency has noted that it anticipated its regulatory process may be delayed “due to the COVID-19 emergency.”

Virginia Issues First COVID-19 Emergency Workplace Safety and Health Standard

SongSigel

 

By Leah M. Song and Gabrielle Sigel 

Covid-19

 

On July 27, 2020, Virginia became the first state to adopt an emergency workplace safety standard regarding exposure to COVID-19. Virginia is one of the 22 states which has jurisdiction to issue its own workplace safety and health regulations, which must be at least as stringent as regulations issued by U.S. OSHA, but can go beyond federal requirements. The Virginia regulation titled §16 VAC 25‐220, Emergency Temporary Standard, Infectious Disease Prevention: SARS‐CoV‐2 Virus That Causes COVID‑19 (“Emergency Standard”) was adopted during a meeting of the Virginia Safety and Health Codes Board on July 15, 2020. The Emergency Standard will expire “(i) within six months of its effective date, upon expiration of the Governor’s State of Emergency, or when superseded by a permanent standard, whichever occurs first, or (ii) when repealed by the Virginia Safety and Health Codes Board.” The Emergency Standard was available as of July 24, 2020, but will be formally published on July 27, 2020, and its legal effective date is July 27, 2020.

The Emergency Standard shall apply to every employer, employee, and place of employment in Virginia within the jurisdiction of the Virginia Occupational Safety and Health Program (“VOSH”), as described in §§ 16 VAC 25-60-20 and 16 VAC 25-60-30 for both public and private employers.

The “[a]pplication of this [Emergency Standard] to a place of employment will be based on the exposure risk level” (i.e., “very high,” “high,” “medium,” and “lower” of COVID-19 and “related hazards present or job tasks.” The Emergency Standard includes a minimum list of factors to be considered in determining exposure risk level, such as the work environment and employee contact, as well as employer requirements for each exposure risk level.

The Emergency Standard details mandatory requirements for all employers, regardless of exposure risk level, such as:

  • Exposure assessment and determination, notification requirements, and employee access to exposure and medical records
  • Return to work policies and procedures
  • Physical distancing
  • Limited access to common areas
  • Compliance with respiratory protection and personal protective equipment standards
  • Compliance with sanitation and disinfection standards

The Emergency Standard details additional requirements for each exposure risk level designated as “very high,” “high,” and “medium.” For all workplaces other than those with low exposure risk, the employer must develop and implement a written Infectious Disease Preparedness and Response Plan (“IDPR Plan”). The IDPR Plan, employers shall consider contingency plans for outbreaks, identify basic infection prevention measures, and address interaction with outside businesses.

In addition, the Emergency Standard requires that in workplaces in the “very high” and “high” exposure risk levels, the employer shall implement protective measures such as isolation facilities and physical barriers. For the “medium” exposure risk level, the employer shall consider protective measures such as flexible work arrangements and increasing physical distancing.

With regard to face coverings, the Emergency Standard defines “face covering” as not PPE. The Emergency Standard states: “Employee use of face coverings for contact inside six feet of coworkers, customers, or other persons is not an acceptable administrative or work practice control to achieve minimal occupational contact. However, when it is necessary for an employee to have brief contact with others inside the six feet distance a face covering is required.” §16 VAC 25‐220-30. At the “medium” exposure level, employers of "medium" exposure level workplaces are required, “to the extent possible,” to provide and have their employees wear face coverings where it is not feasible to physically distance between employees or in customer-facing jobs for the “medium” exposure level. Face coverings may not be required under certain circumstances, such due to the wearer’s medical condition and religious waivers.

To the extent that an employer actually complies with a recommendation contained in CDC guidelines, and those guidelines provide “equivalent or greater protection than provided by a provision of this [Emergency Standard], the employer’s actions shall be considered in compliance with this [Emergency Standard].” “An employer’s actual compliance with a recommendation contained in CDC guidelines … shall be considered evidence of good faith in any enforcement proceeding related to this [Emergency Standard].”

The Emergency Standard also expressly addressed the notification requirements when there is an employee with a positive COVID-19 case. Employers must notify (a) the building or facility owner if any employee in the building tests positive for COVID-19; (b) the Virginia Department of Health within 24 hours of the discovery of a positive case; and (c) the Virginia Department of Labor and Industry within 24 hours of the discovery of three or more employees who test positive for COVID-19 within a 14-day period.

Additionally, employers are prohibited from using antibody testing to “make decisions about returning employees to work who were previously classified as known or suspected to be infected” with COVID-19.

The Emergency Standard also confirms an employee’s right to “refus[e] to do work or enter a location that the employee feels is unsafe.” Section 16 VAC 25-60-110 provides requirements regarding the “discharge or discipline of an employee who has refused to complete an assigned task because of a reasonable fear of injury or death.” That provision states that such discharge or discipline will be considered retaliatory “only if the employee has sought abatement of the hazard from the employer and the statutory procedures for securing abatement would not have provided timely protection.”

Under Emergency Standard §16 VAC 25‐220‐80, covered employers will have until August 26, 2020, to train employees, covering topics such as the requirements of the Emergency Standard, COVID-19 symptoms and methods of transmission, safe and healthy work practices, and anti-discrimination provisions. It is important to note that training requirements for exposure risk levels “very high,” “high,” and “medium” differ from the less-comprehensive requirements for the “lower” risk level. Under subsection 16 VAC 25‐220‐70, if an employer is required to have an IDPR Plan, the employer must develop and train employees on their IDPR Plan by September 25, 2020.

Training and outreach materials, including training PowerPoints, FAQs, an IDPR Plan template, and an exposure risk level flow chart, are being developed by the VOSH Cooperative Programs Division, with some available here, as of July 24, 2020.

At the federal level, OSHA has come under scrutiny for its decision not to adopt a COVID-19 emergency temporary standard. The American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations’ (“AFL-CIO”) and other unions asked OSHA to issue an Emergency Temporary Standard (“ETS”), rather than have employers rely solely on existing OSHA regulations and new COVID-19 guidance to no avail. On May 18, 2020, the AFL-CIO filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the U.S. Court of Appeals to compel OSHA to issue an ETS within 30 days. However, on June 11, 2020, the court held that “OSHA reasonably determined that an ETS is not necessary at this time” given the “unprecedented nature of the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as the regulatory tools that the OSHA has at its disposal to ensure that employers are maintaining hazard-free work environment.” On June 18, 2020, the AFL-CIO filed for a rehearing en banc. Please see Jenner & Block’s analysis of the AFL-CIO lawsuit here. In addition, the U.S. House of Representatives introduced legislation, titled “The COVID-19 Every Worker Protection Act” (H.R. 6559), which would require OSHA to issue an ETS. The provisions of H.R. 6559, including the provisions relating to the ETS, were included in H.R. 6800, The Heroes Act. H.R, passed by the House on May 15, 2020, and which is set to be part of the upcoming political debates and votes by the House and the Senate on new COVID-19 economic stimulus and related legislation.

Jenner & Block’s Corporate Environmental Lawyer will continue to update on these matters, as well as other important COVID‑19 related guidance, as they unfold.

Lawsuits Challenging EPA’s Temporary Enforcement Discretion Policy for COVID‑19 Pandemic Hit Dead End

Song

By Leah M. Song

Covid-19As an update to our July 1st blog regarding EPA’s notice that its COVID-19 Temporary Enforcement Policy will end on August 31, 2020, there have been some new developments in the lawsuits filed challenging that policy.

On July 8, 2020, Judge McMahon of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York ruled that the Natural Resources Defense Counsel and other environmental organizations (“Plaintiffs”) failed to show that they were injured by EPA’s purported “unreasonable delay” in responding to the petition. The Plaintiffs had petitioned EPA to publish an emergency rule requiring an entity to provide written notice if they were suspending monitoring and reporting because of COVID-19.

The court held that the Plaintiffs failed to establish the standing requirements. The Plaintiffs did not establish that they were “legally entitled to the information they seek” and lacked association standing as well. The Plaintiffs did not demonstrate that they “suffered a sufficiently concrete injury nor that that alleged injury is fairly traceable to EPA’s purported delay in responding to the Petition.”

The court said it was “perfectly obvious that, at the time Plaintiffs brought this lawsuit, the EPA had not ‘unreasonably’ delayed its response to the Petition.” Judge McMahon said that “the real litigation – over the legality of the [Enforcement Policy] itself – is presently being briefed in an action brought by nine State Attorneys General. That is where the action will – and should – take place.” Accordingly, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the EPA.

One day later on July 9, the State Attorneys General indicated that they will drop their lawsuit against EPA given the upcoming Enforcement Policy deadline. “EPA does not intend to extend the [Enforcement] Policy beyond August 31 and, should the policy terminate on (or before) August 31, Plaintiffs currently intend to voluntarily dismiss the Complaint without prejudice.” The parties prepared a “contingent, expedited briefing schedule” should EPA not terminate the Enforcement Policy by that date. This announcement is unlikely to cause Judge McMahon to revisit the summary judgment ruling since this decision doesn’t change that Plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the claims.

Jenner & Block’s Corporate Environmental Lawyer will continue to update on these matters, as well as other important COVID‑19 related guidance, as they unfold.

PFAS SNUR Finalized Without “Safe Harbor” Provisions

Linkedin_Steven_Siros_3130By Steven M. Siros

Epa logoOn June 22, 2020, U.S. EPA issued a final TSCA significant new use rule (SNUR) for long-chain perfluoroalkyl carboxylate (LCPFAC) and perfluoroalkyl sulfonate (PFAS) chemical substances. Specifically, the SNUR designates as a significant new use manufacturing (including importing) or processing of (i) an identified subset of LCPFAC chemical substances for any use that was not ongoing as of December 15, 2015 and (ii) for all other LCPFAC chemical substances for which there were no ongoing uses as of January 21, 2015. 

The SNUR also makes inapplicable the exemption for persons who import LCPFAC chemical substances as part of the surface coating on articles (note that the SNUR narrows the scope of affected articles from all imported articles to only those articles that contain such a substance in a surface coating). The SNUR also makes inapplicable the exemption for persons who import PFAS chemical substances in carpets. Persons subject to this SNUR would be required to provide notification to U.S. EPA prior to manufacturing or importing these chemical substances which notification would trigger U.S. EPA’s TSCA review and evaluation of the intended use. 

The final SNUR did drop two controversial provisions that would have provided a “de minimis” exemption below which notification would not be required and a “safe harbor” provision that would have allowed article importers to avoid enforcement action if they could demonstrate that their use was ongoing prior to the rule’s effective date. 

In response to comments submitted on the proposed “safe harbor” provisions, U.S EPA noted that “[a] safe harbor approach undermines the regulatory process for what uses are allowed by permitting a manufacturer to claim a use was ongoing at the time the SNUR was issued” especially since manufacturers and/or importers were put on notice of the proposed SNUR five years ago. 

With respect to the proposed “de minimis” threshold for articles before the notification requirements would kick in, U.S. EPA  noted while it was not establishing a de minimis threshold in the final rule, U.S. EPA stated that it “will, however, continue to engage with interested stakeholders on this issue and continue to consider whether guidance for applying this standard may be appropriate in the future, whether as a general matter or, for instance, as applied to specific categories of substances or potential exposures.”

The SNUR will take effect 60 days after official publication in the Federal Register. 


U.S. Court of Appeals Denies AFL-CIO’s Petition for OSHA COVID-19 Emergency Temporary Standard

SongSigel

 

By Leah M. Song and Gabrielle Sigel 

Covid-19

 

On June 11, 2020, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit denied the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations’ (“AFL-CIO”) petition for a writ of mandamus to compel OSHA to issue an Emergency Temporary Standard for Infectious Diseases (“ETS”), providing regulations to protect workers against coronavirus exposure in the workplace.

The three-judge panel, consisting of Judges Henderson, Wilkins, and Rao, found that “OSHA reasonably determined that an ETS is not necessary at this time” given the “unprecedented nature of the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as the regulatory tools that the OSHA has at its disposal to ensure that employers are maintaining hazard-free work environments, see 29 U.S.C. § 654(a).” The statutory section referenced by the court, includes the General Duty Clause of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (“the OSH Act”), which states that each employer “shall furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees.” 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1). The statute also requires that each employer shall “comply with occupational safety and health standards promulgated under this Act.” 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(2). The panel held that “OSHA’s decision not to issue an ETS is entitled to considerable deference.”

Following the Court’s ruling, Solicitor of Labor Kate O’Scannlain and OSHA Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Loren Sweatt stated in a news release: “We are pleased with the decision from the D.C. Circuit, which agreed that OSHA reasonably determined that its existing statutory and regulatory tools are protecting America’s workers and that an emergency temporary standard is not necessary at this time. OSHA will continue to enforce the law and offer guidance to employers and employees to keep America’s workplaces safe.” The ALF-CIO has the right to ask for a rehearing, including en banc, i.e., by all the judges appointed to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.

The lawsuit grew out of written requests that the AFL-CIO and more than 20 unions, including unions for healthcare workers, sent to OSHA in early March.  They asked OSHA to issue an ETS, rather than have employers rely solely on existing OSHA regulations and new COVID-19 guidance.  They requested an ETS that would include a requirement that all employers devise and implement an infection control plan and implement the necessary controls. After the AFL-CIO sent a letter on April 28, 2020, to the Secretary of Labor calling on the agency “to take immediate action to protect the safety and health of workers from exposure to COVID-19 on the job,” the Secretary responded two days later and stated that an ETS was not necessary.

On May 18, 2020, the AFL-CIO filed its petition for a writ of mandamus in the U.S. Court of Appeals to compel OSHA to issue an ETS within 30 days. The petition was based on Section 6(c) of the OSH Act, which states that OSHA “shall provide…for an emergency temporary standard to take immediate effect upon publication in the Federal Register if [it] determines (A) that employees are exposed to grave danger from exposure to substances or agents determined to be toxic or physically harmful or from new hazards, and (B) that such emergency standard is necessary to protect employees from such danger.” 29 U.S.C. § 655(c)(1). The AFL-CIO argued in its court petition that the COVID-19 pandemic is “exactly the type of workplace catastrophe that Congress intended an emergency temporary standard to address.” Given the risks facing essential workers and those returning to work, the AFL-CIO requested an expedited briefing and disposition of the petition and for OSHA to be given 10 days to respond.

On May 29, 2020, OSHA filed its response to the AFL-CIO’s petition, describing its efforts to protect workers during the pandemic through enforcing “existing rules and statutory requirements” and providing “rapid, flexible guidance.” OSHA emphasized the extreme nature of an ETS and how an ETS is rarely used as it “imposes a mandatory standard immediately without public input” and “stays in place…until a permanent rule informed by comment is put in place just six months later.” OSHA argued that 1) the AFL-CIO failed to demonstrate legal standing to bring the petition for a writ of mandamus; 2) an ETS is not “necessary” given OSHA’s existing specific rules, the general duty clause and would otherwise be counterproductive to OSHA’s COVID-19 efforts; and 3) “an ETS would foreclose ongoing policy assessments by the executive branch, Congress, and the states.” The National Association of Home Builders of the United States and other business associations filed amicus curiae briefs in support of OSHA’s position.

On June 2, 2020, the AFL-CIO filed its reply brief  defending its legal standing to bring the case based on its representation of workers in highly impacted industries and that at least 660 of its members have died as a result of COVID-19. The AFL-CIO continued to stress that an ETS is necessary given the “urgent situation” and “grave danger” that COVID-19 presents. Additionally, the AFL-CIO stated that “Congress required OSHA to issue standards despite inevitable scientific uncertainty,” and an ETS does provide flexibility navigating new scientific information since “an ETS can be issued and modified without notice and comment.” The AFL-CIO clarified that the OSH Act requires the agency to issue an ETS, “not that it requires a static, uniform, or all-encompassing ETS.”

In denying AFL-CIO’s petition, the court did not address OSHA’s standing argument, ruling solely on the substance of AFL-CIO’s petition.

Of note, OSHA regulations do not have direct application to the 22 states who have their own state occupational safety and health agencies and regulations governing private employers. One of those “state plan states” is California.  On May 20, 2020, the Labor & Employment Committee of the National Lawyers Guild and Worksafe, a California nonprofit “dedicated to ensuring occupational safety and health rights of vulnerable workers,” filed a petition for a temporary emergency standard before the California Occupational Safety & Health Standards Board (“the Board”). The petitioners requested that the Board create two new California safety regulations. First, the petitioners requested “a temporary emergency standard that would provide specific protections to California employees who may have exposure to COVID-19, but are not protected by the Aerosol Transmissible Diseases standards (Sections 5199 and 5199.1).” The petitioners recommended that the Board consider their draft emergency temporary standard for the Board’s consideration of language for an emergency standard. The petitioners’ draft parallels the framework of the Injury and Illness Prevention Program, but adding COVID-19 related provisions, such as identifying an employee representative, establishing various procedures, and analyzing job hazards and implementing preventative measures. Second, the petitioners requested that the Board enter into “a permanent rulemaking effort to protect workers from infectious diseases including novel pathogens,” such as COVID-19. As of June 11, 2020, the Board has not yet issued its decision on the petition.

Please feel free to contact the authors with questions or for further information. For regular updates about the impact of COVID‑19 in the workplace and on business generally, please visit Jenner & Block’s Corporate Environmental Lawyer blog and Jenner & Block’s COVID‑19 Resource Center.

The Ninth Circuit Sends Climate Change Cases Back to State Court

Song

By Leah M. Song

EarthOn May 26, 2020, the Ninth Circuit agreed with plaintiffs that two climate change lawsuits—County of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp. et al. and City of Oakland v. BP p.l.c. et al.—had been improperly removed to the federal courts, continuing courts’ recent trend of remanding these types of cases back to state court.

A growing form of climate change litigation in the United States consists of lawsuits filed by states or municipalities against private industry, and more specifically, the fossil-fuel industry. States, cities and other units of local government have filed lawsuits alleging state common law theories, including nuisance, trespass, failure to warn of the known impacts of climate change, and unjust enrichment. The outcome of these cases thus far has hinged on whether or not the fossil fuel companies are able to successfully remove the litigation to federal court where they stand a much greater chance of getting the litigation dismissed. Generally, plaintiffs (including states, units of local government, and non-governmental organizations) asserting climate change claims against corporations prefer to be in state court where they can take advantage of perceived plaintiff-friendly common law or state statutes. On the other hand, defendants inevitably seek to remove such cases to federal court where they have had a higher level of success securing dismissals on the grounds that the issue is preempted by the Clean Air Act and/or addresses a “political question” which is better left to the discretion of Congress. See City of N.Y. v. BP P.L.C.. 325 F. Supp. 3d 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).

In County of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp. et al., six California municipalities and counties sued more than 30 fossil-fuel companies in California state court. The plaintiffs brought a variety of claims under state common law including nuisance, negligence, failure to warn, and trespass. In City of Oakland v. BP p.l.c. et al., the Cities of Oakland and San Francisco sued five fossil-fuel companies in state court under a theory of nuisance. The fossil-fuel companies removed both cases to federal court. The San Mateo district court remanded the case back to state court while the Oakland district court refused to remand the case back to state court, finding that plaintiffs’ public nuisance claims were governed by federal common law, but then proceeding to dismiss the lawsuit. Both cases were appealed to the Ninth Circuit.

On May 26th, the Ninth Circuit joined the Fourth Circuit (Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. BP P.L.C., et al., No. 19-1644 (4th Cir. Mar. 6, 2020)) in concluding that these climate change cases alleging only state-common law claim belonged in state court. In County of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp. et al., the Ninth Circuit emphasized its limited authority to review an order remanding a case back to state court under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). The Ninth Circuit therefore limited its review to determining whether the district court erred in holding that the federal court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the federal-officer removal statute.

In order to determine whether the district court erred in holding that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit examined whether the companies were “acting under” a federal officer’s directions. The companies argued that they were “persons acting under” a federal officer based on several agreements with the government. However, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the companies’ activities under these agreements did not give rise to a relationship where they were “acting under” a federal officer. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit court held that the fossil fuel companies failed to meet their burden for federal-officer removal and therefore affirmed the district court’s remand order.

In City of Oakland v. BP p.l.c. et al., the Ninth Circuit considered whether “the district court erred in determining that it had federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331” and ultimately held that plaintiffs’ state common-law public nuisance claims did not arise under federal common law. The court acknowledged that there are exceptions to the well-pleaded complaint rule for claims that arise under federal law, but concluded that none of those exceptions applied here.

The court reasoned that “[t]he question whether the Energy Companies can be held liable for public nuisance based on production and promotion of the use of fossil fuels and be required to spend billions of dollars on abatement is no doubt an important policy question, but it does not raise a substantial question of federal law for the purpose of determining whether there is jurisdiction under § 1331.” Furthermore, evaluation of the public nuisance claim would require factual determinations which are “not the type of claim for which federal-question lies.” The fossil fuel companies argued that the plaintiffs’ public nuisance claim was completely preempted by the Clean Air Act, but the court was not persuaded.

In response to defendants’ argument that by amending their complaint to assert a federal common law claim, the district court properly had subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the Ninth Circuit noted that plaintiffs only amended their complaint in response to the district court’s statements that plaintiffs’ claims were governed by federal common law. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit noted that since a party violates § 1441(a) “if it removes a cases that is not fit for federal adjudication, a district court must remand the case to state court, even if subsequent action conferred subject-matter jurisdiction on the district court.”

Notwithstanding these conclusions, the Ninth Circuit noted that the district court had not addressed alternative bases for removal raised by defendants and therefore remanded the case back to the district court. However, the Ninth Circuit specifically noted that if the district court concludes that there are no valid bases for federal jurisdiction, the case should be remanded back to state court.

Although these rulings did not address the merits of plaintiffs’ common-law claims, these cases will certainly pose challenges for defendants seeking to remove these types of cases to federal court, and will likely affect plaintiffs’ and defendants’ strategies in climate change litigation moving forward. Jenner & Block’s Corporate Environmental Lawyer will continue to update on those matters, as well as other important climate change litigation cases, as they unfold.

 

New Executive Order Presses Agencies to Continue to Seek Regulatory Flexibility in Response to the Covid-19 Pandemic

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By Leah M. Song

Covid-19On May 19, 2020, the President issued an executive order titled “Regulatory Relief to Support Economic Recovery” (“Executive Order”). The Executive Order seeks to “overcome the effects the virus has had on [the] economy”  and to that end, directs agencies and executive departments to "continue to remove barriers to the greatest engine ever known: the innovation, initiative and drive of the American people."  To do so, executive departments and agencies are encouraged and directed to take appropriate action.

The Executive Order directs agencies to respond to the economic consequences of COVID‑19 by “rescinding, modifying, waiving, or providing exemptions from regulations and other requirements that may inhibit economic recovery.”  Agencies are directed, "to use, to the fullest extent possible and consistent with applicable law, any emergency authorities” to support the economic response to COVID-19. Agencies are charged with identifying “regulatory standards that may inhibit economic recovery” and take appropriate action to promote job creation and economic growth. This includes issuing proposed rules, exempting persons or entities from requirements, exercising appropriate temporary enforcement discretion or temporary time extensions.

The Executive Order further instructs agencies to provide compliance assistance for regulated entities and to “accelerate procedures by which a regulated person or entity may receive a pre-enforcement ruling.” Agencies should consider enforcement discretion policies for those that “have attempted in reasonable good faith to comply with applicable statutory and regulatory standards.” Additionally, the Executive Order emphasized that agencies should “consider the principles of fairness” and “revise their procedures and practices in light of them.” The Executive Order recommends that agencies review regulatory standards and “determine which, if any, would promote economic recovery if made permanent.”

Consistent with this Executive Order, the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) has previously issued a COVID-19-related policy regarding EPA's decision to exercise enforcement discretion with respect to non-compliance with certain environmental requirements (this enforcement policy was the subject of a prior Corporate Environmental blog).  Although EPA's enforcement discretion policy has been challenged by several states and environmental organizations, the Executive Order would seem to diminish the likelihood that EPA will rescind its enforcement discretion policy in the near term. 

Please feel free to contact the author with questions or for further information. For regular updates about the impact of COVID‑19 in the workplace and on business generally, please visit Jenner & Block’s Corporate Environmental Lawyer blog and Jenner & Block’s COVID‑19 Resource Center.


U.S. EPA Extends Comment Period on PFAS Safe Drinking Water Act Regulatory Determination to June 10, 2020

Linkedin_Steven_Siros_3130By Steven M. Siros

Epa logoAs discussed in more detail in a previous blog, on February 20, 2020, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“U.S. EPA”) announced that it was seeking public comments on its preliminary regulatory determination that seeks to implement regulatory limits for Per- and Polyfluoroalkyl Substances (PFAS) in public drinking water across the United States.  The regulatory determination is a key step in the creation of a Maximum Contamination Level (“MCL”) that will act to limit the quantity of PFAS permitted in public drinking water. 

In its preliminary regulatory determination, U.S. EPA proposes setting MCL levels for two PFAS substances, perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA) and perfluorooctane sulfonate (PFOS), which EPA has determined meet the statutory criteria to become regulated contaminants under the Safe Drinking Water Act.  To meet this criteria, U.S. EPA had to find that: (1) the consumption of PFOS and PFOA may result in adverse health effects; (2) PFOS and PFOA have been identified in public water supplies at frequencies and levels sufficient to cause a public health concern; and (3) that new regulation presents a meaningful opportunity to reduce the health risks posed by PFOS and PFOA.

The Association of Metropolitan Water Agencies and the American Water Works Association (collectively “AMWA”) submitted comments that were supportive of setting an MCL for PFOS and PFOA. In addition to targeting PFOA and PFOS, the AMWA recommended that U. S. EPA also include four other long-chain PFAS compounds in its regulatory determination. AMWA also recommended that U.S. EPA “thoroughly consider state standards and guidelines with significantly lower PFAS levels that [U.S. EPA’s] Health Advisory Level (HAL) of 70 parts per trillion (ppt) for combined concentrations of PFOA and PFOS.”

The AMWA also requested that U.S. EPA extend the comment period an additional 30 days to allow the AMWA to more fully engage with its members and to provide more meaningful and comprehensive comments on the proposal. To that end, U.S. EPA has now agreed to extend the comment period an additional 30 days May 10th to June 10th.

EPA’s Temporary Enforcement Discretion Policy for COVID-19 Pandemic

Song By Leah M. Song and Steven M. SirosLinkedin_Steven_Siros_3130

Covid-19On March 26, 2020, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) announced a temporary policy regarding EPA enforcement of environmental legal obligations during the COVID-19 pandemic. EPA Administrator Andrew Wheeler stated that the “EPA is committed to protecting human health and the environment, but recognizes challenges resulting from efforts to protect workers and the public from COVID-19 may directly impact the ability of regulated facilities to meet all federal regulatory requirements.”

This temporary enforcement discretion policy applies to civil violations during the COVID-19 outbreak. To clarify, the policy does not apply to: a) any criminal violations or conditions of probation in criminal sentences, b) activities that are carried out under Superfund and RCRA Corrective Action enforcement instruments, and c) imports. Additionally, the policy does not relieve any entity from preventing, responding to, or reporting accidental releases.

The temporary policy makes it clear that the EPA expects regulated facilities to comply with regulatory requirements, where reasonably practicable, and to return to compliance as quickly as possible. To be eligible for enforcement discretion, the policy also requires facilities to document decisions made to prevent or mitigate noncompliance and demonstrate how the noncompliance was caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

The policy addresses different categories of noncompliance differently and is broken into the following sections:

 

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